Control costs and potential functions for spatial games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 541-561

  Baron, Richard ^a   Durieu, Jacques ^a   Haller, Hans ^b   Solal, Philippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ JEAN MONNET   (France)

^b VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Control Costs; Evolutionary Games; Potentials; Spatial Games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142219346     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820300138     Document Type: Article

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