When all else fails: Ethnic population transfers and partitions in the twentieth century

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 120-156

  Kaufmann, Chaim D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032339465     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.2.120     Document Type: Review

References (214)

1. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
2. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
3. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
4. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
5. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
6. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
7. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
8. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
9. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
10. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740-742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5-18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 25-28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42-55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," Brookings Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45-48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.
11. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-29. See also Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; and Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity," Political Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January-March 1992), pp. 68-78. On why separation can resolve ethnic conflicts but not ideological civil wars, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 62-103.
12. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-29. See also Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; and Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity," Political Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January-March 1992), pp. 68-78. On why separation can resolve ethnic conflicts but not ideological civil wars, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 62-103.
13. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-29. See also Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; and Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity," Political Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January-March 1992), pp. 68-78. On why separation can resolve ethnic conflicts but not ideological civil wars, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 62-103.
14. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-29. See also Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; and Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity," Political Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January-March 1992), pp. 68-78. On why separation can resolve ethnic conflicts but not ideological civil wars, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 62-103.
15. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-29. See also Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; and Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity," Political Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January-March 1992), pp. 68-78. On why separation can resolve ethnic conflicts but not ideological civil wars, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 62-103.
16. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-29. See also Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; and Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity," Political Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January-March 1992), pp. 68-78. On why separation can resolve ethnic conflicts but not ideological civil wars, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 62-103.
17. Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 22-34.
18. Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 108-111.
19. The processes of war, especially reports of real or imagined enemy atrocities, also harden ethnic identities and solidify hostility and mistrust, creating additional hard-to-counter threat perceptions even in excess of real threats; this effect persists for a considerable time even after the end of large-scale fighting. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," pp. 141-145, 150-151.
20. For additional types of proposed solutions to ethnic conflicts, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 451-476; Arend J. Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in ibid., pp. 491-510; Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against State (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267-273. For an analysis that focuses on perceptual rather than structural aspects of intergroup security dilemmas, and recommends solutions based on institution and confidence building, see David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75.
21. For additional types of proposed solutions to ethnic conflicts, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 451-476; Arend J. Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in ibid., pp. 491-510; Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against State (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267-273. For an analysis that focuses on perceptual rather than structural aspects of intergroup security dilemmas, and recommends solutions based on institution and confidence building, see David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75.
22. For additional types of proposed solutions to ethnic conflicts, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 451-476; Arend J. Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in ibid., pp. 491-510; Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against State (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267-273. For an analysis that focuses on perceptual rather than structural aspects of intergroup security dilemmas, and recommends solutions based on institution and confidence building, see David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75.
23. For additional types of proposed solutions to ethnic conflicts, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 451-476; Arend J. Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in ibid., pp. 491-510; Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against State (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267-273. For an analysis that focuses on perceptual rather than structural aspects of intergroup security dilemmas, and recommends solutions based on institution and confidence building, see David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75.
24. For additional types of proposed solutions to ethnic conflicts, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 451-476; Arend J. Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in ibid., pp. 491-510; Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against State (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267-273. For an analysis that focuses on perceptual rather than structural aspects of intergroup security dilemmas, and recommends solutions based on institution and confidence building, see David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75.
25. Although, in principle, final political arrangements could be based on either regional autonomy or separate sovereignty, in practice, demographic separation is likely to be accompanied by partition, for three reasons. First, one side will often insist on partition. Second, whenever the international community intervenes to facilitate population transfers, it will need to specify partition lines, whether these are between what are to become autonomous provinces or between independent states. Third, because international law favors sovereign states, granting sovereignty will usually improve a group's ability to maintain its security.
26. UNHCR, "Working Document for the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia" (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992). According to former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The new danger which will appear in the world in the next ten years is more fragmentation. . . . We will not be able to achieve any kind of economic development, not to mention more disputes on boundaries." "UN Chief Fears World Could Split into 400 Mini-states," Montreal Gazette, September 21, 1992. On international practice toward secession movements, see Lee C. Buchheit; Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).
27. UNHCR, "Working Document for the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia" (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992). According to former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The new danger which will appear in the world in the next ten years is more fragmentation. . . . We will not be able to achieve any kind of economic development, not to mention more disputes on boundaries." "UN Chief Fears World Could Split into 400 Mini-states," Montreal Gazette, September 21, 1992. On international practice toward secession movements, see Lee C. Buchheit; Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).
28. UNHCR, "Working Document for the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia" (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992). According to former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The new danger which will appear in the world in the next ten years is more fragmentation. . . . We will not be able to achieve any kind of economic development, not to mention more disputes on boundaries." "UN Chief Fears World Could Split into 400 Mini-states," Montreal Gazette, September 21, 1992. On international practice toward secession movements, see Lee C. Buchheit; Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).
29. Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 21-35; Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations without States," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 100-112; and Kumar, "Troubled History of Partition."
30. Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 21-35; Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations without States," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 100-112; and Kumar, "Troubled History of Partition."
31. Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 21-35; Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations without States," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 100-112; and Kumar, "Troubled History of Partition."
32. Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 21-35; Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations without States," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 100-112; and Kumar, "Troubled History of Partition."
33. Additional criticisms of partition and population transfers include claims that they damage prospects for future economic growth and that international support for one instance could create a "moral hazard" that would encourage proliferation of secession movements. These issues are considered in Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," pp. 170-173.
34. The claims of both sides in this debate about effects on political development are best understood as "other things being equal," given that political development is also affected by numerous nonethnic factors, such as economic development, income distribution, preexisting political institutions, and so forth.
35. I define partitions as separations jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party. Secessions are new states created by the unilateral action of a rebellious ethnic group. We could study ethnic population transfers between states to see whether they reduce subsequent interstate violence. Indeed, the records of the two largest ethnic population transfers in twentieth-century Europe - the Greco-Bulgarian-Turkish population exchanges in the 1920s and the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II-suggest that they may. Each of these exchanges was preceded by a series of wars that cost many times more lives than the Population transfers did, and each has been followed by interstate peace.
36. The following discussions pay special attention to the roles of the minority communities in each case, because it is usually minorities who are most concerned about their group's security and who press hardest for partition.
37. Alan J. Ward, The Easter Rising (Arlington Heights, Ill.: AHM Publishing, 1980), p. 13.
38. Michael Hughes, Ireland Divided: The Roots of the Modern Irish Problem (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 49; and Ward, Easter Rising, p. 126 .
39. Michael Hughes, Ireland Divided: The Roots of the Modern Irish Problem (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 49; and Ward, Easter Rising, p. 126 .
40. J.J. Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 69.
41. Patrick Buckland, Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1973), p. 176; and Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 342.
42. Patrick Buckland, Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1973), p. 176; and Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 342.
43. 1911 Census, reported in Buckland, Ulster Unionism, pp. 179-180.
44. Ibid.
45. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, p. 176; D.G. Pringle, One Island, Two Nations? (Letchworth, U.K.: Research Studies Press, 1985), pp. 239-242; and Frank Gallagher, The Indivisible Island (London: Victor Gollancz, 1957), pp. 225-265.
46. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, p. 176; D.G. Pringle, One Island, Two Nations? (Letchworth, U.K.: Research Studies Press, 1985), pp. 239-242; and Frank Gallagher, The Indivisible Island (London: Victor Gollancz, 1957), pp. 225-265.
47. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, p. 176; D.G. Pringle, One Island, Two Nations? (Letchworth, U.K.: Research Studies Press, 1985), pp. 239-242; and Frank Gallagher, The Indivisible Island (London: Victor Gollancz, 1957), pp. 225-265.
48. J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army, 1916-1970 (New York: John Day, 1971), pp. 29-66; a nd Dennis Kennedy, The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State, 1919-49 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988), pp. 72-77.
49. J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army, 1916-1970 (New York: John Day, 1971), pp. 29-66; a nd Dennis Kennedy, The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State, 1919-49 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988), pp. 72-77.
50. In the June 1922 election, the most extreme nationalist party, Eamon De Valera's faction of Sinn Fein, gained only 36 seats versus 92 others, but even De Valera did not favor prompt action against Northern Ireland. The IRA was not united either; an emergency convention in June voted narrowly against rebellion. Bell, Secret Army, pp. 30-34.
51. When in March 1914 the British government attempted to deploy troops to reinforce arms depots in Ulster, most of the officers who received the orders mutinied. War Minister J.E.B. Seely, Army Chief of Staff Sir Henry Wilson, and Army Commander-in-Chief Sir John French sided with the mutineers, assuring them that force would not be used against Ulster. When ordered to withdraw this promise, Seely and French resigned, which led to a threat of mass resignations by military officers. At this point there was a real risk of a complete split in the British Army. Elizabeth A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886-1914 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), pp. 168-172, 188-191; and Hughes, Ireland Divided, pp. 34-36.
52. When in March 1914 the British government attempted to deploy troops to reinforce arms depots in Ulster, most of the officers who received the orders mutinied. War Minister J.E.B. Seely, Army Chief of Staff Sir Henry Wilson, and Army Commander-in-Chief Sir John French sided with the mutineers, assuring them that force would not be used against Ulster. When ordered to withdraw this promise, Seely and French resigned, which led to a threat of mass resignations by military officers. At this point there was a real risk of a complete split in the British Army. Elizabeth A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886-1914 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), pp. 168-172, 188-191; and Hughes, Ireland Divided, pp. 34-36.
53. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, p. 64; Townshend, Political Violence, p. 343; and Gallagher, The Indivisible Island.
54. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, p. 64; Townshend, Political Violence, p. 343; and Gallagher, The Indivisible Island.
55. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, p. 64; Townshend, Political Violence, p. 343; and Gallagher, The Indivisible Island.
56. John F. Galliher and Jerry L. DeGregory, Violence in Northern Ireland: Understanding Protestant Perspectives (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), p. 10. Despite class, rural-city, and other cleavages within the Ulster Protestant community, Unionism commanded absolutely solid support. In 1910 all Protestant-majority districts in Ulster elected Unionist MPs. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, frontispiece, pp. 22-34, 179-180.
57. John F. Galliher and Jerry L. DeGregory, Violence in Northern Ireland: Understanding Protestant Perspectives (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), p. 10. Despite class, rural-city, and other cleavages within the Ulster Protestant community, Unionism commanded absolutely solid support. In 1910 all Protestant-majority districts in Ulster elected Unionist MPs. Buckland, Ulster Unionism, frontispiece, pp. 22-34, 179-180.
58. Townshend, Political Violence, pp. 252-255; and Muenger, British Military Dilemma, p. 177.
59. Townshend, Political Violence, pp. 252-255; and Muenger, British Military Dilemma, p. 177.
60. Hughes, Ireland Divided, p. 35.
61. Townshend, British Campaign in Ireland, pp. 189-192; and Sheila Lawlor, Britain and Ireland, 1914-1923 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1983), pp. 85-86.
62. Townshend, British Campaign in Ireland, pp. 189-192; and Sheila Lawlor, Britain and Ireland, 1914-1923 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1983), pp. 85-86.
63. In 1991, 82 percent were prepared to postpone union if that would help bring about an internal settlement in the North. Market Research Bureau of Ireland, reported in Gemma Hussey, Ireland Today (London: Viking, 1993), pp. 186-188. In a 1996 poll only 38 percent of people polled in the republic supported unification. Carl Homore, "Desire for Union Now a Need for Peace," Houston Chronicle, September 22, 1996.
64. In 1991, 82 percent were prepared to postpone union if that would help bring about an internal settlement in the North. Market Research Bureau of Ireland, reported in Gemma Hussey, Ireland Today (London: Viking, 1993), pp. 186-188. In a 1996 poll only 38 percent of people polled in the republic supported unification. Carl Homore, "Desire for Union Now a Need for Peace," Houston Chronicle, September 22, 1996.
65. Richard W. Mansbach, ed., Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition (New York: Facts on File, 1973).
66. Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 1.
67. Ireland: Statistical Abstract, 1995 (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1995), pp. 55, 409.
68. "Dublin Parliament Poised for Peace Poll Go-Ahead, Press Association, April 21, 1998; and Frank Millar, "Blair and Trimble Appeal to Undecided Unionists," Irish Times, May 21, 1998.
69. "Dublin Parliament Poised for Peace Poll Go-Ahead, Press Association, April 21, 1998; and Frank Millar, "Blair and Trimble Appeal to Undecided Unionists," Irish Times, May 21, 1998.
70. Lawlor, Britain and Ireland, 1914-1923, pp. 124-126; and D.W. Harkness, Ireland in the Twentieth Century: Divided Island (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 34-37.
71. Lawlor, Britain and Ireland, 1914-1923, pp. 124-126; and D.W. Harkness, Ireland in the Twentieth Century: Divided Island (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 34-37.
72. A Boundary Commission operated from 1924 to 1925, but was limited to recommending only very minor changes, which in any case were not implemented. Report of the Irish Boundary Commission, 1925 (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969). A better partition would have given the Unionists all of counties Antrim and Londonderry; much but not all of Down, Armagh, and Tyrone; and a few small bits of Monaghan, Fermanagh, and Donegal. The large Catholic-majority region spanning Londonderry and Tyrone (see Map 1) is mountainous and was thinly settled.
73. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916-1928 (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1979); Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Milton Israel Communications and Power: Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920-1947 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
74. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916-1928 (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1979); Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Milton Israel Communications and Power: Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920-1947 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
75. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916-1928 (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1979); Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Milton Israel Communications and Power: Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920-1947 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
76. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916-1928 (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1979); Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Milton Israel Communications and Power: Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920-1947 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
77. The Hindu-Muslim security dilemma was most severe in the belt of North India, where the percentage of Muslims ranged from 20 to 60 percent. In the South, where Muslim minorities were quite small, intergroup security dilemmas were weak, and communal mobilization and violence remained low before, during, and after partition.
78. Census of India, 1931, Vol. 1, Part 1 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933), p. 392.
79. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 59. Moonje argued that Hindus should negotiate with Muslims only from a position of strength and that Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence would "lead to destruction and extermination of the Hindus from the face of the world." Letter, March 16, 1922, cited in Mushirul Hasan, "Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress," in Hasan, ed., Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India (Delhi: Manohar, 1985), p. 206. According to Jawarlhalal Nehru, many a congressman "was a communalist under his national cloak." Nehru, An Autobiography (London: John Lane, 1936), p. 136.
80. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 59. Moonje argued that Hindus should negotiate with Muslims only from a position of strength and that Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence would "lead to destruction and extermination of the Hindus from the face of the world." Letter, March 16, 1922, cited in Mushirul Hasan, "Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress," in Hasan, ed., Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India (Delhi: Manohar, 1985), p. 206. According to Jawarlhalal Nehru, many a congressman "was a communalist under his national cloak." Nehru, An Autobiography (London: John Lane, 1936), p. 136.
81. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 59. Moonje argued that Hindus should negotiate with Muslims only from a position of strength and that Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence would "lead to destruction and extermination of the Hindus from the face of the world." Letter, March 16, 1922, cited in Mushirul Hasan, "Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress," in Hasan, ed., Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India (Delhi: Manohar, 1985), p. 206. According to Jawarlhalal Nehru, many a congressman "was a communalist under his national cloak." Nehru, An Autobiography (London: John Lane, 1936), p. 136.
82. Jinnah also called for one-third of the seats in the central legislature and a 75 percent majority requirement for action by the legislature. Although Jinnah did not dominate Muslim politics until much later, a wider meeting of a number of Muslim groups in 1927 had agreed on a similar program, as had another such meeting in 1925. V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 36-37; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1977), pp. 29-30; and R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940 (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 24-25.
83. Jinnah also called for one-third of the seats in the central legislature and a 75 percent majority requirement for action by the legislature. Although Jinnah did not dominate Muslim politics until much later, a wider meeting of a number of Muslim groups in 1927 had agreed on a similar program, as had another such meeting in 1925. V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 36-37; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1977), pp. 29-30; and R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940 (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 24-25.
84. Jinnah also called for one-third of the seats in the central legislature and a 75 percent majority requirement for action by the legislature. Although Jinnah did not dominate Muslim politics until much later, a wider meeting of a number of Muslim groups in 1927 had agreed on a similar program, as had another such meeting in 1925. V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 36-37; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1977), pp. 29-30; and R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940 (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 24-25.
85. Aga Khan at the Second Round Table Conference, London, 1931, reported in Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, pp. 72-73.
86. Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp. 101-104; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, pp. 42-51; R. Coupland, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 125; and Hasan, "Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress," p. 210.
87. Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp. 101-104; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, pp. 42-51; R. Coupland, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 125; and Hasan, "Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress," p. 210.
88. Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp. 101-104; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, pp. 42-51; R. Coupland, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 125; and Hasan, "Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress," p. 210.
89. Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp. 101-104; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, pp. 42-51; R. Coupland, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 125; and Hasan, "Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress," p. 210.
90. Congress swept most of the country, gaining control of seven provinces. Subsequently, it took the position that it represented all Indian nationalists, so its own Muslim members, not Jinnah or others, were the true arbiters of Muslim opinion and interests. Actually, however, it contested only 58 of 482 Muslim seats and won just 26, 19 of these based on Pathan protest votes against Punjabi political dominance of Northwest Frontier Province. Hodson, The Great Divide, pp. 66-72; Return Showing the Results of the Elections of 1937, Cmd. 5589, cited in Coupland, Indian Problem, pp. 15-16, 121-123.
91. Congress swept most of the country, gaining control of seven provinces. Subsequently, it took the position that it represented all Indian nationalists, so its own Muslim members, not Jinnah or others, were the true arbiters of Muslim opinion and interests. Actually, however, it contested only 58 of 482 Muslim seats and won just 26, 19 of these based on Pathan protest votes against Punjabi political dominance of Northwest Frontier Province. Hodson, The Great Divide, pp. 66-72; Return Showing the Results of the Elections of 1937, Cmd. 5589, cited in Coupland, Indian Problem, pp. 15-16, 121-123.
92. Congress swept most of the country, gaining control of seven provinces. Subsequently, it took the position that it represented all Indian nationalists, so its own Muslim members, not Jinnah or others, were the true arbiters of Muslim opinion and interests. Actually, however, it contested only 58 of 482 Muslim seats and won just 26, 19 of these based on Pathan protest votes against Punjabi political dominance of Northwest Frontier Province. Hodson, The Great Divide, pp. 66-72; Return Showing the Results of the Elections of 1937, Cmd. 5589, cited in Coupland, Indian Problem, pp. 15-16, 121-123.
93. Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946), pp. 146-152; and Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 164-169.
94. Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946), pp. 146-152; and Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 164-169.
95. Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, pp. 128-129.
96. In 1946 elections the Muslim League won all the Muslim seats in the central assembly. In the Punjab legislature, the Muslim League won 79 of 86 Muslim seats, while the intercommunal Punjab Unionist Party declined from 99 seats in 1937 to 18. Two of these immediately defected to the Muslim League. E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1942-7 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954), pp. 69, 145-148.
97. Ibid., pp. 162-164.
98. Census of India, 1931, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 387, 392; and Census of India, 1941 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1943). Prior to 1927 Sikhs were 24 percent of the electorate and held 18 percent of the seats in the provincial council. Sikhs also maintained special claims to Punjab on grounds that they provided a disproportionate share of the province's revenue, that the province contained all their important religious sites, and that Sikhs had been the last rulers of the region before the British. Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1985), pp. 39, 43.
99. Census of India, 1931, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 387, 392; and Census of India, 1941 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1943). Prior to 1927 Sikhs were 24 percent of the electorate and held 18 percent of the seats in the provincial council. Sikhs also maintained special claims to Punjab on grounds that they provided a disproportionate share of the province's revenue, that the province contained all their important religious sites, and that Sikhs had been the last rulers of the region before the British. Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1985), pp. 39, 43.
100. Census of India, 1931, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 387, 392; and Census of India, 1941 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1943). Prior to 1927 Sikhs were 24 percent of the electorate and held 18 percent of the seats in the provincial council. Sikhs also maintained special claims to Punjab on grounds that they provided a disproportionate share of the province's revenue, that the province contained all their important religious sites, and that Sikhs had been the last rulers of the region before the British. Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1985), pp. 39, 43.
101. Sikhism was transformed from a purely religious movement to a distinct, militant community in response to Muslim rule; Sikhs fought 250 years of almost continuous war against Muslim princes from about 1600 onward. Sikh rulers had controlled the Punjab for about 100 years prior to the British takeover in 1849, and were still remembered in the twentieth century for harsh repression of their Muslim subjects. Sikh troops also helped suppress Muslim rebels during the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857-58. Kapur, Punjab Crisis, pp. 6-9; and Hodson, Great Divide, pp. 18-20.
102. Sikhism was transformed from a purely religious movement to a distinct, militant community in response to Muslim rule; Sikhs fought 250 years of almost continuous war against Muslim princes from about 1600 onward. Sikh rulers had controlled the Punjab for about 100 years prior to the British takeover in 1849, and were still remembered in the twentieth century for harsh repression of their Muslim subjects. Sikh troops also helped suppress Muslim rebels during the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857-58. Kapur, Punjab Crisis, pp. 6-9; and Hodson, Great Divide, pp. 18-20.
103. Sikh tradition requires males to carry ceremonial daggers at all times, and to take up arms when necessary to defend righteousness. Sikhs also comprised a greatly disproportionate fraction of the Indian Army: 13 percent in 1930 compared to slightly more than 1 percent of the population. Kapur, Punjab Crisis, p. 7, notes 9 and 10; and p. 20, n. 47.
104. Sikh tradition requires males to carry ceremonial daggers at all times, and to take up arms when necessary to defend righteousness. Sikhs also comprised a greatly disproportionate fraction of the Indian Army: 13 percent in 1930 compared to slightly more than 1 percent of the population. Kapur, Punjab Crisis, p. 7, notes 9 and 10; and p. 20, n. 47.
105. Ibid., pp. 51, 98, 111.
106. Ibid.; Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 37-38; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 185-186.
107. Ibid.; Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 37-38; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 185-186.
108. Ibid.; Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 37-38; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 185-186.
109. This agitation was sparked by a government attempt in January to disarm the Muslim National Guards. Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party, and the Partition of India (Surrey, U.K.: Curzon Press, 1996), pp. 68, 148, 154-161.
110. This violence was partly sparked by Sikh leader Master Tara Singh's calls in the provincial assembly on March 4 for "Death to Pakistan" and "The pure shall rule; no resister will remain." Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 77. The police in Lahore and Amritsar, who were mostly Muslim, were not effective. Violence also spread to Muslim-majority areas in Western Punjab, in turn followed by attacks on Muslims in Southeastern Punjab. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj (Riverdale, Md.: Riverdale, 1988), pp. 227-228; Rai, Partition of the Punjab, p. 83, n. 25; and Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 218-220.
111. This violence was partly sparked by Sikh leader Master Tara Singh's calls in the provincial assembly on March 4 for "Death to Pakistan" and "The pure shall rule; no resister will remain." Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 77. The police in Lahore and Amritsar, who were mostly Muslim, were not effective. Violence also spread to Muslim-majority areas in Western Punjab, in turn followed by attacks on Muslims in Southeastern Punjab. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj (Riverdale, Md.: Riverdale, 1988), pp. 227-228; Rai, Partition of the Punjab, p. 83, n. 25; and Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 218-220.
112. This violence was partly sparked by Sikh leader Master Tara Singh's calls in the provincial assembly on March 4 for "Death to Pakistan" and "The pure shall rule; no resister will remain." Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India (London: Chatto and
113. This violence was partly sparked by Sikh leader Master Tara Singh's calls in the provincial assembly on March 4 for "Death to Pakistan" and "The pure shall rule; no resister will remain." Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 77. The police in Lahore and Amritsar, who were mostly Muslim, were not effective. Violence also spread to Muslim-majority areas in Western Punjab, in turn followed by attacks on Muslims in Southeastern Punjab. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj (Riverdale, Md.: Riverdale, 1988), pp. 227-228; Rai, Partition of the Punjab, p. 83, n. 25; and Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 218-220.
114. Singh, Origins of Partition, pp. 205-206; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 186. In June a last attempt by moderate Muslim League leader Nawab Mushtaq Achmad Gurmani to mediate between the Muslim League and the Sikh leadership was disavowed by Jinnah. Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 82-87. According to Moon, Jinnah had frequently threatened the Sikhs that division of Punjab would not be in their interest, but had never encouraged them on their prospects in Pakistan. See also Kapur, Punjab Crisis, pp. 94-95.
115. Singh, Origins of Partition, pp. 205-206; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 186. In June a last attempt by moderate Muslim League leader Nawab Mushtaq Achmad Gurmani to mediate between the Muslim League and the Sikh leadership was disavowed by Jinnah. Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 82-87. According to Moon, Jinnah had frequently threatened the Sikhs that division of Punjab would not be in their interest, but had never encouraged them on their prospects in Pakistan. See also Kapur, Punjab Crisis, pp. 94-95.
116. Singh, Origins of Partition, pp. 205-206; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 186. In June a last attempt by moderate Muslim League leader Nawab Mushtaq Achmad Gurmani to mediate between the Muslim League and the Sikh leadership was disavowed by Jinnah. Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 82-87. According to Moon, Jinnah had frequently threatened the Sikhs that division of Punjab would not be in their interest, but had never encouraged them on their prospects in Pakistan. See also Kapur, Punjab Crisis, pp. 94-95.
117. Singh, Origins of Partition, pp. 205-206; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 186. In June a last attempt by moderate Muslim League leader Nawab Mushtaq Achmad Gurmani to mediate between the Muslim League and the Sikh leadership was disavowed by Jinnah. Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 82-87. According to Moon, Jinnah had frequently threatened the Sikhs that division of Punjab would not be in their interest, but had never encouraged them on their prospects in Pakistan. See also Kapur, Punjab Crisis, pp. 94-95.
118. This was the only organized Sikh party, holding 22 of 33 Sikh seats in the Punjab assembly. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 227; Rai, Partition of Punjab, p. 40; and Kapur, Punjab Crisis, p. 50.
119. This was the only organized Sikh party, holding 22 of 33 Sikh seats in the Punjab assembly. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 227; Rai, Partition of Punjab, p. 40; and Kapur, Punjab Crisis, p. 50.
120. This was the only organized Sikh party, holding 22 of 33 Sikh seats in the Punjab assembly. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 227; Rai, Partition of Punjab, p. 40; and Kapur, Punjab Crisis, p. 50.
121. By June the Hindu RSSS had 58,000 men and the Muslim League National Guards 39,000. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, pp. 232-233. At the end of March the superintendent of police in Delhi predicted that "once a line of division is drawn in the Punjab all Sikhs to the West of it and all Muslims to the east of it will have their...chopped off." Quoted in Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 87-88. The previous governor of Punjab had begun predicting civil war as early as 1945. Wolpert, Jinnah, p. 249.
122. By June the Hindu RSSS had 58,000 men and the Muslim League National Guards 39,000. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, pp. 232-233. At the end of March the superintendent of police in Delhi predicted that "once a line of division is drawn in the Punjab all Sikhs to the West of it and all Muslims to the east of it will have their...chopped off." Quoted in Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 87-88. The previous governor of Punjab had begun predicting civil war as early as 1945. Wolpert, Jinnah, p. 249.
123. By June the Hindu RSSS had 58,000 men and the Muslim League National Guards 39,000. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, pp. 232-233. At the end of March the superintendent of police in Delhi predicted that "once a line of division is drawn in the Punjab all Sikhs to the West of it and all Muslims to the east of it will have their...chopped off." Quoted in Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 87-88. The previous governor of Punjab had begun predicting civil war as early as 1945. Wolpert, Jinnah, p. 249.
124. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 232; and Hodson, Great Divide, p. 338.
125. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 232; and Hodson, Great Divide, p. 338.
126. Although in the end this fighting did not affect the final partition line, it appears that Sikh forces did temporarily occupy some locations west of the partition line. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, pp. 233-234; The Sikhs in Action (Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1948); and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 151-152.
127. Although in the end this fighting did not affect the final partition line, it appears that Sikh forces did temporarily occupy some locations west of the partition line. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, pp. 233-234; The Sikhs in Action (Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1948); and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 151-152.
128. Although in the end this fighting did not affect the final partition line, it appears that Sikh forces did temporarily occupy some locations west of the partition line. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, pp. 233-234; The Sikhs in Action (Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1948); and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 151-152.
129. Moon's judgment is that the Sikhs were deliberately making room for 2 million refugees from Pakistan. Divide and Quit, pp. 279-280.
130. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 411; and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 122, 281.
131. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 411; and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 122, 281.
132. Kapur, Punjab Crisis, pp. 149-183. This did not end the conflict over the scope of Sikh autonomy, which flared into violence again between 1980 and 1992.
133. In many areas police and officials of the "wrong" community fled, further reducing restraints on pogroms. Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 419-423; Hodson, Great Divide, p. 406; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 193-195.
134. In many areas police and officials of the "wrong" community fled, further reducing restraints on pogroms. Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 419-423; Hodson, Great Divide, p. 406; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 193-195.
135. In many areas police and officials of the "wrong" community fled, further reducing restraints on pogroms. Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 419-423; Hodson, Great Divide, p. 406; and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 193-195.
136. The number of deaths is disputed. Hodson estimates 200,000, Moon less than 200,000. Lumby says "hundreds of thousands," an Indian High Court judge later estimated 500,000, and the Pakistani government claimed more than 500,000 Muslims alone. Kumar says that more than a million died. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 418; Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 268-269, 293; Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 199; Sikhs in Action, foreword; and Kumar, "Troubled History," p. 26.
137. The number of deaths is disputed. Hodson estimates 200,000, Moon less than 200,000. Lumby says "hundreds of thousands," an Indian High Court judge later estimated 500,000, and the Pakistani government claimed more than 500,000 Muslims alone. Kumar says that more than a million died. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 418; Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 268-269, 293; Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 199; Sikhs in Action, foreword; and Kumar, "Troubled History," p. 26.
138. The number of deaths is disputed. Hodson estimates 200,000, Moon less than 200,000. Lumby says "hundreds of thousands," an Indian High Court judge later estimated 500,000, and the Pakistani government claimed more than 500,000 Muslims alone. Kumar says that more than a million died. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 418; Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 268-269, 293; Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 199; Sikhs in Action, foreword; and Kumar, "Troubled History," p. 26.
139. The number of deaths is disputed. Hodson estimates 200,000, Moon less than 200,000. Lumby says "hundreds of thousands," an Indian High Court judge later estimated 500,000, and the Pakistani government claimed more than 500,000 Muslims alone. Kumar says that more than a million died. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 418; Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 268-269, 293; Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 199; Sikhs in Action, foreword; and Kumar, "Troubled History," p. 26.
140. The number of deaths is disputed. Hodson estimates 200,000, Moon less than 200,000. Lumby says "hundreds of thousands," an Indian High Court judge later estimated 500,000, and the Pakistani government claimed more than 500,000 Muslims alone. Kumar says that more than a million died. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 418; Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 268-269, 293; Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, p. 199; Sikhs in Action, foreword; and Kumar, "Troubled History," p. 26.
141. Congress agreed to "communal option" for officials, but maintained that the general population throughout the country should stay where they were. Rai, Partition of the Punjab, pp. 73-75.
142. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 412; Rai, Partition of the Punjab, p. 79; and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 278-279.
143. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 412; Rai, Partition of the Punjab, p. 79; and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 278-279.
144. Hodson, Great Divide, p. 412; Rai, Partition of the Punjab, p. 79; and Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 278-279.
145. Barry Posen provides a formula that can be used to estimate the number of troops needed to protect a refugee movement, in this case roughly 250,000. Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), p. 106, n. 51.
146. Although accounts are incomplete, it appears that total deaths in intercommunal violence in India in 1946-47 not directly related to the Punjab civil war may have been about 20,000. Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 167-205; Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassel, 1950), pp. 424-426; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 17-24, 1948, p. 9049; Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 294, 434-445, and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 120-122.
147. Although accounts are incomplete, it appears that total deaths in intercommunal violence in India in 1946-47 not directly related to the Punjab civil war may have been about 20,000. Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 167-205; Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassel, 1950), pp. 424-426; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 17-24, 1948, p. 9049; Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 294, 434-445, and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 120-122.
148. Although accounts are incomplete, it appears that total deaths in intercommunal violence in India in 1946-47 not directly related to the Punjab civil war may have been about 20,000. Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 167-205; Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassel, 1950), pp. 424-426; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 17-24, 1948, p. 9049; Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 294, 434-445, and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 120-122.
149. Although accounts are incomplete, it appears that total deaths in intercommunal violence in India in 1946-47 not directly related to the Punjab civil war may have been about 20,000. Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 167-205; Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassel, 1950), pp. 424-426; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 17-24, 1948, p. 9049; Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 294, 434-445, and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 120-122.
150. Although accounts are incomplete, it appears that total deaths in intercommunal violence in India in 1946-47 not directly related to the Punjab civil war may have been about 20,000. Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 167-205; Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassel, 1950), pp. 424-426; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 17-24, 1948, p. 9049; Menon, Transfer of Power, pp. 294, 434-445, and Lumby, Transfer of Power, 1942-7, pp. 120-122.
151. Majid Husain, Geography of Jammu and Kashmir State (New Delhi: Rajesh Publications, 1987), p. 54.
152. Šumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 34-35, 42.
153. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 (Hertingfordbury, U.K.: Roxford Books, 1991), pp. 131-136; and Ganguly, Origins of War in South Asia, pp. 13-14.
154. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 (Hertingfordbury, U.K.: Roxford Books, 1991), pp. 131-136; and Ganguly, Origins of War in South Asia, pp. 13-14.
155. The arrival in 1983 of Muslim refugees fleeing a massacre in Assam and the assault in 1984 by Indian forces on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar did not help either. Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes for Peace (Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. 76-90; and Lamb, Disputed Legacy, pp. 327-330.
156. The arrival in 1983 of Muslim refugees fleeing a massacre in Assam and the assault in 1984 by Indian forces on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar did not help either. Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes for Peace (Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. 76-90; and Lamb, Disputed Legacy, pp. 327-330.
157. Ganguly, Crisis in Kashmir, pp. 107-108, 133, 152-156; "India and Pakistan Plan Kashmir Talks," New York Times, June 24, 1997. In 1998, in the first free elections in Kashmir in nearly two decades, the antiseparatist National Conference won 4 of 6 seats, while turnout was low as a result of a boycott called by Muslim separatists. Surinder Oberoi, "Three Die and 12 Abducted during Kashmir Elections," AAP Information Services, March 1, 1998; and "Betrayal in Jammu and Kashmir," The Hindu, April 5, 1998.
158. Ganguly, Crisis in Kashmir, pp. 107-108, 133, 152-156; "India and Pakistan Plan Kashmir Talks," New York Times, June 24, 1997. In 1998, in the first free elections in Kashmir in nearly two decades, the antiseparatist National Conference won 4 of 6 seats, while turnout was low as a result of a boycott called by Muslim separatists. Surinder Oberoi, "Three Die and 12 Abducted during Kashmir Elections," AAP Information Services, March 1, 1998; and "Betrayal in Jammu and Kashmir," The Hindu, April 5, 1998.
159. Ganguly, Crisis in Kashmir, pp. 107-108, 133, 152-156; "India and Pakistan Plan Kashmir Talks," New York Times, June 24, 1997. In 1998, in the first free elections in Kashmir in nearly two decades, the antiseparatist National Conference won 4 of 6 seats, while turnout was low as a result of a boycott called by Muslim separatists. Surinder Oberoi, "Three Die and 12 Abducted during Kashmir Elections," AAP Information Services, March 1, 1998; and "Betrayal in Jammu and Kashmir," The Hindu, April 5, 1998.
160. Ganguly, Crisis in Kashmir, pp. 107-108, 133, 152-156; "India and Pakistan Plan Kashmir Talks," New York Times, June 24, 1997. In 1998, in the first free elections in Kashmir in nearly two decades, the antiseparatist National Conference won 4 of 6 seats, while turnout was low as a result of a boycott called by Muslim separatists. Surinder Oberoi, "Three Die and 12 Abducted during Kashmir Elections," AAP Information Services, March 1, 1998; and "Betrayal in Jammu and Kashmir," The Hindu, April 5, 1998.
161. Ganguly, Origins of War in South Asia, p. 58.
162. Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978)
163. Reuters World Service, January 28, 1995; and Reuters North American Wire, April 28, 1997.
164. Reuters World Service, January 28, 1995; and Reuters North American Wire, April 28, 1997.
165. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 108; Walid Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Washington, D.C. Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982), p. 582; and Joseph P. Schechtman, The Refugee in the World: Displacement and Integration (New York: Barnes; Yoseloff, 1964), p. 262.
166. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 108; Walid Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Washington, D.C. Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982), p. 582; and Joseph P. Schechtman, The Refugee in the World: Displacement and Integration (New York: Barnes; Yoseloff, 1964), p. 262.
167. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 108; Walid Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Washington, D.C. Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982), p. 582; and Joseph P. Schechtman, The Refugee in the World: Displacement and Integration (New York: Barnes; Yoseloff, 1964), p. 262.
168. The plan divided Palestine into eight parts: three main Jewish and three main Arab enclaves, meeting at two points in such a way that none of the Jewish or Arab enclaves were contiguous. A seventh small Arab enclave (the city of Jaffa) was surrounded by Jewish territory and the eighth ("internationalized" Jerusalem) by Arab territory. T.G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 177-183.
169. British District Police Reports, April 26 and 28 1948, cited in Schechtman, The Refugee in the World, p. 191.
170. British District Police Reports, April 26 and 28 1948, cited in Schechtman, The Refugee in the World, p. 191.
171. Benny Morris, "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramie in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 82-109.
172. Jewish terrorists not under government discipline carried out an even more brutal cleansing operation in the village of Deir Yassin, which also overlooks the Jersualem road.
173. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York: Knopf, 1979), pp. 382, 395.
174. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); and Geoffrey Aronson, Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians, and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987).
175. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); and Geoffrey Aronson, Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians, and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987).
176. Alexander B. Downes, "The Holy Land Divided? Theory and Practice for a Successful Partition of Palestine," unpublished ms., University of Chicago, suggests that Jews now living in the West Bank exchange places with the Palestinians of Gaza. This seems to me excessive.
177. Kumar, "Troubled History of Partition," p. 29. Kumar further claims that there was a war scare between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus as recently as August 1996, but this actually amounted to no more than some moderately warm rhetoric by Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, plus Turkish protests about attacks on three consulates. See Michele Kambas, "Greek PM Slams Turkey on Arrival in Cyprus," Reuters European Community Report, August 17, 1996.
178. Kumar, "Troubled History of Partition," p. 29. Kumar further claims that there was a war scare between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus as recently as August 1996, but this actually amounted to no more than some moderately warm rhetoric by Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, plus Turkish protests about attacks on three consulates. See Michele Kambas, "Greek PM Slams Turkey on Arrival in Cyprus," Reuters European Community Report, August 17, 1996.
179. Five in 1975, two between 1989 and 1993, and five in 1996. "List of Deaths on Green Line since 1974," Agence France-Presse, August 11, 1996; Patrick Baz, Agence France-Presse, August 14, 1996; and Michele Kambas, Reuters World Service, October 15, 1996.
180. Five in 1975, two between 1989 and 1993, and five in 1996. "List of Deaths on Green Line since 1974," Agence France-Presse, August 11, 1996; Patrick Baz, Agence France-Presse, August 14, 1996; and Michele Kambas, Reuters World Service, October 15, 1996.
181. Five in 1975, two between 1989 and 1993, and five in 1996. "List of Deaths on Green Line since 1974," Agence France-Presse, August 11, 1996; Patrick Baz, Agence France-Presse, August 14, 1996; and Michele Kambas, Reuters World Service, October 15, 1996.
182. Nancy Cranshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 42-50, 62-67, 71-75; Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to Kissinger (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989), pp. 42-46; and Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 28-30.
183. Nancy Cranshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 42-50, 62-67, 71-75; Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to Kissinger (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989), pp. 42-46; and Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 28-30.
184. Nancy Cranshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 42-50, 62-67, 71-75; Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to Kissinger (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989), pp. 42-46; and Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 28-30.
185. Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971 (Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1976), pp. 8-11.
186. British official figures, reported in Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, p. 406.
187. Makarios was, however, prepared to be patient on the latter, because he did not want to provoke Turkish intervention. Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, pp. 341-345, 366-367; P.N. Vanezis, Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism (London: Abelard Schuman, 1974), pp. 123-133; and Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 159-166.
188. Makarios was, however, prepared to be patient on the latter, because he did not want to provoke Turkish intervention. Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, pp. 341-345, 366-367; P.N. Vanezis, Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism (London: Abelard Schuman, 1974), pp. 123-133; and Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 159-166.
189. Makarios was, however, prepared to be patient on the latter, because he did not want to provoke Turkish intervention. Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, pp. 341-345, 366-367; P.N. Vanezis, Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism (London: Abelard Schuman, 1974), pp. 123-133; and Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 159-166.
190. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, p. 46; and Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, pp. 367-373. The presence of 7,000 UN peacekeepers during the latter part of the fighting had little effect.
191. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, p. 46; and Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, pp. 367-373. The presence of 7,000 UN peacekeepers during the latter part of the fighting had little effect.
192. Makarios's personal interest in enosis waned after the April 1967 military coup in Athens, but he felt unable to oppose the projects of Greek Cypriot nationalists, which commanded great popularity. In 1970 he barely survived a nationalist assassination attempt. Mayes, Makarios, pp. 183-186, 206-207.
193. Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 65; Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations, pp. 73-74, 173; and Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, p. 119.
194. Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 65; Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations, pp. 73-74, 173; and Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, p. 119.
195. Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 65; Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations, pp. 73-74, 173; and Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, p. 119.
196. For details of the negotiations and internal politics of the sides, see Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), pp. 62-132; and Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations, pp. 89, 167, 175-188.
197. For details of the negotiations and internal politics of the sides, see Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), pp. 62-132; and Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations, pp. 89, 167, 175-188.
198. Although EOKA B was an illegal organization, it commanded great popular support among Greek Cypriots, including much of the Cypriot National Guard. The funeral in January 1974 of its founder, General George Grivas, was attended by one-fifth of the entire Greek population. Polyviou, Cyprus, pp. 120-130; and Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellepais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 149-150.
199. Although EOKA B was an illegal organization, it commanded great popular support among Greek Cypriots, including much of the Cypriot National Guard. The funeral in January 1974 of its founder, General George Grivas, was attended by one-fifth of the entire Greek population. Polyviou, Cyprus, pp. 120-130; and Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellepais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 149-150.
200. Sampson was elected to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives in 1969 on the slogan "Death to the Turks!" Oberling, Road to Bellepais, p. 160. According to Makarios, Sampson and the head of the Athens junta in 1974, General Dimitrios Ioannides, had come to see him back in 1964 and proposed: "Your Beatitude, here is my project. To attack the Turkish Cypriots suddenly, everywhere on the island, and eliminate them to the last one." Quoted in Orianna Fallaci, Interview with History (New York: Liveright, 1976), p. 318.
201. Sampson was elected to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives in 1969 on the slogan "Death to the Turks!" Oberling, Road to Bellepais, p. 160. According to Makarios, Sampson and the head of the Athens junta in 1974, General Dimitrios Ioannides, had come to see him back in 1964 and proposed: "Your Beatitude, here is my project. To attack the Turkish Cypriots suddenly, everywhere on the island, and eliminate them to the last one." Quoted in Orianna Fallaci, Interview with History (New York: Liveright, 1976), p. 318.
202. Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, p. 395; and Polyviou, Cyprus, p. 203.
203. Cranshaw, Cyprus Revolt, p. 395; and Polyviou, Cyprus, p. 203.
204. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13.
205. A British plan in the 1920s to create a legislature was blocked by Arab opposition. Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917-1929 (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1978).
206. The presence of refugees from Palestine had some impact on the civil war from 1975 onward, although the war was more the result of tensions among the native Christian, Sunni, and Shiite populations. David Gilmour, Lebanon, the Fractured Country (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).
207. Since 1974 the (Greek) rump state of Cyprus has had several changes of government in free elections. Eric Solsten, Cyprus: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).
208. Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).
209. "Rabin Meets Hadash, DAP Representatives: Shas Hints at Abstention Tomorrow," Jerusalem Post, November 9, 1993; and "Netanyahu Wins Israeli Election," Associated Press, May 31, 1996.
210. "Rabin Meets Hadash, DAP Representatives: Shas Hints at Abstention Tomorrow," Jerusalem Post, November 9, 1993; and "Netanyahu Wins Israeli Election," Associated Press, May 31, 1996.
211. Schaeffer, Warpaths, pp. 166-167.
212. Critics also charge that partition successor states discriminate against minorities through citizenship and language laws - for example, Israel's Law of Return, which grants automatic citizenship to Jewish immigrants, and its 1950 Absentee Property Law, which bars the return of Arabs who left the country during the 1947-49 war. However, official languages, citizenship laws, and immigration practices that favor the majority are actually features of most nation-states, including such liberal democracies as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, and Italy.
213. Existing administrative unit boundaries are often given excessive weight, as in Kashmir in 1947 and Ulster in 1921. See Steven R. Ratner, "Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 90, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 590-624.
214. The severity of this risk depends on the robustness of the winning side's territorial control. Nigeria could afford to reabsorb refugees of the Biafran war because the war's decisive outcome meant that there was little chance of a new revolt. The Republika Srpska, which is far more fragile, cannot. International demands that the Rwandan Patriotic Front accept the return of more than 2 million Hutu refugees placed the RPF in an impossible position. Because the RPF represented less than 10 percent of the population, it could not claim legitimacy if it refused repatriation, but the return of large numbers of Hutus, including adherents of the former government, was bound to lead to a new round of civil war, and did. "Hutu Rebels Terrorize Three Nations: The Slaughter Continues," International Herald Tribune, January 29, 1998.