When good fences make bad neighbors: Fixed borders, state weakness, and international conflict

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 139-173

  Atzili, Boaz ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33847252435     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.139     Document Type: Article

References (207)

1. John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 123-152;
2. and Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 306-311.
3. Noting this is John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174.
4. See, for example, Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System," World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1986), pp. 27-52;
5. Brendan O'Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds., Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002);
6. and Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).
7. Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 215-250;
8. and Tanisha M. Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm," paper presented at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August 29-September 2, 2001. Rather than referring to this norm as "territorial integrity" or "territorial sovereignty," I use "fixed borders" to distinguish between territorial and nonterritorial intervention.
9. Although outside the scope of the article, it is useful to note that states in an international system of fixed borders create more favorable conditions for global terrorist organizations to emerge (e.g., in Lebanon and Somalia). See Robert I. Rotberg, ed., "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators," in Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Cambridge, Mass.: World Peace Foundation, 2003), pp. 1-25.
10. Fund for Peace, "Failed States Index," http://www.fundforpeace. org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php. See also Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 85.
11. I use "Congo" when referring to the country in general, and Zaire and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) when it was officially termed so. Plausibility probes are "preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted." See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 75-76.
12. On the justification and logic of using an extreme case, see ibid., pp. 120-123. For an example of a study that uses a similar approach, see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.
13. For most actors, a norm would mean "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity." See Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5. Some actors, however, adhere to a norm simply because it is common practice, or out of fear of retribution should they breach it.
14. See Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1095-1111.
15. For similar arguments, see Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm"; and Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm."
16. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), p. 203.
17. I use the term "homeland territory" to control for cases of decolonization and the breakup of empires, which involve territorial changes but are not relevant to the norm of fixed borders. The ten cases are Israel from Syria, 1967; Israel from Jordan, 1967; Israel from Egypt, 1967; Iran from the United Arab Emirates, 1971; India from Pakistan, 1971; Libya from Chad, 1973; Israel from Syria, 1973; Turkey from Cyprus, 1973; China from South Vietnam, 1974; and Armenia from Azerbaijan, 1991-94 (a border case between foreign conquest and secession). I do not consider the U.S. occupation in Iraq as one of these cases, because it is not intended to be permanent occupation or annexation. Should the occupation continue much longer, however, it might be considered as such.
18. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 281-288.
19. Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.
20. Moreover, John E. Mueller argues that even without nuclear weapons, war has become unthinkable because of its devastating costs for advanced industrial societies. See Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1996).
21. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
22. Wilson's words in 1919 to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations expressed precisely the idea of fixed borders: "I understand that article [article 10 of the League covenant] to mean that no nation is at liberty to invade the territorial integrity of another. Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by armed intervention; it is destroyed by the retention of territory, by taking territory away from it." "A Conversation with Members of the Foreign Relations Committee," August 19, 1919, in Arthur S. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm," p. 25.
23. On the development of these ideas, see Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 133-199; and Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 216-221.
24. United Nations General Assembly, "Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," Resolution 2625, October 24,1970. In addition, some regional organizations emphasize the sanctity of borders in their conventions and resolutions. For the institutionalization of the norm in the United Nations and regional organizations, see Korman, The Right of Conquest, pp. 199-214; and Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 221-223.
25. For this interpretation, see Korman, The Right of Conquest, pp. 209-214.
26. Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm."
27. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.
28. Michael C. Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 237-268, could be interpreted this way.
29. William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks by the President in Greeting to the Peoples of Pakistan," Islamabad, Pakistan, March 25, 2000.
30. Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
31. Michel-Cyr Djiena Wembou, "The OAU and International Law," in Yassin El-Ayouty, ed., The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. 16.
32. Jeffery Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 683-687, at p. 673.
33. See also Herbst, States and Power in Africa;
34. Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa': Lessons of a Continental War," World Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 11-20;
35. and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 87-90. The only case that possibly contradicts the norm of fixed borders is Morocco's annexation of the Western Sahara in 1976. Note that the African norm against changing borders goes beyond even that of the wider international community by prohibiting secessions, as well as conquests. I consider this only a variant of the international norm of fixed borders, not a separate phenomenon. From the point of view of the individual state, moreover, this norm is still "international," regardless of whether it originates in the region or beyond it.
36. For an example of a similar use of state strength, see Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 82-98.
37. See also Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 57-111.
38. Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 21-46, 193-194.
39. See, for example, Samuel E. Finer, "State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 134-144. France is another example.
40. See Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979).
41. Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, Felix Gilbert, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975);
42. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 3-83;
43. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992;
44. Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992);
45. and Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
46. See, for example, Henry Tajfel and John C. Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior," in Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin, eds., Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 2d ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 7-24. For a sociological viewpoint,
47. see Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), pp. 87-110.
48. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 87-110;
49. Janice Gross Stein, "Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 189-208;
50. and Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" pp. 247-248.
51. See Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653-673;
52. and Max Weber, "The Prestige and Power of the Great Powers," in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 159-162.
53. Here I diverge from the argument of Herbst, "War and the State in Africa"; and Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" Both authors argue that the absence of international wars (of any kind) is what weakens third world states, whereas I maintain that only the absence of a particular kind of war (i.e., wars of territorial conquest) has this effect.
54. See Cameron G. Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Postcolonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (March 2004), pp. 53-72.
55. In most cases in which a state in the post-World War II era faced a real threat to its territorial integrity and its survival - such as in Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan (though not officially a state) - it engaged relatively successfully in state building. See, for instance, Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 142-205. Although some states that faced territorial threats did not grow stronger (e.g., Jordan and Pakistan), they were not wiped off the map, as they probably would have been in previous eras.
56. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States; and Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 32-33. For discussion of a similar process in ancient China,
57. see Victoria Tin-bor Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe," International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 175-205.
58. See Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International System," International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April 2004), p. 320.
59. Robert H. Jackson, "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 1-16.
60. Jackson, Quasi-states, pp. 1-12, 40-59, 74-81.
61. William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 1-40, at pp. 8-9.
62. I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 1-11;
63. René Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes," African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1997), http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/3/2.htm;
64. and Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 45-79.
65. Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 17-19;
66. and Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-256.
67. Ted Robert Gurr, "Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century," in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Turbulent Peace, pp. 163-188.
68. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, p. 22.
69. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, 1989-98," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 5 (September 1999), pp. 593-606.
70. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, pp. 19-21. Civil wars were common in Latin America as well, but their motives - at least during the Cold War era - were more often ideological.
71. See Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47;
72. James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 115-125;
73. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 48-52;
74. and Sarah K. Lischer, "Causes of Communal War: Fear and Feasibility," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 22, No. 4 (November 1999), pp. 331-335.
75. On greed as a motive for violence in failed states, see Nelson Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation: Causes and Failures," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 53-76.
76. Stein, "Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict," p. 193; and Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," pp. 53-56. Of course, protracted civil war might further magnify the state's weakness. Yet cases in which a strong state becomes embroiled in civil war and emerges from it as a weak state are few. Yugoslavia is perhaps one, but it was considerably weak even before the war.
77. Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-32.
78. Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 5-42. See also Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," pp. 3-7;
79. and Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 143-163.
80. See especially Sarah K. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries; Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 28-31;
81. but also Ted Robert Gurr, "The Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conflicts since 1945: Which Groups, Where, and How?" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., The Internationalization of Communal Strife (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 4-5;
82. and I. William Zartman, "Internationalization of Communal Strife: Temptations and Opportunities of Triangulation," in Midlarsky, The Internationalization of Communal Strife, pp. 27-42.
83. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 35-39;
84. Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," pp. 5-6;
85. and Stuart J. Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-ethnic War," Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 153.
86. Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 1-35, 203-222. For a counterargument,
87. see Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in Brown, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, pp. 603-627.
88. On the proposition that territorial conquest was replaced by intervention for regime change, see Tanisha M. Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1-5, 2005.
89. Buzan, People, States, and Fear, p. 113.
90. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 93-95, at p. 93.
91. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 41-42.
92. In fact, scholars of Congo note the considerable degree of fluidity of Congolese ethnic identities at the time. See ibid., pp. 40-42; and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 200-204.
93. Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 42-43.
94. This figure comes from a survey conducted by the International Rescue Committee in 2004; it includes military and civilian casualties, as well as war-related deaths caused directly by violence and indirectly as a consequence of famine and epidemics.
95. Comprehensive sources on the war are still scarce. For a decent beginning, see John F. Clark, ed., The African Stakes of the Congo War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
96. Edgar O'Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-98 (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 114-115.
97. David Shearer, "Africa's Great War," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 89-106.
98. Quoted in Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, p. 274.
99. Ibid., pp. 74-75, 248-275; and Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 206-209.
100. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 159-162;
101. and René Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Failure to Potential Reconstruction," in Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, pp. 40-41.
102. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook, 2004."
103. Jeffrey Herbst, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice - Implications for Policy," in Rotberg, When States Fail, pp. 306-308;
104. and Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 172-173.
105. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 194-204.
106. For these data, see World Bank, Development Indicators, http://devdata.worldbank.org.ezp2.harvard.edu/dataonline. Compare this, for example, with tax revenues of 30-38 percent for the same years in France and 16-19 percent in the United States, which in the latter case are considered to be very low levels of taxation by Western standards.
107. Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, p. 328. See also Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p. 152;
108. and Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 191-192.
109. It is at least plausible to assume, though, that it took Mobutu and his regime a few years to recognize the extent of the new norm of fixed borders, and that only after the unequivocal position of the international community on the Nigerian civil war (in 1970) became clear did they fully grasp the new norm's implications.
110. "Authenticity" emphasized the need to replace colonial and Western names and institutions with authentic African ones. "Mobutism" was, in essence, the elevation of Mobutu's policies and words over all others. "Zairianization" and "Radicalization" were economic policies that allowed the state to seize private assets belonging to foreign nationals and redistribute them among its supporters. See Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 54-71, 185-247, 326-362, at p. 327;
111. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 233-276;
112. Kevin C. Dunn, "Imagining Mobutu's Zaire: The Production and Consumption of Identity in International Relations," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 245-258;
113. and Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 151-153.
114. Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, p. 397. Max Weber uses the term "patrimonial" to denote a regime that is, for most practical purposes, an extension of the ruler's household.
115. See Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster, 1968), pp. 231-232, 1010-1044.
116. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, p. 409.
117. See also Jean-Claude Willame, Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 2.
118. Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 164-184.
119. Ibid., pp. 71-77; and Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" pp. 14-15.
120. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 149-152.
121. Shearer, "Africa's Great War," p. 92.
122. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 172-173; and Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 44-45.
123. Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 52.
124. Ibid., p. 154; and Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 184-194.
125. For the marginalization of provinces beyond Kinshasa and the Copper Belt region in Shaba, see Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 78-91. For data,
126. see ibid., pp. 82-83.
127. See Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980), pp. 121-148.
128. For the general argument, see Victor Azarya, "Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 83-100. For the case of Congo,
129. see Janet MacGaffey, "Civil Society in Zaire: Hidden Resistance and the Use of Personal Ties in Class Struggle," in Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan, Civil Society and the State in Africa, pp. 169-189.
130. U.S. Department of State country background profile at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm.
131. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 410-414, at p. 412.
132. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 93-95.
133. On the way various ethnic groups in Congo allied themselves with the different external interveners, see Thomas Turner, "The Kabilas' Congo," Current History, May 2001, pp. 215-218.
134. Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 38-43; and Chris McGreal, "Zaire Buries the Victims of Hatred and Expediency," Guardian, September 24, 1993. Banyarwanda is the collective term for groups that migrated from Rwanda and Burundi (ethnically both Hutu and Tutsi) to Congo, mostly in the precolonial era.
135. McGreal, "Zaire Buries the Victims of Hatred and Expediency."
136. "Zaire: Folly by the Numbers," Economist, August 7, 1993, p. 41.
137. Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 152-157; and Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 40-41.
138. Jermaine O. McCalpin, "Historicity of a Crisis: The Origins of the Congo War," in Clark, The African Stakes in the Congo War, p. 46.
139. See also Kisangani N.F. Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 166-167;
140. and Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p. 161.
141. Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 45.
142. Ibid.
143. David Shearer, "Lines on a Map," World Today, Vol. 45, No. 11 (November 1998), p. 295.
144. All of these states are ranked among the weakest in the Failed States Index; their rankings would have been even worse in the early 1900s. See Fund for Peace, "Failed States Index"; and Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," pp. 7-10.
145. Sarah K. Lischer, "Internal Conflict and International Contagion: Refugees, Rebels, and Humanitarian Aid," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 29-September 1, 2002, pp. 13-14.
146. Christian R. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of International Order in Central Africa," African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2000), http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/ v4ila2.htm.
147. See also Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, p. 82;
148. Shearer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 90-92;
149. and Emizet, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," p. 165.
150. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, pp. 91-111;
151. and Herbst, States and Power in Africa, p. 238.
152. See Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, pp. 108-111.
153. For more details, see Human Right Watch Arms Project, "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity: International Support of the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide" (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, May 1995).
154. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, p. 85.
155. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," pp. 1-4;
156. Shearer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 90-92;
157. Bruce Baker, "Going to War Democratically: The Case of the Second Congo War (1998-2000)," Contemporary Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2000), p. 266;
158. and Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2.
159. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," p. 3. See also Shearer, "Africa's Great War"; and Emizet, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," p. 168.
160. Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2; and Shearer, "Africa's Great War," p. 95.
161. Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2;
162. and John F. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 271-272.
163. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 271-273.
164. Thomas Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War," in Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo War, pp. 75-83;
165. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 151-162;
166. Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" p. 14; and Shearer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 96-97.
167. Shearer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 93-95; Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" p. 12; and Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 45-48.
168. Baker, "Going to War Democratically," p. 269.
169. Shearer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 95-96; Baker, "Going to War Democratically," pp. 268-269, at p. 269; and Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 271-273.
170. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 272-273, 278-281;
171. and Shearer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 95-96. This is consistent with Fazal's argument regarding the replacement of the practice of territorial conquest with one of regime change. See Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention."
172. Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" p. 14; and Shearer, "Africa's Great War," p. 95.
173. Shearer, "Lines on a Map," p. 295;
174. and Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," p. 6. On Kabila's appeal to Angola to intervene, which explicitly promised to continue pursuing anti-UNITA policies,
175. see François Misser and Alan Rake, "An African World War?" New African, Vol. 367 (October 1998), p. 14.
176. Emizet, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," pp. 166-167; Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 49-52;
177. and Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 6.
178. Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 6.
179. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, p. 238.
180. Emizet, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," pp. 167-179;
181. Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," pp. 6-7;
182. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," pp. 2-4;
183. and Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" p. 13.
184. Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 45-46;
185. and Misser and Rake, "An African World War?" p. 15.
186. Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" p. 18. For a similar explanation of the war,
187. see Marc Lacey, "Congo Tires of War, but the End Is Not in Sight," New York Times, July 15, 2002.
188. Baker, "Going to War Democratically," p. 274.
189. Ibid., p. 269; and Shearer, "Lines on a Map," p. 295.
190. Misser and Rake, "An African World War?" p. 14;
191. and Shearer, "Africa's Great War," p. 98.
192. Baker, "Going to War Democratically," pp. 268, 274-275;
193. and Shearer, "Africa's Great War," p. 98.
194. Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" pp. 15-16.
195. Shearer, "Lines on a Map," p. 295;
196. and Misser and Rake, "An African World War?" p. 14.
197. Baker, "Going to War Democratically," pp. 275, 278. For more evidence of exploitation,
198. see Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 275-278;
199. Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa,'" p. 17;
200. and Turner, "The Kabilas' Congo," p. 217.
201. United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo," S/2001/357 (New York: United Nations, April 12, 2001).
202. United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo," S/2003/1027 (New York: United Nations, October 23, 2003).
203. Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 43.
204. Turner, "The Kabilas' Congo," pp. 216-217; and Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 52-53.
205. Condoleezza Rice, "The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom Is the Only Realistic Path to Security," Washington Post, December 11, 2005. Rice's remarks were in line with the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy.
206. See President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2002).
207. See, for example, Boaz Atzili, "Border Fixity: When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006.