An equilibrium model of asset pricing and moral hazard

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 1253-1303

  Ou Yang, Hui ^a,b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Brain metastases; HRQoL; Stereotactic radiosurgery

Indexed keywords

EID: 27544510174     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhi025     Document Type: Review

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