Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 47-69

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Sandholm, William H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium; Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845589762     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.011     Document Type: Article

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