Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 158-209

  Bisin, Alberto ^a   Gottardi, Piero ^b   Rampini, Adriano A ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^c DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 40249096195     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.1.158     Document Type: Article

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