Single transferable vote resists strategic voting

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 1991, Pages 341-354

  Bartholdi III, John J ^a   Orlin, James B ^b  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001511919     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: 1432217X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00183045     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games
2. Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
3. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
4. The AMS nominating system is vulnerable to truncation of preferences
5. Alternative voting systems
6. An investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems
7. Single transferable vote: an example of a perverse social choice function
8. Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
9. Paradoxes of preferential voting
10. Manipulation of social choice functions
11. Manipulation of voting schemes
12. Single transferable vote by Meek's method
13. To vote or not to vote: what is the quota?
14. Condorcet's principle implies the no-show paradox
15. The equivalence of strong positive associate and strategy-proofness
16. The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation
17. Probability models in constitutional choice
18. Susceptibility to manipulation
19. On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
20. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions