Active investors and management turnover following unsuccessful control contests

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 239-266

  Denis, David J ^a   Serrano, Jan M ^b  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STEPHEN F AUSTIN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Active investors; Blockholders; Management turnover

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030075541     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(95)00846-7     Document Type: Article

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