Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 124, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 45-78

  Morris, Stephen ^a   Ui, Takashi ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YOKOHAMA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Incomplete information; Potential; Refinements; Robustness

Indexed keywords

EID: 23844528068     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009     Document Type: Article

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