Mutual fund advisory contracts: An empirical investigation

Journal of Finance

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 109-133

  Deli, Daniel N ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042172982     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00417     Document Type: Article

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