Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 47-77

  Acharya, Viral V ^a   Bisin, Alberto ^b  

^a CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 66249132115     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00055.x     Document Type: Article

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