Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 87, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-48

  Bisin, Alberto ^a   Gottardi, Piero ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002554415     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2514     Document Type: Article

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