Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-23

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Sorger, Gerhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012285320     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2485     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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