The impact of mandated disclosure on performance-based CEO compensation;L'incidence de l'obligation d'information relative à la rémunération des chefs de la direction en fonction des résultats

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 369-398

  Craighead, Jane A ^a   Magnan, Michel L ^b   Thorne, Linda ^c  

^a Mercer Human Resource Consulting   (United States)

^b Gina Cody School of Engineering and Computer Science   (Canada)

^c YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Disclosure; Executive compensation; Ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042531084     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/BPCX-D3FC-Y8VY-M541     Document Type: Review

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