Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 61-78

  Mattsson, Lars Göran ^a   Weibull, Jörgen W ^b  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

^b Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Control costs; Decision theory; Probabilistic choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036810673     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00014-3     Document Type: Article

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