Empire, imperialism and the Bush doctrine

Review of International Studies

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 585-608

  Cox, Michael ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 6344292034     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210504006242     Document Type: Review

References (139)

1. Quote from Michael Ignatieff, 'Empire Lite', Prospect, 83 (February 2003), p. 36.
2. On the role played by war in the formation of great states, see Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (London: Penguin Books, 2002).
3. John T. McNay, Acheson and the Empire: the British Accent in American Foreign Policy (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2001).
4. On the scale of American preponderance in 1945, see Donald White, 'The Nature of World Power in American History: an Evaluation at the End of World War II',, Diplomatic History, 11:3 (1987), pp. 181-202.
5. For one of the better studies of the American Empire, see Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967).
6. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 68.
7. Toynbee, it has been observed, 'attended Winchester and studied classics at Oxford, both of which were intended to prepare young men for service in an enlightened Empire'. Quoted from Cornelia Navari, 'Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975): Prophecy and Civilization', Review of International Studies, 26: 2 (April 2000), p. 289.
8. On what he sees as the 'myth of the reluctant superpower', see Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 7-31.
9. G. John Ikenberry, 'Rethinking The Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quarterly, 104: 3 (1989), p. 377.
10. According to one of the principle American theorists of hegemonic stability, it was E.H.Carr in The Twenty Years' Crisis who first 'demonstrated that a liberal world economy world must rest on a dominant liberal power'. See Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), fn. 52, pp. 100-1.
11. Even the best American study on the subject uses the term Empire to apply to every other power-other than the United States. See Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1986).
12. Niall Ferguson, 'Is the US Empire an Empire in Denial?' Lecture given at the Foreign Policy Association, 17 September 2003. 〈http://www.fpa.org/ topics〉. Ferguson later argued that the United States is 'an empire . . . that dare not speak its name. It is an empire in denial.' Quote from his popular, Empire: How Britain Made The Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 381.
13. Most famously William Appleman Williams in his Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random House, 1969).
14. A point made by Dimitri K. Simes in his useful 'America's Imperial Dilemma', Foreign Affairs, 82: 6 (November/December 2003), p. 93. On foreign reflections on the American Empire, see for instance Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: the United States and the World, 1945-1973 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975), Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952', Journal of Peace Research, 23: 3 (1986), pp. 263-77, and Susan Strange, The Future of the American Empire', Journal of International Affairs, 42: 1 (1988), pp. 1-18.
15. A point made by Dimitri K. Simes in his useful 'America's Imperial Dilemma', Foreign Affairs, 82: 6 (November/December 2003), p. 93. On foreign reflections on the American Empire, see for instance Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: the United States and the World, 1945-1973 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975), Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952', Journal of Peace Research, 23: 3 (1986), pp. 263-77, and Susan Strange, The Future of the American Empire', Journal of International Affairs, 42: 1 (1988), pp. 1-18.
16. A point made by Dimitri K. Simes in his useful 'America's Imperial Dilemma', Foreign Affairs, 82: 6 (November/December 2003), p. 93. On foreign reflections on the American Empire, see for instance Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: the United States and the World, 1945-1973 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975), Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952', Journal of Peace Research, 23: 3 (1986), pp. 263-77, and Susan Strange, The Future of the American Empire', Journal of International Affairs, 42: 1 (1988), pp. 1-18.
17. A point made by Dimitri K. Simes in his useful 'America's Imperial Dilemma', Foreign Affairs, 82: 6 (November/December 2003), p. 93. On foreign reflections on the American Empire, see for instance Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: the United States and the World, 1945-1973 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975), Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952', Journal of Peace Research, 23: 3 (1986), pp. 263-77, and Susan Strange, The Future of the American Empire', Journal of International Affairs, 42: 1 (1988), pp. 1-18.
18. Emma Rothschild, 'Empire Beware!', The New York Review of Books, 51: 5 (25 March 2004), pp. 37-8.
19. Charles Krauthammer, Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy For A Unipolar World (Washingon, DC: The AEI Press, 2004), pp. 2-3.
20. On Empire denial in the United States, see the comments by Andrew J. Bacevich in his edited volume The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire (Chicago, IL: Ivor R. Dee, 2003), p. x.
21. See for example George Liska, Career of Empire (Washington, John Hopkins University Press, 1979).
22. I discuss the rebirth of the idea of hegemony in the 1990s in my 'September 11th and US Hegemony - Or Will the 21st Century Be American Too?', International Studies Perspective, 3 (2002), pp. 53-70.
23. Still the most useful overview of 9/11 is Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
24. Most recently, the former US Director of Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, in his Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (London: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
25. For contemporary Marxist assessments of US foreign policy, see Alex Callinicos, The Actuality of Imperialism' Millennium, 31: 2 (2002), pp. 319-26 and David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
26. For contemporary Marxist assessments of US foreign policy, see Alex Callinicos, The Actuality of Imperialism' Millennium, 31: 2 (2002), pp. 319-26 and David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
27. A point also endorsed by a few revisionist liberal writers. See Michael Ignatieff, 'American Empire: Get Used To It', New York Times Magazine, 5 January 2003; and also Robert Cooper's advocacy of a voluntary imperium in Europe in his The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).
28. A point also endorsed by a few revisionist liberal writers. See Michael Ignatieff, 'American Empire: Get Used To It', New York Times Magazine, 5 January 2003; and also Robert Cooper's advocacy of a voluntary imperium in Europe in his The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).
29. Max Boot, 'The Case for American Empire', Weekly Standard, 15 October 2001.
30. Michael Ignatieff insists that 'America's entire war on terror is an exercise in imperialism', New York Times Magazine, 28 July 2002.
31. Sebastian Mallaby, 'The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire', Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March-April 2002), p. 6.
32. William Appleman Williams, 'The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy', Pacific Historic Review, 24 (1955), p. 379.
33. Charles S. Maier, 'An American Empire', Harvard Magazine, 105: 2 ( November-December 2002), pp. 28-31.
34. Ronald Wright, 'For a wild surmise', Times Literary Supplement, 20 December 2002, p. 3.
35. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
36. Robert Kaplan. See Preston Jones, 'The world according to Robert Kaplan', Ottawa Citizen, 3 March 2002.
37. Dinesh D'Souza, 'In praise of American empire', Christian Science Monitor, 26 April 2002.
38. Sebastian Mallaby, 'The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States and the Case for an American Empire', Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March-April 2002), pp. 2-7.
39. '. . . troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets'. Max Boot, quoted in Emily Eakin, 'It takes an Empire say several thinkers', New York Times, 2 April 2002.
40. Thomas E. Ricks, 'Empire or not? A quiet debate over the US role', Washington Post, 21 August 2001.
41. George Bush speeches to cadets at West Point (June 2002) and to veterans at the White House (November 2002).
42. Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 152, 153.
43. See G. John Ikenberry, 'The Illusions of Empire', Foreign Affairs, 82: 2 (2004), pp. 144-154 and his 'The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment', Survival, 46: 1 (2004), pp. 47-62.
44. See G. John Ikenberry, 'The Illusions of Empire', Foreign Affairs, 82: 2 (2004), pp. 144-154 and his 'The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment', Survival, 46: 1 (2004), pp. 47-62.
45. 'Whatever Happened to Globalization?' asks Chalmers Johnson in his The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (London: Verso Books, 2004), pp. 255-82.
46. For confirmation of this thesis see the very useful James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004).
47. A point made by Michael Mastanduno about the 1990s in particular in his 'Incomplete Hegemony and Security Order in the Asia-Pacific' in G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 192.
48. On the theme of a 'new American century' in modern neo-conservative theory see the influential publications of the Project for a New American Century at 〈http://www.newamerican century.org〉 Key figures associated with this very important pressure group - founded in 1998 - include several people who later went on to exert great influence under George W. Bush. It included, amongst others, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, I. Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan, Max Boot, Frank Carlucci, Midge Decter, Elliot Abrams, Donald Kagan, R.James Woolsey, William Kristol, William J. Bennett, Aaron Friedberg, Dan Quayle, Fred C. Ikle, Jeb Bush, Peter W. Rodman, and Norman Podhoretz.
49. See, for example, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), David C. Hendrickson, 'Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security', World Policy Journal, 19: 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 1-10, and John Lewis Gaddis, 'A Grand Strategy of Transformation', Foreign Policy (November-December 2002), pp. 1-8.
50. See, for example, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), David C. Hendrickson, 'Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security', World Policy Journal, 19: 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 1-10, and John Lewis Gaddis, 'A Grand Strategy of Transformation', Foreign Policy (November-December 2002), pp. 1-8.
51. See, for example, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), David C. Hendrickson, 'Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security', World Policy Journal, 19: 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 1-10, and John Lewis Gaddis, 'A Grand Strategy of Transformation', Foreign Policy (November-December 2002), pp. 1-8.
52. For a liberal critique of the Bush foreign policy, see Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). A conservative critique can be found in Ivan Eland, 'The Empire Strikes Out; The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws', Policy Analysis, 459 (26 November 2002), pp. 1-27.
53. For a liberal critique of the Bush foreign policy, see Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). A conservative critique can be found in Ivan Eland, 'The Empire Strikes Out; The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws', Policy Analysis, 459 (26 November 2002), pp. 1-27.
54. Though, for a useful discussion, see Martin Shaw, 'Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era', Millennium, 31: 2 (2002), pp. 327-36.
55. A point made in Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations', Millennium, 31: 1 (2002), pp. 109-27.
56. See Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London, Verso Press, 2003).
57. See Alfredo Valladao, The Twenty First Century Will Be American (London: Verso, 1996).
58. Thanh Duong, Hegemonic Globalisation: US Centrality and Global Strategy in the Emerging World Order (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
59. See David Campbell, 'Contradictions of Lonely Superpower', in David Slater and Peter J. Taylor (eds.), The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 222-42.
60. For a fuller discussion of the issues raised here, see my longer 'Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New United States Hegemony', New Political Economy, 6: 3 (2002), pp. 311-40.
61. Quote from Dmitri K. Simes, 'America's Imperial Dilemma', Foreign Affairs, p. 93.
62. Walter Russell Mead, Mortal Splendour: The American Empire in Transition (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1987).
63. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (London, Unwin Hyman, 1988).
64. See Richard Rosecrance, America as an Ordinary Country: US Foreign Policy and the Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).
65. Stephen Gill explores one response to hegemonic crisis in his American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
66. See Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3rd edn. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), and Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order? American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (New York: McGrawHill, 1978).
67. See Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3rd edn. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), and Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order? American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (New York: McGrawHill, 1978).
68. To get a flavour of the ideology of the 'new' Cold Warriors of the time see the publications of the Committee on the Present Danger, especially Is America Becoming Number Two? (Washington DC, 1978) and Has America Become Number Two? (Washington DC, 1982).
69. A view also supported by a number of those opposed to Reagan's foreign policy of revitalised containment, including Bruce Russett, 'The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?', International Organization, 39: 2 (1985), pp. 206-31.
70. A point well made in Fred Halliday's classic, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso Books, 1983).
71. See the several contributions in the Review of International Studies, 25: 4 (1999).
72. Coral Bell, A World Out of Balance: American Ascendancy and International Politics in the 21st Century (New South Wales, Australia: Longueville Books, 2003).
73. See my 'International History since 1989', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 122-4.
74. I discuss this in my US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission? (London: Pinter, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
75. For a critique of Clinton's lack of military purpose see the detailed David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
76. On the American renaissance in the 1990s, see Bruce Cumings, 'Still the American Century' in Michael Cox, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 271-99.
77. This section draws heavily from the excellent first-hand description provided by Nicholas Lehmann, 'The next world order: the Bush Administration may have a brand-new doctrine of power', The New Yorker, 4 April 2002. To be found at 〈http://new yorker.com/fact/content/?020401faFACT1〉.
78. The document which summed up these hegemonic thoughts was put together by a group of defence intellectuals in 1992 led by Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Albert Wohlstetter, I. Lewis Libby and Zalmay Khalizad.
79. See James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 208-15.
80. Charles Krauthammer, 'The New Unilateralism' Washington Post, 8 June 2001, p. 29.
81. James Woolsey, 'Interview by Galina J. Michkovitch', Prospect, September (2003), pp. 20-23.
82. For a sample of this kind of thinking, see the neo-conservative magazine The Weekly Standard.
83. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, 'Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, July/August, 1996, pp. 23-35.
84. I discuss European criticism of the early Bush policies in my 'Europe and the New American Challenge after September 11: Crisis-What Crisis?', Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 1:1 (2003), pp. 37-55.
85. In one of the more significant studies edited and authored by key figures on the new right, nearly every other threat was mentioned from China to Iraq, but little was said about the Sunni-inspired terrorism articulated and practised by Bin Laden. See Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds.), Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2000).
86. On 20 September 2001, Bush told Blair that 'after Afghanistan we must come back to Iraq'. Cited in Bryan Burrough, Evgenia Peretz, David Rose and David Wise, The Path to War', Vanity Fair, 525 (May 2004), pp. 100-16, 169-82.
87. To see how European allies responded to the Bush Doctrine, see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
88. Quoted in Christopher Hitchens, 'Imperialism, superpower dominance, malignant and benign', 10 December 2002. 〈http://slate.msn.com/id= 2075261〉
89. Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (London: Pimlico, 2003), p. 3.
90. On September 11 as opportunity see Andrew Roberts, 'Americans are on the march', The Times, 12 April 2003.
91. Quote from Andrew Bacevich, cited in Niall Ferguson, The empire that dares not speak its name', The Sunday Times, 13 April 2003.
92. G. John Ikenberry, 'The Illusions of Empire', Foreign Affairs, 83: 2 (March/April 2004), pp. 154-62.
93. Dominic Lieven, 'The Concept of Empire', Fathom: The Source far Online Learning. See 〈http://www.fathom.com/feauture/122086〉
94. It remains a moot point as to whether or not territorial expansion was even constitutional. See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Liberty: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
95. In a letter to James Madison in 1809, Thomas Jefferson wrote that 'no constitution was ever so well calculated as ours for extensive empire'. Quoted in Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, ibid., p. 1.
96. I discuss this in my 'America and the World', in Robert Singh (ed.), Governing America: the Politics of a Divided Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 13-31.
97. Empires, see fn. 11.
98. See John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', Economic History Review, 2nd series, 6: 1 (1953), pp. 1-25.
99. This point is outlined in terms of IR theory by Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 97-102.
100. A point made by G. John Ikenberry in his 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quarterly, 104 (1989), pp. 375-400.
101. See the chapter on 'Imperial Anticolonialism' in William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1959).
102. On British suspicion of American moral rhetoric, see Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made The World, pp. 348-52.
103. On the more general uses of self-determination as a means of advancing US influence, see Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
104. See John Wacher (ed.), 2 vols, The Roman World (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 139.
105. 'Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their external behavior and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behavior within the subordinate states'. Quoted in Stephen Peter Rosen, 'An Empire, If You Can keep It', The National Interest, 71 (Spring 2003), p. 51.
106. 'The US does not and indeed no nation-state can today form the centre of an imperialist project'. Cited in John Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) pp. xiii-xiv.
107. Jospeh Nye Jr, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
108. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 24.
109. Robert Wade, 'The invisible hand of the American Empire', Unpublished ms., 15 February 2003.
110. The main reason cited by the United States for not joining The International Criminal Court. See Dominic McGoldreick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 400-52.
111. For a further elaboration of the issues raised in this section see my 'The Empire's Back in Town: or America's Imperial Temptation - Again', Millennium, 32: 1 (2003), esp. pp. 14-22.
112. Michael Mann, 'The First Failed Empire of the 21st Century', in David Held and Mathias Kosnig-Archibugi, American Power in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
113. Though not to the liking of some Americans. See Philip Zelikow, 'The Transformation of National Security: Five Redefinitions', The National Interest, 71 (Spring 2003), p. 18.
114. See 'America's World', The Economist, 23 October 1999, p. 15, and John M. Owen, 'Why American Hegemony Is Here To Stay', Symposium: Pax Americana or International Rule of Law, 16 January 2003. 〈http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/ portal30/docs〉.
115. See 'America's World', The Economist, 23 October 1999, p. 15, and John M. Owen, 'Why American Hegemony Is Here To Stay', Symposium: Pax Americana or International Rule of Law, 16 January 2003. 〈http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/ portal30/docs〉.
116. Dana Priest and Joe Stephens, 'The secret world of US interrogation', The Wall Street Journal Europe, 12 May 2004.
117. See Dominic McGoldrick, From '9-11' to the Iraq War 2003; International Law in an Age of Complexity (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004).
118. See Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era (New York: Vintage Books, 2002).
119. A points also made by Clyde Prestowitz in his Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
120. On Clinton as a more effective Empire builder than George W. Bush, see Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, pp. 255-6.
121. Fareed Zakaria, 'Arrogant Empire', Newsweek, March 2003.
122. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, original 2000 edition: New York: Time Warner Paperbacks, 2002).
123. I discuss this in my 'September 11th and US Hegemony - Or Will the 21st Century Be American Too?', International Studies Perspective, 3 (2002), pp. 53-70.
124. See New World Coming: American Security in the Twenty First Century. Phase I Report. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 15 September 1999.
125. See Chris Reus-Smit, American Power and Global Order (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004).
126. Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York and London, Oxford University Press, 2002).
127. See Robert Kagan, 'America's Crisis of Legitimacy', Foreign Affairs, 83: 2 (March-April 2004), pp. 65-87.
128. See the critical comments by a former undersecretary of state to Clinton and a senior adviser to Senator Kerry on foreign policy. James P. Rubin, 'Political dynamite', FT Magazine, 3 April 2004.
129. Charles Grant, 'Comment', The Centre for European Economic Reform. May 2003.
130. See Joseph M. Grieco, 'Let's get a second opinion: allies, the UN and US public support for war'. Unpublished manuscript, June 2002.
131. Niall Ferguson, Colossus, p. 293.
132. Robert Hunter Wade, 'The Invisible Hand of the American Empire', Ethics & International Affairs, 17: 2 (2003), pp. 77-88.
133. See Robert Brenner, 'The Crisis in the US Economy', London Review of Books, 25: 3 (6 February 2003), pp. 18-23.
134. Precisely the point made by Bush's first Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neill who was later sacked for pointing out that massive tax cuts for the rich combined with huge defence outlays was likely to lead to serious deficit problems. See Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, The White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
135. See George Soros, The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting the Misuse of American Power (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2004).
136. See Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order (London and New York, Routledge, 2003), esp. pp. 39-71.
137. See Robert Dujarric, America's Inadvertent Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
138. After having concluded that the situation in Iraq by May 2004 was as difficult as the one that had driven the United States out of Vietnam, one former Clinton official argued: 'We now have to admit that the American position is untenable'. Richard Holbrooke, quoted in International Herald Tribune, 11 May 2004.
139. The title on the cover of one well known US magazine said all that most Americans wanted or needed to know about Iraq: 'State of Siege', Time, 163: 16 (19 April 2004). In the same issue one poll showed that whereas in April 2003 over 50 per cent of Americans felt safer because of having got rid of Saddam, a year later the figure had fallen to 40 per cent.