Why do Managers Diversify their Firms? Agency Reconsidered

Journal of Finance

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 71-118

  Aggarwal, Rajesh K ^a   Samwick, Andrew A ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142219269     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00519     Document Type: Review

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