Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1987, Pages 173-183

  Niemi, R G ^a   Wright, J R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002955982     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: 1432217X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00433943     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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3. Empirical comparisons of voting procedures
4. The paradox of voting: probability calculations
5. Condorcet's paradox
6. Why so much stability: the impact of agency determined stability
7. Equilibrium in spatial voting: the median voter result is an artifact
8. Majority decision-making with partial unidimensionality
9. Why so much stability?: another opinion
10. Single-peakedness and Guttman scales: concept and measurement
11. Ideology, party, and voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980
12. U.S. presidential elections, 1968–1980: a spatial analysis
13. The structure of presidential elections and the process of realignment
14. Voting and the summation of preferences: an intrepretative bibliographic review of selected developments during the last decade
15. The strategy of ambiguity: uncertainty and electoral competition
16. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models
17. Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
18. Why so much stability