How hard is it to control an election?

Mathematical and Computer Modelling

Volumn 16, Issue 8-9, 1992, Pages 27-40

  Bartholdi III, John J ^a   Tovey, Craig A ^a   Trick, Michael A ^b  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38249010608     PISSN: 08957177     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0895-7177(92)90085-Y     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Axiomatic social choice theory An overview and interpretation
2. Theories of bounded rationality
3. Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting models
4. Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
5. Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
6. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
7. On the strategic properties of some modern methods of group decision making
8. Voting procedures
9. Path independence rationality and social choice
10. Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
11. The theory of round robin tournaments
12. A new solution set for tournaments and majority voting Further graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of voting
13. New directions in cryptography