Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 149-190

  Magill, Michael ^a   Quinzii, Martine ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Capital market equilibrium; Constrained optimality; Equity; Incentives; Options; Spanning overlap condition; Welfare theorems

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036756404     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00068-X     Document Type: Article

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