Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 367-382

  Sandholm, William H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection.; Evolutionary game theory; Externality pricing; Implementation theory; Potential games

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845578100     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.005     Document Type: Article

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