The market for corporate control and CEO compensation: Complements or substitutes

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 701-728

  Cheng, Shijun ^a   Indjejikian, Raffi J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Anti take over laws; CEO compensation; Corporate governance; Performance based incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 76249102979     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/car.26.3.3     Document Type: Article

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