Is imperial rule obsolete?: Assessing the barriers to overseas adventurism

Security Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 79-114

  MacDonald, Paul K ^a  

^a WILLIAMS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60649118829     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410802678080     Document Type: Article

References (344)

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10. For realist critics, see Ivan Eland, "The Empire Strikes Out: The fdNew Imperialism' and Its Fatal Flaws," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 459, 26 November 2002, 6-13
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14. For radical critics, see David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)
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16. Michael Mann, "The First Failed Empire of the 21st Century," Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004): 631
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20. For similar definitions, see Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 30, 31-47.
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22. and Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 124-26.
23. For example, Ignatieff, Empire Lite, 54. Charles Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 24-77.
24. For example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 160-82. David Singh Grewal, "Network Power and Globalization," Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 90.
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28. For example S. N. Eisenstad, The Political System of Empires (New York: Free Press, 1963).
29. Like Miles Kahler, I reject these approaches in preference of a conception of empire as a "dynamic set of relations between societies rather than as a unit exhibiting certain timeless characteristics." See "Empires, Neo-Empires and Political Change," in The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, eds., Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 287.
30. David A. Lake, "The Rise, Fall and Future of the Russian Empire: A Theoretical Interpretation," in End of Empire, eds., Dawisha and Parrott, 33
31. David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in this Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 24-31
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36. Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 23-25.
37. The promise of economic benefit is one of the reasons why poorer states surrender sovereignty to international financial institutions. See Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Empire of Capital (London: Verso, 2003), 143-68.
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48. Coalition personnel were exempt from Iraqi law, while Iraq's security forces remained under the "operational control" of coalition commanders. See GAO, "Iraq's Transitional Law," GAO-04-746R, 25 May 2004, 10.
49. One U.S. official accurately described the situation as one of "limited sovereignty." New York Times, 23 April 2004, A1.
50. Coalition advisors continue to "work closely" with Iraqi cabinet members and ministers, and Iraqi security forces remain heavily dependent on the coalition for supply and support. As of mid-2006, for example, only half of Iraq's army divisions were capable of assuming "primary responsibility" for conducting security operations. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 26 May 2006, 49.
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55. and Simon Chesterman, "Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building," Survival 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2002).
56. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House 1998), 262-88
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58. This often put the United States at odds with the European-led Office of the High Commissioner. See International Crisis Group, "Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery," Report No. 121, 29 November 2001, 2-8.
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61. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 170-90
62. and International Crisis Group, "The New Kosovo Protectorate," Report No. 69, 20 June 1999, 4-5.
63. Kimberly Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia University Press 2004), 119-44.
64. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
65. Mann, "The First Failed Empire," 641. See also John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," International Security 13, no. 2 (Autumn 1988): 55-79.
66. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 14-15.
67. Interview with Los Angeles Times, 29 April 2002.
68. Robert Jervis, "America and the Twentieth Century: Continuity and Change," in The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century", ed. Michael Hogan (New York: Cambridge, 1999), 99-104.
69. Richard F. Grimmett, "International Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: U.S. Policy," CRS Report to Congress, RS20958, October 2006, 3
70. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2005 was nearly $30.2 billion. Agreements with developing nations comprised 66.8 percent of all global agreements. Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005," CRS Report to Congress, RL33696, October 2006, 1. The United States is consistently a leading exporter. Between 1996-98, the United States alone authorized or delivered $3.7 billion in small arms and light weapons to over 150 different nations. GAO, "Conventional Arms Transfers: U.S. Efforts to Control the Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons," GAO/NSIAD-00-141, July 2000, 7
71. Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 2002.
72. BBC News, 26 October 2004; New York Times, 27 October 2004; and GAO, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning," GAO-07-444, March 2007, 3-4.
73. Thomas Homer-Dixon, "The Rise of Complex Terrorism," Foreign Policy no.128, January/February 2002
74. George I. Brown, The Big Bang: A History of Explosives (Sutton Publishing, 2000)
75. and Alfred W. Crosby, Throwing Fire: Projectile Technology through History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
76. Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
77. Clay Wilson, "Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures," CRS Report for Congress RS22330, February 2007, 1.
78. See also International Crisis Group (ICG), "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," Middle East Report No. 50, February 2006, 23
79. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 11-12, 207-8.
80. See Douglas M. Peers, "Introduction," in Warfare and Empires, ed. Douglas M. Peers (Aldershot: Asgate, 1997), xvii-xviii
81. essays in J. A. De Moor and H. L. Wesseling, ed., Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989).
82. Prior to the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War, for example, the Zulu kingdom possessed at least eight thousand firearms. See J. J. Guy, "A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom," Journal of African History 12, no. 4 (1971): 560-61.
83. More generally, see Gavin White, "Firearms in Africa: An Introduction," Journal of African History 12, no. 2 (1971): 173-84.
84. John Pemble, "Resources and Techniques in the Second Maratha War," Historical Journal 19, no. 2 (1976): 379
85. and Bruce P. Lenman, "The Transition to European Military Ascendancy in India, 1600-1800," in Tools of War, ed. John A. Lynn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 119-20.
86. See also Peter Stephen Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 165-72.
87. See Ronald E. Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, eds., Roger Owen and Robert B. Sutcliffe (London, Longman, 1972), 139
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95. Stryker Brigades have received mixed reviews in Iraq. See Washington Post, 3 April 2005.
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103. and Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2004), 16-18.
104. See Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002, 43-49.
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107. and Alexander H. Montgomery, "Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network," International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 153-87.
108. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy Washington: Brookings Institution, 2001), 41-50
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110. William W. Keller and Jane E. Nolan, "The Arms Trade: Business as Usual?" Foreign Policy, no. 109, Winter 1997/98, 113-25
111. and Shannon Lindsey Blanton, "Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 2 (March 1999): 233-44.
112. See also Martin Libicki, "Rethinking War: The Mouse's New Roar?" Foreign Policy, no. 117, Winter 1999/2000, 37-38.
113. See Michael Cox, "Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine," Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004): 598-601.
114. Jeffrey A. Frieden, "International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation," International Organization 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 559-93.
115. See Hendrick Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 39-87
116. and Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
117. Edward Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization," World Politics 22, no. 3 (April 1970): 377-87
118. and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
119. Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990): 49-53
120. Richard Rosecrance, "The Rise of the Virtual State," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 48-56
121. and Stephen G. Brooks, "Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (October 1999): 655-59.
122. See also Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? 18-35.
123. Brooks, "Globalization of Production," 665-66
124. and Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 129-60.
125. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," PS: Political Science and Politics 32, no. 4 (December 1999): 694-95
126. Paul Q. Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 20-98
127. and Robert H. Wade, "Globalization and Its Limits," in National Diversity and Global Capitalism, eds., S Berger and R. Dore (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 66-84.
128. See World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), http://www.worldbank.org/data, accessed 29 May 2007.
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130. and Nicholas Crafts, "Globalization and Growth in the Twentieth Century," International Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/00/44, March 2000, 25-26.
131. Europe's exports to Asia and North America, for example, remained constant between 1910 and 1996 at roughly 10 percent and 7 percent respectively. Baldwin and Martin, "Two Waves," 16-17.
132. On arbitrage, see Jeffrey Frankel, "Globalization of the Economy," in Governance in a Globalizing World, eds., Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 42-45.
133. World Bank, WDI, accessed at http://www.worldbank.org/data.
134. Baldwin and Martin, "Two Waves," 27-28
135. and Alan H. Taylor, "International Capital Mobility in History: The Savings-Investment Relationship," NBER Working Paper No. 5743, 8-9.
136. Frankel, "Globalization of the Economy"
137. Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka, "Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows," Economic Journal 90, no. 358 (June 1980): 314-29
138. and Jeffrey Frankel, "Measuring International Capital Mobility: A Review," American Economic Review 82, no. 2 (May 1992): 197-202.
139. Paul N. Doremus, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich, The Myth of the Global Corporation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 11-21.
140. See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 79-98
141. and Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 6.
142. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," 698-99.
143. World Bank, WDI, accessed at http://www.worldbank.org/data. For similar numbers, see David L. Hummels and Robert M. Stern, "Evolving Patterns of North American Merchandise Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, 1960-1990," The World Economy 17, no. 1 (January 1994): 5-30.
144. Sebastian Edwards, "Trade Policy, Growth, and Income Distribution," American Economic Review 87, no. 2 (May 1997): 205-10
145. Sebastian Edwards, "Openness, Productivity and Growth: What do We Really Know?" Economic Journal 108, no. 447 (March 1998): 383-98
146. and Francisco Rodríguez and Dani Rodrik, "Trade Polity and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence," NBER Macroeconomics Annual 15 (2000): 261-325.
147. See, however, Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer, "Does Trade Cause Growth?" American Economic Review 89, no. 3 (June 1999): 379-99.
148. See Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and Ayhan Kose, "Financial Globalization, Growth and Volatility in Developing Countries," NBER Working Paper No. 10942, 2004
149. And Nancy Birdsall, "Stormy Days on an Open Field: Asymmetries in the Global Economy," Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 81 (February 2006), 8-10.
150. L. Pritchett, "Divergence, Big Time," Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 3 (1997): 3-17
151. and J. Temple, "The New Growth Evidence,"Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 1 (March 1999): 112-56.
152. Mattias Lundberg and Lyn Squire, "The Simultaneous Evolution of Growth and Inequality," World Bank unpublished manuscript, 2003, 31-32
153. Robert Barro, "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries," Journal of Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (March 2000): 5-32 and
154. Martin Ravallion, "Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages," World Development 19, no. 11 (November 2001): 1,811.
155. See, however, David Dollar and Aart Kraay, "Trade, Growth, and Poverty," World Bank Working Paper No. 2615 (2000).
156. Robert Wade, "Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?" World Development 32, no. 4 (April 2004): 567-89.
157. Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, "Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis," British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (January 2003): 29-54.
158. Nita Rudra, "Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World," American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 4 (October 2005): 704-30.
159. See also Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (December 1994): 903-4.
160. Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution and Political Unrest," Journal of World Systems Research 5, no. 2 (1999): 327-65
161. and Katerine Barbieri and Rafael Reuveny, "Economic Globalization and Civil War," Journal of Politics 67, no. 4 (November 2005 : 1,228-47.
162. Ironically, there is no strong link between these structural adjustment programs and economic growth. See James Raymond Vreeland, "The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor," World Development 30, no. 1 (January 2002): 21-139
163. and Adam Prezworski and James Raymond Vreeland, "The Effects of IMF Programs on Economic Growth," Journal of Development Economics 62, no. 2 (August 2000): 385-421.
164. For the opposing view, however, see Brian F. Crisp and Michael J. Kelly, "The Socioeconomic Impacts of Structural Adjustment," International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (September 1999): 533-52
165. and M. Rodwan Abouharb and David L. Cingranelli, "The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000," International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 2 (June 2006): 233-62.
166. A. G. Hopkin, "The History of Globalization - and the Globalization of History?" in A. G. Hopkins, ed. Globalization in World History (London: Pimlico, 2002).
167. See also Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization," European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 4 (December 1999): 403-34.
168. C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 121-69
169. and C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (New York: Longman, 1989).
170. See Paul K. MacDonald, Networks of Domination: Social Ties and Imperial Governance in International Politics, unpublished manuscript.
171. Robert Hunter Wade, "Bringing the Economics Back In," Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (June 2004): 244-46
172. and Robert Hunter Wade, "The Invisible Hand of the American Empire," Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 87.
173. See also Susan Strange, "The Future of the American Empire," Journal of International Affairs 42, no. 1 (Fall 1988): 10.
174. Mann, "The First Failed Empire," 647
175. and Anna Simons, "The Death of Conquest," The National Interest 71 (Spring 2003): 41.
176. See also John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1989).
177. Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 223.
178. Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International System," International Organization 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 328.
179. Zacher, "Territorial Integrity," 221-22
180. and Fazal, "State Death," 339-40.
181. See also Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 40-47.
182. Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48, no. 1 (Winter1994): 107-30.
183. James D. Fearon, "Separatist Wars, Partition and World Order," Security Studies 13, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 394.
184. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 184-219.
185. Page Fortna, "Where Have All the Victories Gone? War Outcomes in Historical Perspective," paper presented at the American Political Science Association, September 2004, 38.
186. Chaim D. Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," International Security 23, no. 2 (Autumn 1998): 126.
187. Ravi L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa," World Politics 18, no. 4 (July 1966): 656-73
188. and Jeffery Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," International Organization 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1989): 683-87
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190. Boaz Atzili, "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict," International Security 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/07): 145-50.
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192. and Stephen Krasner, "Building Democracy After Conflict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 1 (January 2005): 73-75.
193. Jackson, Quasi-States, 40-47.
194. See also Michael Barnett, "The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty," Global Governance 1, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 80-83.
195. On the imperial potential in cosmopolitan liberalism, see Jean Cohen, "Sovereign Equality vs. Imperial Right: The Battle over the 'New World Order'," Constellations 13, no. 4 (December 2006): 487-90
196. and Jean Cohen, "Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law," Ethics & International Affairs 18, no. 3 (August 2004): 1-24.
197. See, for example, United Nations Charter, Article 1 Para. 2 and Article 2 Para. 1. For an overview, see David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Helene Lambert, International Law and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 117-50.
198. Dino Kritsiotis, "When States Use Armed Force," in The Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 45-79.
199. See General Assembly Resolution 1514, "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples," December 1960.
200. See also Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 46-72, 153-67.
201. Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics, Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 291-342.
202. See Simon Chesterman, "Legality Verses Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule of Law," Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (September 2002): 293-307.
203. See Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 135-73
204. Fernando R. Teśon, "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention," in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, eds., J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 93-129.
205. See discussion in Simon Chesterman, JustWar of Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 112-62
206. Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 52-84
207. and Roland Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'," Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (October 2002): 638-39.
208. Ralph Wilde, "From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration," American Journal of International Law 95, no. 3 (July 2001): 583-606.
209. See discussion in Simon Chesterman, You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 99-125.
210. Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27-50.
211. David B. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, "Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace," The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 87-103
212. and Conor McCarthy, "The Paradox of International Law of Military Occupation: Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 43-74.
213. Richard Caplan, A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-Torn Territories, Adelphi Paper No. 341 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
214. Fearon and Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," 10-13
215. and Stephen Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 85-86, 105-8.
216. See, however, Roland Paris "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture," European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 3 (September 2003): 462-63.
217. See, for example, the conclusions of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), 1-14.
218. See also Carsten Stahn, "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?" American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (January 2007): 99-120.
219. Seminal examples include the General Act of the Berlin Conference that established the principal of "effective occupation" and Article 22 of the Convent of the League of Nations that established the mandate system.
220. See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
221. Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 98-178
222. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)
223. and Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 120-44.
224. Stanley Kurtz, "Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint," Policy Review 112 (April/May 2003)
225. Martin Walker, "America's Virtual Empire," World Policy Journal, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 13
226. and Benjamin Barber, "Imperialism or Interdependence?" Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (June 2004): 240.
227. Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century(New York: Knopf, 2002), 74-81
228. and G. John Ikenberry, "America and the Ambivalence of Power," Current History 102, no. 667 (November 2003): 381-82.
229. Ferguson, Colossus; Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?" Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003)
230. and Niall Ferguson, "Recovering our Nerve," The National Interest 76 (Summer 2004): 51-55.
231. Only 10 percent of respondents agreed that the United States should "withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems," while just 31 percent pressed for fewer overseas military bases.
232. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy(Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), 7, 18, 15-16.
233. On the specific question of Darfur, for example, 64 percent of Republicans and 68 percent of Democrats favor sending American troops as part of an international peacekeeping force.
234. Steven Kull et al., Opportunities for Bipartisan Consensus - 2007: What Both Republicans and Democrats Want in US Foreign Policy, Program on International Policy Attitudes (January 2007), 11-12, 31.
235. Republicans had either identical or stronger preferences in favor of each of these interventions. Security and Peace Institute, American Attitudes toward National Security, Foreign Policy, and the War on Terror (Center for American Progress, 2005), 17-18, 21-22.
236. Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1996).
237. See also Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad, Rand Report MG-231-A (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005).
238. Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 94.
239. Feaver and Gelip also find that the general public is more casualty acceptant than both civilian elites and the military brass.
240. Idem, Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil Military Gap and American National Security(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 485.
241. Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American opinion on the Use of Military Force," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 49-74.
242. See also Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4 (August 1998): 395-417
243. and Richard C. Eichenberg, "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 140-77.
244. In the aftermath of the upswing of sectarian strife in 2006, however, recent polls have put support for the war in the low 40 percent range. Numbers acquired from http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/Iraq.aspx, accessed 2 February 2007.
245. Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 8-9.
246. See also Washington Post, 10 September 2004.
247. Eric Alterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences(New York, NY: Viking, 2004)
248. and Jon Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Publicf(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
249. Doris A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), 77-80
250. and Ruhl Jacob Bartlett, Policy and Power: Two Centuries of American Foreign Relations(New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), 126-27.
251. Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War Against Nazi Germany (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001)
252. and John Schuessler, "Democracy, Deception, and the Use of Force: FDR's Undeclared War," paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, (February/March 2007).
253. David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 331-39
254. and Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 336-39.
255. Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 5-48.
256. Rather, the extent of media coverage seems to be an important determinant of the size of increases in public support. See John R. Oneal, Brad Lian, and James H. Joyner Jr., "Are the American People 'Pretty Prudent'? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950-1988," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 273.
257. Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal, "Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (June 1993): 277-300
258. and John R. Oneal and Anna Lillian Bryan, "The Rally 'Round the Flag Effect in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises, 1950-1985," Political Behavior 17, no. 4 (December 1995): 379-401.
259. See generally, Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy(New York: Praeger, 1960).
260. Pew Research Center, Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News and Information Revolution, 15 April 2007, 2, 5, 13.
261. Stephen Earl Bennett, "'Know Nothings' Revisited Again," Political Behavior 18, no. 3 (September 1996): 224-25.
262. Richard K. Betts, "The Political Support System for American Primacy," International Affairs 81, no. 1 (January 2005): 4.
263. John Aldrich, John Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida likewise find evidence that foreign affairs can influence voting in Presidential elections. See "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?"' American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (March 1989): 123-41.
264. See Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-38, 134-65.
265. C. C. Eldridge, England's Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880 (London: Macmillian, 1973)
266. and Stanley R. Stembridge, "Disraeli and the Millstones," Journal of British Studies 5, no. 1 (November 1965): 122-39.
267. Marvin Swartz, The Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli and Gladstone(London: St. Martin's Press, 1985)
268. and W. David McIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-1875(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967).
269. Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895-1914 (London: St. Martin's Press, 1968).
270. Interview with Al Jazeera, 25 February 2003.
271. Interview with Middle East Broadcasting, 22 February 2003.
272. See Julian Go, "The Provinciality of American Empire: 'Liberal Exceptionalism' and U.S. Colonial Rule, 1898-1912," Comparative Studies In Society and History 49, no. 1 (January 2007): 74-108.
273. Paul Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons," in The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives, eds., Julian Go and Anne Foster (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 43-91.
274. On the ideology of American exceptionalism, see Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton & Company, 1996).
275. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997)
276. and Tami R. Davis and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Citty upon a Hill," Foreign Policy, no. 66, Spring 1987, 20-38.
277. Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Destiny: American Exceptionalism and Empire, revised edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 173-214
278. and Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Exceptionalism and the Empire of Right(New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
279. See also Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in the Age of International History," American Historical Review 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1,031-55.
280. White House Press Release, 1 May 2003. The president has frequently returned to this theme. In an address at the National Defense University in 2005, for example, he similarly stated: "We meet at a time of great consequence for the security of our nation, a time when the defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom, a time with echoes in our history." White House Press Release, 8 March 2005.
281. On the American Revolution, see White House Press Release, 18 May 2005. White House Press Release, 24 August 2005. On the Philippines, see Fred Kaplan, "From Baghdad to Manila," Slate, 21 October 2003.
282. On post-war Europe, see White House Press Release, 27 May 2006. White House Press Release, 10 April 2006. Washington Post, 15 December 2006, A03.
283. See Walter LaFeber, "The Bush Doctrine," Diplomatic History 26, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 534-58.
284. Joseph Lepgold and Timothy McKeown, "Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis," Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 369-84.
285. Mary Ann Heiss, "The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and U.S. National Identity," Diplomatic History 26, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 511-12.
286. Julian Go, "The Provinciality of American Empire," 99-102.
287. Geir Lundestad, The American 'Empire' and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 31-32.
288. Anthony Pagden, Lord of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995)
289. and Leah Greenfeld, Nationalism(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 78-86.
290. See also David Armitage, "Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?" American Historical Review 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 428, 443-45.
291. Michael Adas, "From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History," American Historical Review 106, no. 5 (December 2001): 1,710-13.
292. John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (New York: Praeger, 2002), 8-10, 217-19
293. and Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars," Parameters 34, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 75-79.
294. Andrew Krepinevich, The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, June 2004, 7-8
295. and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq's Evolving Insurgency: The Nature of Attacks and Patterns and Cycles in the Conflict, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2006, 2-3.
296. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," Military Review 85, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 8-12
297. and Robert M. Cassidy, "The Salience of Military Culture," Military Review 85, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 54-58.
298. Washington Post, 19 March 2005, A01.
299. Steven Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007, 54-75.
300. Department of Defense, Directive Number 3000.5, 28 November 2005; Washington Post, 1 December 2005, A21
301. Washington Post, 29 January 2006
302. and Nina M. Serafino, "Peacekeeping and Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement," CRS Issue Brief for Congress IB94040, 18 May 2006.
303. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: Department of Defense, 2005), 3
304. Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington: Department of Defense, 2006), 19-23
305. and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: White House, 2006), 8-17.
306. Department of the Army, FM 3-27, Counterinsurgency (June 2006).
307. This document updated the interim field manual F3-07 from October 2004. New York Times, 5 October 2006, A1
308. and Washington Post, 25 February 2007, B03.
309. Christian Science Monitor, 5 July 2006, 1
310. Washington Post, 21 January 2006, A01
311. and Christian Science Monitor, 28 June 2006, 2.
312. Edward F. Bruner, "Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, RS20787, 11 March 2004
313. Ralph O. Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," Military Review 86, no. 3 (May/June 2006)
314. and Peter A. Wilson, John Gordon IV, and David E. Johnson, "An Alternative Future Force: Building a Better Army," Parameters 33, no. 4 (Winter 2003/04): 19-39.
315. Congress, however, failed to provide the Office with a significant budget. In 2005, for example, the Office received just $7 million. Washington Post, 25 March 2005, A17
316. and Washington Post, 24 February 2007.
317. Thomas Baltazar and Elisabeth Kvitashvili, "The Role of USAID and Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism," Military Review 87, no. 2 (March/April 2007): 40.
318. Theo Farrell, "Strategic Culture and American Empire," SAIS Review 25, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2005): 7-10.
319. Washington Post, 15 December 2006, A01
320. Washington Post, 16 February 2007, A13
321. and P. W. Singer, "Bent But Not Broken: The Military Challenge for the Next Commander and Chief," Brookings Institution, 28 February 2007, 5-6.
322. In FY 2005, for example, 32 percent of the army's active component specialties went under filled. GAO, "Military Personnel: Preliminary Observation on Recruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces," GAO-05-419T, 16 March 2005, 6-8.
323. Department of Defense, "National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2005," 2004.
324. William C.Wohlforth, "The Stability of a UnipolarWorld," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41
325. and Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 9.
326. See also Stephen Peter Rosen, "An Empire, If You Can Keep It," The National Interest 71 (Spring 2003): 52-61.
327. Readiness at home, on the other hand, was between ten and fifteen percentage points lower. This is primarily a consequence of the policy adopted in late 2003 of leaving equipment in theater rather than transferring it home. Andrew Feickert, "U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements: Background and Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, RL 33757, 20 December 2006, 8-10, 31.
328. Washington Post, 13 December 2006, A01.
329. GAO, "Defense Logistics; Preliminary Observations on the Army's Implementation of its Equipment Reset Strategies," GAO-07-439T, January 2007, 8-10.
330. Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B. Thompson, and Caroline P. Wadhams, Army Equipment After Iraq, Center for American Progress, April 2006, 10
331. and Feickert, "U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements," 20-21. Repairing National Guard units, however, would not be complete until 2013. Washington Post, 30 January 2007, A12.
332. Lawrence J. Korb and Max A. Bergmann, Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq, Center for American Progress, August 2006, 18.
333. Feickert, "U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements," 11-12.
334. New York Times, 25 September 2006. Of course, it is not clear how long these deployments could be sustained. In the words of one senior army official, it "would ... be ugly as hell ... but we could get it done." Washington Post, 15 December 2006, A01.
335. Washington Post, 15 December 2006, A01.
336. Congressional Budget Office, "Recruiting, Retention and Future Levels of Military Personnel," Pub. No. 2777, October 2006, 19, 32.
337. Under the emergency supplemental, the army has temporarily raised its size to 507,000 active-duty personnel. Washington Post, 13 December 2006, A01.
338. Washington Post, 16 February 2007, A13.
339. Mark N. Katz, "What Do We Do if the Saudi Monarchy Fails?" Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (January 2003): 45-58.
340. Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back," Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May/June 2007).
341. The author would like to thank Joseph Parent for suggesting this scenario.
342. Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, "America, China, and the Scramble for Africa's Oil," Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 108 (June 2006): 297-309.
343. For examples Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 1-20.
344. J. P. D. Dunbain, The Post-Imperial Age: The Great Powers and the WiderWorld(London: Longman, 1994).