Ringing in proliferation: How to dismantle an atomic bomb network

International Security

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 153-187

  Montgomery, Alexander H ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33645732868     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228805775124543     Document Type: Review

References (180)

1. On proliferation networks in general, see Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49. On North Korea,
2. see Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," Naval War Review, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 11-49.
3. On Iran, see IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA report GOV/ 2004/83 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, November 15, 2004), http://www .iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Board/2004/gov2004-83_derestrict.pdf. On the A.Q. Khan network,
4. see Gaurav Kampani, "Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan" (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 23, 2004), http://cns.miis.edu/ pubs/week/040223.htm.
5. See, for example, Paul Wolfowitz, "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Q&A," International Institute for Strategic Studies, Asia Security Conference, Singapore, May 31, 2003, http://www .defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 2003/tr20030531-depsecdef0246.html;
6. George W. Bush, "President Announces New Measure to Counter the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation," February 11, 2004, http:// www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2004/29291.htm;
7. Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice to the Reagan Lecture," February 26, 2004, http://www .whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040228-1.html;
8. John R. Bolton, "The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges," panel 1 of a hearing of the House Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong., 2d sess., March 30, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/ us/rm/31010.htm;
9. and Richard Cheney, "Remarks by the Vice President at Westminster College," April 26, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/ print/20040426-8.html.
10. John R. Bolton, "Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons," remarks to the Hudson Institute, August 17, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/35281.htm.
11. As Vice President Dick Cheney has argued, "I have been charged by the president with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We don't negotiate with evil; we defeat it." Quoted in Warren P. Strobel, "Administration Struggles to Find Right Approach to N. Korea Talks," Knight Ridder, December 20, 2003.
12. Libya reinvigorated its nuclear program in 1995, then announced its termination in December 2003. On the roles of Tahir and Tinner, see Polis Diraja Malaysia, "Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme," Royal Malaysia Police official website, February 20, 2004, http://www.rmp.gov.my/rmp03/040220scomi_eng.htm.
13. Global methods advocated by Braun and Chyba include universalization of export controls, extension of the Proliferation Security Initative (PSI), an Energy Security Initative to complement the PSI, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and a policy of nuclear de-emphasis by the United States. Braun and Chyba, "Proliferation Rings."
14. Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 45-55.
15. Bush, "President Announces New Measure to Counter the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction."
16. Rice, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice to the Reagan Lecture."
17. Cheney, "Remarks by the Vice President at Westminster College."
18. John R. Bolton, "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary," statement to the 2004 Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary meeting, Göteborg, Sweden, May 27, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33121.htm.
19. Bill Gertz, "North Korea Seen Readying Its First Nuclear Arms Test," Washington Times, April 23, 2005.
20. According to David Albright, Hans Berkhout, and William Walker, if between 1989 and 1994 the plant was operated 80 percent of the time - a high estimate - it could have produced 33 kg of plutonium in addition to the 9.5 kg still in the rods if only a few rods were extracted in 1989. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 298-299.
21. Capacity factor is equal to the actual energy produced divided by the energy that could have been produced if the reactor was run constantly for the entire time period at 100 percent power.
22. Robert Alvarez, interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 8, 2004;
23. and Robert Alvarez, "North Korea: No Bygones at Yongbyon," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 38-45. Alvarez was a senior policy adviser in the U.S. Department of Energy who oversaw the canning of the spent fuel rods. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker note the presence of 650 rods in dry storage in addition to the rods extracted from the reactor.
24. See Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996, p. 294.
25. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996, p. 298.
26. See, for example, the images at the Institute for Science and International Security of the DPRK nuclear power plant. Corey Hinderstein, "Imagery Brief of Activities at the Yongbyon Site," July 1, 2003, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/Imagery.pdf. These photos indicate a shutdown sometime between March and June; a second shutdown occurred later that fall.
27. Douglas Jehl, "Shutdown of Nuclear Complex Deepens North Korean Mystery," New York Times, September 13, 2003.
28. Hecker avoided arguing that all of the rods had been reprocessed simply by noting that they were no longer in the cooling pond. See Sigfried S. Hecker, "Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea," Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2d sess., January 21, 2004, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/HeckerTestimony040121 .pdf. Any of three remote-sensing technologies could have detected reprocessing. First, satellite photos could have picked up visible emissions from the reprocessing plant.
29. See Richard R. Paternoster, "Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Indicators and Observables," LA-12430-MS (Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, December 1992), p. 8. Second, steam from the power plant connected to the reprocessing plant could be observed; this was seen briefly in January 2003 but has not been observed since.
30. See David E. Sanger, "U.S. Sees Quick Start of North Korea Nuclear Site," New York Times, March 1, 2003. Third, detectors on the border could find Krypton-85 gas emissions; such emissions were reported only once, in July 2003.
31. See Thorn Shanker and David E. Sanger, "North Korea Hides New Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggests," New York Times, July 20, 2003. While the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency had concluded that North Korea had reprocessed the rods, State Department intelligence was unconvinced as of mid-2004.
32. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," New York Times, May 23, 2004. The reprocessing might have been done instead in an unknown underground facility, which could potentially circumvent these detection methods.
33. Alvarez argues that with the large number of broken rods, the capacity factor of the reactor could have been 40 percent. This figure would also be more consistent with the operating record of the reactor before the 1989 shutdown. With 9.5 kg already in the rods, the additional amount of plutonium in the rods would then be about 16.5 kg, for a total of about 26 kg. Alvarez. also points out that without skilled knowledge of the PUREX process, the amount of plutonium extracted could be significantly less than assumed. Alvarez, interview with author. The fraction by which this would decrease the amount of plutonium extracted is highly uncertain. One possible indication, however, is the amount of material North Korea itself claimed to have lost in its reprocessing - about 30 percent. See David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2000), p. 88. The amount of plutonium that North Korea could potentially extract from these rods is therefore probably closer to 20 kg than 42 kg.
34. The Trinity atomic test on July 16, 1945, and the bomb dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, both used 6 kg or more of plutonium. Richard L. Garwin, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons without Nuclear Testing," Arms Control Today, Vol. 27, No. 8 (November/December 1997), pp. 3-12.
35. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996, p. 306.
36. Although the CIA's assessment in 2003 that "North Korea has produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons" is widely cited, the next sentence of the assessment indicates that this conclusion may have been reached using only the vaguest of evidence: "Press reports indicate North Korea has been conducting nuclear weapon-related high explosive tests since the 1980s in order to validate its weapon design(s)." Central Intelligence Agency, "SSCI Questions for the Record: Regarding 11 February 2003 DCI World Wide Threat Briefing," SSCI 2003-3662, Central Intelligence Agency, August 18, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103qfr-cia.pdf.
37. Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," January 1-June 30, 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/.
38. Joby Warrick, "N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear; Front Companies Step Up Efforts in European Market," Washington Post, August 15, 2003. Assuming 5 separative work units (SWU)/yr. P-2 centrifuges, 428 centrifuges would take nearly two years to produce 20 kg of 93 percent enriched uranium (a standard assumption for a small-implosion nuclear weapon using HEU). But this assumes that no centrifuges break down, which is highly unlikely given the record of North Korea's plutonium program and the difficulties faced by states unfamiliar with centrifuge technology.
39. Mark Hibbs, "Customs Intelligence Data Suggest DPRK Aimed at G-2 Type Centrifuge," Nuclear Fuel, May 26, 2003.
40. Quoted in Mark Hibbs, "CIA Assessment on DPRK Presumes Massive Outside Help on Centrifuges," Nuclear Fuel, November 25, 2002, p. 1.
41. One "Western centrifuge expert" doubted North Korea's progress, arguing that the suggestion that "the North Koreans could make HEU on a consistent basis with (the CNOR/SNOR design) after, say, five years' time, is pretty unlikely, given all the challenges." Quoted in Mark Hibbs, "DPRK Enrichment Not Far Along, Some Intelligence Data Suggest," Nucleonics Week, October 24, 2002, p. 2. The CNOR/SNOR is a simpler aluminum-rotor design similar to the P-1 centrifuge used by Pakistan and distributed by the A.Q. Khan network.
42. IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," IAEA report GOV/2004/12 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, February 20, 2004), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0204.pdf, pp. 4-5.
43. Assuming a natural uranium feed and a 0.3 percent tails assay, 4,000 SWU are required to produce 20 kg of 93 percent enriched HEU from 4,500 kg of natural uranium, enough for a first-generation implosion device. A P-1 centrifuge produces about 2.5 SWU/yr., so 1,600 centrifuges would be required. See Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996, p. 469.
44. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected," New York Times, December 26, 2004.
45. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/83, pp. 6, 12-13.
46. Ibid., p. 8. Uranium centrifuges typically have one or more bellows (connectors) between individual stacked segments to prevent the centrifuges from self-destruction when passing through resonance velocities.
47. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Iran: Countdown to Showdown," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 60, No. 6 (November/December 2004), pp. 67-72.
48. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/83, p. 11.
49. Hibbs, "DPRK Enrichment Not Far Along, Some Intelligence Data Suggest."
50. George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," January 29, 2002, http://www.whitehouse .gov/stateoftheunion/2002/;
51. and Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks by the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to the Conservative Political Action Conference," Marriott Crystal Gateway, Arlington, Virginia, February 1, 2002, http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/02/ 20020201-6.html.
52. Todd S. Purdum, "U.S. Weighs Tackling Iraq On Its Own, Powell Says," New York Times, February 7, 2002.
53. George W. Bush, "President George Bush Discusses Iraq in National Press Conference," March 6, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/03/print/20030306-8.html.
54. David Rennie, "Pentagon Calls for Regime Change in North Korea," Daily Telegraph (London), April 22, 2003.
55. Wolfowitz, "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Q&A."
56. Seymour M. Hersh, "The Coming Wars," New Yorker, January 24-31, 2005, http://lexis-nexis.com.
57. See Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86;
58. and Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 43-60.
59. Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-169;
60. and Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post-Cold War Era," IGCC Policy Paper PP08 (Irvine, Calif.: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October 1, 1994), http://repositories.cdlib.org/igcc/PP/ PP08.
61. See Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6 (December 2004), pp. 859-885;
62. Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," November 2003, http:// www.columbia.edu/~eg589/pdf/nuke- proliferation-112003.pdf;
63. and Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher R. Way, "Testing Theories of Proliferation: The Lessons from South Asia," paper presented at the Center for International Security and Cooperation-Army War College Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, Stanford, California, June 3-4, 2004.
64. John R. Bolton, "Arms Control and Nonproliferation Issues," press conference, July 21, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/34676.htm.
65. Charles Duelfer, "Key Findings of the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," September 30, 2004, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/ Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf.
66. On the shah's program, see Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," in Onkar S. Marwah and Ann Schul/, eds., Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), pp. 185-204.
67. After the revolution in 1979, Iran first constituted its centrifuge program and began construction on the Isfahan nuclear complex in 1985. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/83, pp. 6, 14.
68. Bolton, "Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons."
69. The centrifuge parts arrived in two shipments: the first in March 1994 and the second in July 1996. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/83, pp. 6-8.
70. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
71. Ibid., pp. 12-15.
72. IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA report GOV/2003/63 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, August 26, 2003), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf, p. 9.
73. Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Iran Pursues Plans for Heavy Water Reactor," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 14, 2003, http://jir.janes.com.
74. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 7, 2000), http://www.csis.org/mideast/ reports/irannuclear02072000.PDF, p. 13.
75. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/75, p. 14.
76. Institute for Science and International Security, "Iran Constructing the 40 MW Heavy Water Reactor at Arak Despite Calls Not to Do So by the European Union and the IAEA Board of Governors," March 4, 2005, http://isis-online.org/publications/iran/arakconstruction.html.
77. 2O).
78. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/83, p. 17.
79. I thank Sonja Schmid for bringing this to my attention and providing a translation. Aleksandr Rumiantsev, "Interview with the Minister of Atomic Energy," Ekho Moskvy, May 29, 2003.
80. Louis Charbonneau, "Iran in Rio Tinto Link," Reuters, January 31, 2005.
81. Bolton, "Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons."
82. "U.S. Intelligence on Iran Seen Lacking-Experts," Reuters, February 9, 2005.
83. Nicholas Kralev, "U.S. Doubts Tehran Nukes Are Imminent," Washington Times, April 14, 2005.
84. Bolton, "Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons."
85. Nazila Fathi, "Iran Hints It Sped Up Enriching Uranium as a Ploy," New York Times, December 6, 2004.
86. David Crawford, "Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb; Program Was Haphazard, But Shows How Technology Was Bought Off-the-Shelf," Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2004.
87. Joseph Bermudez, Jr., "Lifting the Lid on Kim's Nuclear Workshop," Jane's Defense Weekly, November 27, 2002;
88. and Seymour M. Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," New Yorker, January 27, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com.
89. Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center, "Untitled CIA Estimate to Congress," November 19, 2002, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ dprk/nuke/cia111902.html.
90. Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," July 1-December 31, 2001, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/.
91. North Korea unsuccessfully sought two frequency converters, used for timing centrifuges, in 1999, then tried again in 2002 and 2003. Part of the 2003 shipment was delivered, but the others were stopped. Mark Hibbs, "Procurement by Iran, DPRK Focuses Attention on 'Catch-All' Controls," Nucleonics Week, May 29, 2003.
92. Hibbs, "DPRK Enrichment Not Far Along, Some Intelligence Data Suggest."
93. Braun and Chyba, "Proliferation Rings."
94. These are ideal types and do not by any means exhaust potential network structures; centralization and density are only two possible network measures. See Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
95. An uncorroborated report alleges that North Korea and Iran have assisted each other since the late 1990s. Louis Charbonneau, "N. Korea Provides Nuclear Aid to Iran-Intel Reports," Reuters, July 6, 2005.
96. Braun and Chyba also argue that China, Russia, Taiwan, Macedonia, and Belarus also assisted Iran. Braun and Chyba, "Proliferation Rings." According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, China has also given assistance to Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria; Russia (or the Soviet Union previously) has also helped Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.
97. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles, January 8, 2005, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/.
98. On China's missile exports and dates, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles, On its bid to join the MTCR,
99. see Wade Boese, "Missile Regime Puts Off China," Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 9 (November 2004).
100. For details on these trades, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles.
101. I thank Dean Wilkening for pointing this out.
102. Glenn Kessler, "North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies," Washington Post, February 2, 2005.
103. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea," New York Times, February 2, 2005.
104. Sanger and Broad reported isotopic ratios;
105. Kessler reported plutonium. Ibid;
106. and Kessler, "North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies."
107. Quoted in Sanger and Broad, "Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea."
108. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Using Clues from Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery," New York Times, March 31, 2005.
109. Glenn Kessler and Dafna Linzer, "Nuclear Evidence Could Point to Pakistan," Washington Post, February 3, 2005.
110. Steve Fetter, "Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production," Science and Global Security, Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4 (1993), pp. 237-259.
111. See Sanger and Broad, "Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea."
112. Jon B. Wolfsthal, "No Good Choices: The Implications of a Nuclear North Korea," House Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong., 1st sess., February 17, 2005.
113. 6; the small ones had 25 kg each. Libya received the large cylinder in February 2001 and the small ones in September 2000. See IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, IAEA report GOV/2004/33, International Atomic Energy Agency, May 28, 2004, http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf, p. 3;
114. and IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, IAEA report GOV/2004/59, International Atomic Energy Agency, August 30, 2004, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/ iaea0804.pdf, p. 4. Based on a natural uranium percentage of 0.71 percent, this would give a total of 11.6 kg of U-235; assuming a standard tails assay of 0.3 percent and an HEU enrichment of 93 percent, 7.2 kg of HEU could be extracted, about a third of the amount necessary for a small first-generation implosion weapon. Depleted uranium can be put in a blanket around a reactor core to produce plutonium or as a tamper in a nuclear weapon, but it cannot be usefully enriched.
115. Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," July 1-December 31, 2001.
116. Sanger and Broad, "Using Clues from Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery."
117. I thank Paul Kerr for pointing this out. See Jeffrey Lewis and Paul Kerr, "A Financial Link in That AQ Khan-North Korea-Libya UF6 Daisy Chain?" April 1, 2005, http://www .armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=509.
118. Kessler and Linzer, "Nuclear Evidence Could Point to Pakistan."
119. Dafna Linzer, "U.S. Misled Allies About Nuclear Export: N. Korean Material Landed in Pakistan, Instead of Libya," Washington Post, March 20, 2005.
120. Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (July 1995), pp. 44-99.
121. Alexander H. Montgomery, "Reconstructing Reliability: Confidence in Nuclear Weapons under Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship," master's thesis, University of California, Berkeley, May 1999.
122. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
123. Competitive pressures or direct negative ties can overcome the tendency of structurally equivalent actors to cooperate unless faced with a greater threat-for example, animosity between Iran and Iraq.
124. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered," March 1, 2004, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya/cent_procure .html.
125. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/63, p. 7.
126. Hibbs, "CIA Assessment on DPRK Presumes Massive Outside Help on Centrifuges."
127. Mehdi Mohammadi, "Iran Press: Official Interviewed on Nuclear Activities since 1970," BBC Monitoring International Reports, Keyhan (Tehran), translated from Persian, April 28, 2005.
128. Joseph Cirincione, personal communication, June 3, 2005, from conversations with Western officials and IAEA experts.
129. Quoted in Crawford, "Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb."
130. MacKenzie and Spinardi, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons."
131. Quoted in William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Pakistani's Black Market May Sell Nuclear Secrets," New York Times, March 21, 2005.
132. Pierre Goldschmidt, IAEA deputy director-general and head of the Department of Safeguards, "Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, March 1, 2005.
133. Crawford, "Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb."
134. David E. Sanger, "The Khan Network," paper presented at the Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, Stanford, California, June 4-5, 2004.
135. Albright and Hinderstein, "Iran: Countdown to Showdown."
136. Sanger and Broad, "As Nuclear Secrets Emerge."
137. John W. Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 5-40.
138. Daryl Kimball, "Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories" (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, May 2002), http://www.armscontrol. org/factsheets/missiles.asp.
139. Joseph Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper 2 (Monterey, Calif.: Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/ op2/op2.pdf, p. 27.
140. Jeong-ho Yun, "North Korea Can't Put Nuke Warheads on Missiles: NIS," Choson Ilbo (Seoul), February 15, 2005.
141. David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal," New York Times, April 25, 2003.
142. David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, "North Korea Says It May Test an A-Bomb," New York Times, August 29, 2003.
143. Flynt L. Leverett, "Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb," New York Times, January 23, 2004.
144. Crawford, "Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb";
145. and Michael Roston, "Polishing Up the Story on the PSI," National Interest, June 9, 2004, http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/ Articles/Vol3Issue23/Vol3Issue23RostonPFV.html.
146. Daniel W. Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 3 (July 2003), pp. 643-659.
147. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 32-37.
148. Jo and Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation."
149. See Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000);
150. and Robert S. Litwak, "Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change," Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter 2003), pp. 7-32.
151. Madeleine K. Albright, "Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Interview on the Diane Rehm Show, WAMU-FM," June 19, 2000.
152. Bush, "State of the Union Address."
153. John R. Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction," remarks to Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2002, http://www.state.gov/t/ us/rm/9962.htm.
154. Michael Hirsh, "Bolton's British Problem," Newsweek, May 2, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn .com/id/7614769/site/newsweek/.
155. North Korea is unique in the world; it is geographically surrounded by two nuclear powers (Russia and China) and two latent powers (Japan and South Korea), and has U.S. troops are deployed on its border.
156. "Conclusion of Non-aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called For," Korean Central News Agency, October 24, 2002.
157. On China's threat, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 320.
158. On establishing clear red lines, see Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First 'North Korean 'Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Blockings, 2004).
159. See Alexander H. Montgomery, "A Tale of Two Crises: U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Dynamics," paper presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 2-5, 2004.
160. On this topic, see Michael E. O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, "Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 7-18.
161. "DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement," Korean Central News Agency, February 10, 2005.
162. Chan-ho Kang and Myo-ja Ser, "North's Envoy Lists Conditions," Joong-Ang Ilbo (Seoul), February 19, 2005.
163. "North Korea Not Yet a Nuclear Weapons State: Seoul," Reuters, February 13, 2005.
164. Ari Fleischer, press briefing, James S. Brady Press Briefing Room, April 29, 2003, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030429-3.html.
165. As Robert Gallucci, the Clinton administration's chief negotiator with the North Koreans during the 1993-94 crisis, put it, "Listen, I'm not interested in teaching other people lessons. I'm interested in the national security of the United States. If that's what you're interested in, are you better off with this deal or without it? You tell me what you're going to do without the deal, and I'll compare that with the deal." Quoted in Scott Stossel, "North Korea: The War Game," Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2005, pp. 97-108.
166. Joel Brinkley, "Rice Claims U.S. Role in Korean About-Face," New York Times, July 14, 2005.
167. Bolton, "The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation."
168. Quoted in Reuben Staines, "Verifying NK Nuke Dismantlement Tough Task: U.S.," Korea Times (Seoul), January 31, 2005.
169. Thom Shanker, "If the Scuds Were Going to Iraq," New York Times, December 15, 2002.
170. On North Korea's willingness to trade its nuclear program, see Selig S. Harrison, "Inside North Korea: Leaders Open to Ending Nuclear Crisis," Financial Times (London), May 4, 2004. On its missile, program,
171. see Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 439-440.
172. Sanger and Broad, "As Nuclear Secrets Emerge."
173. Quoted in Louis Charbonneau, "Pakistan Reviving Nuclear Black Market, Experts Say," Reuters, March 15, 2005.
174. "Khan's Nuclear Network Still Trying in 2004 to Buy Nuclear Technology: Swiss Report," Associated Press, May 26, 2005.
175. Evidence found in shipping records indicates a possible fourth country beyond North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, "Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls; President Faces a Multi-front Battle against Threats Known, Unknown," Washington Post, October 26, 2004.
176. Quoted in Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Says Europe Should Not Lift China Arms Ban," New York Times, February 22, 2005.
177. Victor D. Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 40-78.
178. "Region: Tehran Wants U.S. to Open Diplomatic Channel," Daily Times (Lahore), March 27, 2005.
179. George Perkovich, "Iran: Nuclear Power as National Pride," Khaleej Times (Dubai), March 26, 2005;
180. and Neil MacFarquhar, "Across Iran, Nuclear Power Is a Matter of Pride," New York Times, May 29, 2005.