Managerial risk reduction, incentives and firm value

Economic Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 523-535

  Ozerturk, Saltuk ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Hedging; Liquidity; Managerial compensation; Pay performance sensitivity; Systematic risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 18244373938     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0569-2     Document Type: Article

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