Command of the Commons: The Miltary Foundation of U.S. Hegemony

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 5-46

  Posen, Barry R ^a,b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Security Studies Program   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141767146     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228803322427965     Document Type: Review

References (195)

1. The most comprehensive analysis of the extraordinary relative power position of the United States is William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.
2. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53, summarizes the initial phase of the post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy debate. In that article, we discussed a policy called "primacy," a then popular term in U.S. foreign policy discourse. Primacy is one type of hegemony. A distinction should be made between a description of the structure of world politics - that is, the distribution of power among states-and the policies of a particular nation-state. The United States has more power in the world than any other state, and by a substantial margin. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World." This has become clear over the last decade. Thus it is reasonable to describe the world as "unipolar." Though this much power sorely tempts a state to practice a hegemonic foreign and security policy - that is, to further expand and consolidate its power position and to organize the world according to its own preferences - this is not inevitable. In terms of its potential capabilities, the United States has been a great power for at least a century, but it has followed foreign policies of varying activism. The U.S. national security elite (Democratic and Republican) did, however, settle on a policy of hegemony sometime in the late 1990s. The people of the United States did not play a significant role in this decision, so questions remained about how much they would pay to support this policy. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terror, have provided an important foundation of domestic political support for a hegemonic foreign policy. Debates between Democrats and Republicans now focus on the modalities of hegemony - whether the United States should work through multilateral institutions to exercise and increase its power or work outside them.
3. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53, summarizes the initial phase of the post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy debate. In that article, we discussed a policy called "primacy," a then popular term in U.S. foreign policy discourse. Primacy is one type of hegemony. A distinction should be made between a description of the structure of world politics - that is, the distribution of power among states-and the policies of a particular nation-state. The United States has more power in the world than any other state, and by a substantial margin. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World." This has become clear over the last decade. Thus it is reasonable to describe the world as "unipolar." Though this much power sorely tempts a state to practice a hegemonic foreign and security policy - that is, to further expand and consolidate its power position and to organize the world according to its own preferences - this is not inevitable. In terms of its potential capabilities, the United States has been a great power for at least a century, but it has followed foreign policies of varying activism. The U.S. national security elite (Democratic and Republican) did, however, settle on a policy of hegemony sometime in the late 1990s. The people of the United States did not play a significant role in this decision, so questions remained about how much they would pay to support this policy. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terror, have provided an important foundation of domestic political support for a hegemonic foreign policy. Debates between Democrats and Republicans now focus on the modalities of hegemony - whether the United States should work through multilateral institutions to exercise and increase its power or work outside them.
4. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 20-33.
5. To be fair, Bush's National Security Strategy of the United States of America contains many allusions to alliances, cooperation, liberal values, and economic and political development. Nevertheless, the oldest and most powerful U.S. allies - the Europeans - are hardly mentioned in the document. Even allowing for the need for stern language to mobilize public support for the war on terror, the document has a martial tone - and is strongly committed to a wide variety of proactive uses of force. Also, the document has a vaguely nationalist flavor: "The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests." Perhaps to drive home this point, the document devotes an entire paragraph to disassociating the United States from the International Criminal Court. President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 20, 2002), p. 30.
6. Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," pp. 44-50, dubbed this strategy "selective (but cooperative) primacy."
7. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003). In the mid-1990s, most proponents of selective engagement had in mind a less ambitious strategy than Art now proposes. Formerly, the criteria for selective engagement were clear: Does an international problem promise significantly to increase or decrease the odds of great power war? Now the purpose of the strategy is to retain U.S. alliances and presence in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf "to help mold the political, military, and economic configurations of these regions so as to make them more congenial to America's interests." Included in the goals of the strategy are protection of the United States from grand terror attack, stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), preserving peace and stability in Eurasia, securing access to oil, maintaining international economic openness, spreading democracy, protecting human rights, and avoiding severe climate change. Art does propose priorities among these objectives. See ibid., chap. 7.
8. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003). In the mid-1990s, most proponents of selective engagement had in mind a less ambitious strategy than Art now proposes. Formerly, the criteria for selective engagement were clear: Does an international problem promise significantly to increase or decrease the odds of great power war? Now the purpose of the strategy is to retain U.S. alliances and presence in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf "to help mold the political, military, and economic configurations of these regions so as to make them more congenial to America's interests." Included in the goals of the strategy are protection of the United States from grand terror attack, stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), preserving peace and stability in Eurasia, securing access to oil, maintaining international economic openness, spreading democracy, protecting human rights, and avoiding severe climate change. Art does propose priorities among these objectives. See ibid., chap. 7.
9. According to the Center for Defense Information, the fiscal year 2003 budget request of $396 billion "is more than the combined spending of the next 25 nations." See www.cdi.org/issues/wme.
10. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), pp. 20-21.
11. This article does not review three military theoretical terms that have absorbed much attention over the last decade: the revolution in military affairs, net-centric warfare, and military transformation. To do so would require a major digression. I am trying to build an understanding of the overall U.S. military position and its strategic implications on the basis of a small number of empirical observations about familiar categories of conventional military activity.
12. Kennedy distinguishes "naval mastery" from temporary, local naval superiority, or local command of the sea. "By . . . the term 'naval mastery', however, there is meant here something stronger, more exclusive and wider-ranging; namely a situation in which a country has so developed its maritime strength that it is superior to any rival power, and that its predominance is or could be exerted far outside its home waters, with the result that it is extremely difficult for other, lesser states to undertake maritime operations or trade without at least its tacit consent. It does not necessarily imply a superiority over all other navies combined, nor does it mean that this country could not temporarily lose local command of the sea; but it does assume the possession of an overall maritime power such that small-scale defeats overseas would soon be reversed by the dispatch of naval forces sufficient to eradicate the enemy's challenge. Generally speaking, naval mastery is also taken to imply that the nation achieving it will usually be very favourably endowed with many fleet bases, a large merchant marine, considerable national wealth, etc., all of which indicates influence at a global rather than a purely regional level." Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983, first published in 1976 by Allen Lane), p. 9 (emphasis added).
13. Alfred Thayer Mahan called the sea "a wide common." Ibid., p. 2.
14. As is the case with much analysis of conventional military issues, for the sake of analytic simplicity, I do not treat the implications of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Insofar as the main accomplishment of weapons of mass destruction is to increase significantly the costs and risks of any hegemonic foreign policy, the proliferation of these weapons for U.S. grand strategy should be considered independently of a treatment of their narrow tactical military utility. That said, broadly speaking the limited diffusion of these kinds of weapons would likely make the contested zone even more contested before they affect command of the commons.
15. Ibid., chap. 7.
16. I calculated these percentages from the country entries in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 2001). The purchasing power parity method used by the CIA creates an exaggerated impression of China's current economic and technological capability. Measured by currency exchange rates, the United States had 29.5 percent of gross world product in 1999, Japan had 14 percent, and China had only 3.4 percent. See "World Gross Domestic Product by Region," International Energy Outlook, 2002, Report DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, D.C.: Energy Information Administration, 2002), Table A3, Appendix A.
17. I calculated these percentages from the country entries in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 2001). The purchasing power parity method used by the CIA creates an exaggerated impression of China's current economic and technological capability. Measured by currency exchange rates, the United States had 29.5 percent of gross world product in 1999, Japan had 14 percent, and China had only 3.4 percent. See "World Gross Domestic Product by Region," International Energy Outlook, 2002, Report DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, D.C.: Energy Information Administration, 2002), Table A3, Appendix A.
18. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2002-2003 (London: IISS, 2002), pp. 241, 252-253. My colleague Harvey Sapolsky called this to my attention.
19. Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Allen Kaufman, "Security Lessons from the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 77-89.
20. The actual wartime missions of SSNs in the canonical major regional contingencies - aside from lobbing a few conventional cruise missiles and collecting electronic intelligence close to shore - are murky at best.
21. Owen R. Coté Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2003), pp. 69-78.
22. Construction of a new Chinese nuclear attack submarine has been delayed many times, and one is not expected to be completed until 2005. France does not have a nuclear attack submarine under construction, but it has a program planned for the 2010s. Britain has ordered three new nuclear attack submarines, and one is currently under construction. See A.D. Baker III, "World Navies in Review," Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128 (March 2002), pp. 33-36.
23. According to A.D. Baker III, "Submarine construction in Russia had all but halted by the fall of 1998." At the time, there were four incomplete Akula-class nuclear attack submarines and one incomplete new-design attack submarine in Russian yards. Baker, "World Navies in Review," Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125 (March 1999), pp. 3-4. See also Baker, "World Navies in Review," March 2002, pp. 35-36. One of the Akulas was finally commissioned at the end of 2001. One more may yet be completed.
24. According to A.D. Baker III, "Submarine construction in Russia had all but halted by the fall of 1998." At the time, there were four incomplete Akula-class nuclear attack submarines and one incomplete new-design attack submarine in Russian yards. Baker, "World Navies in Review," Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125 (March 1999), pp. 3-4. See also Baker, "World Navies in Review," March 2002, pp. 35-36. One of the Akulas was finally commissioned at the end of 2001. One more may yet be completed.
25. According to A.D. Baker III, "Submarine construction in Russia had all but halted by the fall of 1998." At the time, there were four incomplete Akula-class nuclear attack submarines and one incomplete new-design attack submarine in Russian yards. Baker, "World Navies in Review," Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125 (March 1999), pp. 3-4. See also Baker, "World Navies in Review," March 2002, pp. 35-36. One of the Akulas was finally commissioned at the end of 2001. One more may yet be completed.
26. According to A.D. Baker III, "Submarine construction in Russia had all but halted by the fall of 1998." At the time, there were four incomplete Akula-class nuclear attack submarines and one incomplete new-design attack submarine in Russian yards. Baker, "World Navies in Review," Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125 (March 1999), pp. 3-4. See also Baker, "World Navies in Review," March 2002, pp. 35-36. One of the Akulas was finally commissioned at the end of 2001. One more may yet be completed.
27. IISS, Military Balance, 2002-2003, p. 113, suggests 22. Baker, "World Navies," (March, 2002), suggests about 30. I count Oscar-class cruise missile submarines as attack submarines.
28. IISS, Military Balance, 2002-2003, p. 113, suggests 22. Baker, "World Navies," (March, 2002), suggests about 30. I count Oscar-class cruise missile submarines as attack submarines.
29. For figures on the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, see IISS, Military Balance, 2002-2003, pp. 18-21.
30. For costs of current U.S. warships, see Office of the Comptroller, U.S. Department of Defense, "Shipbuilding and Conversion," National Defense Budget Estimates for the Amended FY 2002 Budget (Green Book), Procurement Programs (P1), pp. N. 17-18.
31. See http:/ /www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ddg-51-unit.htm.
32. The Pentagon has been hinting for some time that it would like to put weapons into space both for antisatellite attacks and for attacks on terrestrial targets. Many independent space policy analysts oppose this-because the United States gets more out of space than any other state. They acknowledge that this makes U.S. space assets an attractive target, but they argue that hardening satellites, ground stations, and the links between them makes more sense than starting an expensive arms competition in space. Implicitly, they also rely on deterrence - the superior ability of the U.S. military to damage the other side's ground stations, links, and missile launch facilities, as well as to retaliate with nascent U.S. antisatellite systems against the other side's satellites. See, for example, Theresa Hitchens, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, April 19, 2002); Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case against Weaponizing Space (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), chap. 3; and Charles V. Pena and Edward L. Hudgins, Should the United States "Weaponize" Space? Policy Analysis No. 427 (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, March 18, 2002), pp. 5-10.
33. The Pentagon has been hinting for some time that it would like to put weapons into space both for antisatellite attacks and for attacks on terrestrial targets. Many independent space policy analysts oppose this-because the United States gets more out of space than any other state. They acknowledge that this makes U.S. space assets an attractive target, but they argue that hardening satellites, ground stations, and the links between them makes more sense than starting an expensive arms competition in space. Implicitly, they also rely on deterrence - the superior ability of the U.S. military to damage the other side's ground stations, links, and missile launch facilities, as well as to retaliate with nascent U.S. antisatellite systems against the other side's satellites. See, for example, Theresa Hitchens, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, April 19, 2002); Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case against Weaponizing Space (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), chap. 3; and Charles V. Pena and Edward L. Hudgins, Should the United States "Weaponize" Space? Policy Analysis No. 427 (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, March 18, 2002), pp. 5-10.
34. The Pentagon has been hinting for some time that it would like to put weapons into space both for antisatellite attacks and for attacks on terrestrial targets. Many independent space policy analysts oppose this-because the United States gets more out of space than any other state. They acknowledge that this makes U.S. space assets an attractive target, but they argue that hardening satellites, ground stations, and the links between them makes more sense than starting an expensive arms competition in space. Implicitly, they also rely on deterrence - the superior ability of the U.S. military to damage the other side's ground stations, links, and missile launch facilities, as well as to retaliate with nascent U.S. antisatellite systems against the other side's satellites. See, for example, Theresa Hitchens, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, April 19, 2002); Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case against Weaponizing Space (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), chap. 3; and Charles V. Pena and Edward L. Hudgins, Should the United States "Weaponize" Space? Policy Analysis No. 427 (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, March 18, 2002), pp. 5-10.
35. Vernon Loeb, "Air Force's Chief Backs Space Arms," Washington Post, August 2, 2001, p. 17.
36. Jim Garamone, "Coalition Air Forces Make Ground Gains Possible," American Forces Press Service, April 5, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/APR2003/n04052003_200304053.html.
37. According to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, "The ability of the United States to access and utilize space is a vital national security interest." Moreover, "the mission of space control is to ensure the freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, to deny such freedom of action to adversaries." According to the report, "Ensuring freedom of access to space and protecting U.S. national security interests are key priorities that must be reflected in future investment decisions." Ibid., p. 45
38. According to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, "The ability of the United States to access and utilize space is a vital national security interest." Moreover, "the mission of space control is to ensure the freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, to deny such freedom of action to adversaries." According to the report, "Ensuring freedom of access to space and protecting U.S. national security interests are key priorities that must be reflected in future investment decisions." Ibid., p. 45
39. General Accounting Office, Military Space Operations: Planning, Funding, and Acquisition Challenges Facing Efforts to Strengthen Space Control, GAO-02-738 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 2002), p. 3. It appears that U.S. military spending on space has nearly doubled since 1998, when it was estimated at $14 billion. See John Pike, "American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium," November 1998, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/space9811.htm.
40. General Accounting Office, Military Space Operations: Planning, Funding, and Acquisition Challenges Facing Efforts to Strengthen Space Control, GAO-02-738 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 2002), p. 3. It appears that U.S. military spending on space has nearly doubled since 1998, when it was estimated at $14 billion. See John Pike, "American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium," November 1998, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/space9811.htm.
41. Pike, "American Control of Outer Space."
42. The United States formerly corrupted the GPS satellite signals to reduce the accuracy that a nonmilitary user terminal could achieve. On May 1,2000, President Clinton ended this policy due to the vast commercial possibilities of highly accurate positional information. At that time, the U.S. government believed that it could employ new techniques to jam the GPS signals regionally in a way that would prevent an adversary from exploiting them, but not dilute the accuracy elsewhere. See President Bill Clinton: "Improving the Civilian Global Positioning System (GPS)," May 1,2000, http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/FGCS/info/sans_SA/docs/statement.html.
43. This is the cost of the development and deployment of the system, and the acquisition of sufficient satellites (118), to achieve and sustain a 24-satellite array. By 1997, $3 billion had been spent on "user equipment," the military terminals that calculate location on the basis of the satellites' signals. See U.S. Department of Defense, "Systems Acquisition Review Program Acquisition Cost Summary as of June 30,1997." See also General Accounting Office, Navstar Should Improve the Effectiveness of Military Missions - Cost Has Increased, PSAD-80-91 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 15, 1980), p. 14. The European Union has decided to produce a competing system to GPS, called Galileo. It is estimated that 3 billion euros will be required to buy and operate 30 satellites. European advocates of Galileo explicitly argue that Europe must have its own satellite navigation systems or lose its "autonomy in defense." See Dee Ann Divis, "Military Role for Galileo Emerges," GPS World, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May 2002), p. 10.
44. This is the cost of the development and deployment of the system, and the acquisition of sufficient satellites (118), to achieve and sustain a 24-satellite array. By 1997, $3 billion had been spent on "user equipment," the military terminals that calculate location on the basis of the satellites' signals. See U.S. Department of Defense, "Systems Acquisition Review Program Acquisition Cost Summary as of June 30,1997." See also General Accounting Office, Navstar Should Improve the Effectiveness of Military Missions - Cost Has Increased, PSAD-80-91 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 15, 1980), p. 14. The European Union has decided to produce a competing system to GPS, called Galileo. It is estimated that 3 billion euros will be required to buy and operate 30 satellites. European advocates of Galileo explicitly argue that Europe must have its own satellite navigation systems or lose its "autonomy in defense." See Dee Ann Divis, "Military Role for Galileo Emerges," GPS World, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May 2002), p. 10.
45. This is the cost of the development and deployment of the system, and the acquisition of sufficient satellites (118), to achieve and sustain a 24-satellite array. By 1997, $3 billion had been spent on "user equipment," the military terminals that calculate location on the basis of the satellites' signals. See U.S. Department of Defense, "Systems Acquisition Review Program Acquisition Cost Summary as of June 30,1997." See also General Accounting Office, Navstar Should Improve the Effectiveness of Military Missions - Cost Has Increased, PSAD-80-91 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 15, 1980), p. 14. The European Union has decided to produce a competing system to GPS, called Galileo. It is estimated that 3 billion euros will be required to buy and operate 30 satellites. European advocates of Galileo explicitly argue that Europe must have its own satellite navigation systems or lose its "autonomy in defense." See Dee Ann Divis, "Military Role for Galileo Emerges," GPS World, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May 2002), p. 10.
46. Tom Wilson, Space Commission staff member, "Threats to United States Space Capabilities," prepared for the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], January 11, 2001). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chaired this commission.
47. A technically competent country with limited resources may be able to develop a capability to damage or destroy U.S. reconnaissance satellites in low earth orbit. See Allen Thomson, "Satellite Vulnerability: A Post-Cold War Issue," Space Policy, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 1995), pp. 19-30.
48. This is based on my simple addition of the maximum estimated cost increases associated with hardening satellites, providing them the capability for autonomous operations, giving them some onboard attack reporting capability, making them maneuverable, supplying them with decoys, and providing them with some self defense capability. See Wilson, "Threats to United States Space Capabilities," p. 6.
49. Pike, "American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium."
50. Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 51-55. For a detailed description of a suppression operation, see Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keaney, Effects and Effectiveness; Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 2, Pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 130-145.
51. Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 51-55. For a detailed description of a suppression operation, see Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keaney, Effects and Effectiveness; Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 2, Pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 130-145.
52. During Desert Storm, the United States employed one experimental JSTARS (joint surveillance target attack radar system) aircraft, a late Cold War project to develop an airborne surveillance radar capable of tracking the movements of large enemy ground forces at ranges of hundreds of kilometers. The U.S. Air Force has 15 such aircraft. Similarly, U.S. forces employed few if any reconnaissance drones in Desert Storm; the U.S. Air Force now operates both high- and low-altitude reconnaissance drones. Under the right conditions, drones allow U.S. forces to get a close and persistent look at enemy ground forces. For current U.S. Air Force holdings, see IISS, Military Balance, 2002-2003, pp. 22-23.
53. Lt. Gen. James Conway, U.S. Marine Corps, "First Marine Expeditionary Force Commander Live Briefing from Iraq," May 30, 2003, U.S. Department of Defense news transcript, http:// www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0229.html.
54. General Accounting Office, Weapons Acquisition: Precision-Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development, GAO/NSIAD-95-95 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 1995), p. 12.
55. The U.S. military says that it needs 200,000 GPS satellite-guided bombs, the joint direct attack munition or JDAM - 7,000 of which were used in the Afghan War. Six thousand five hundred JDAMs were used in the Iraq war. See Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, commander, United States Central Command Air Forces, "Operation Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers," Assessment and Analysis Division, USCENTAF, April 30, 2003, p. 3, http://www.iraqcrisis.co.uk/downloads/ resources/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf. Boeing is producing this weapon at the rate of 2,000 per month, and the military wants to increase production to 2,800 per month. See Nick Cook, "Second-Source JDAM Production Line Moves Closer," Jane's Defense Weekly, October 16, 2002, p. 5.
56. The U.S. military says that it needs 200,000 GPS satellite-guided bombs, the joint direct attack munition or JDAM - 7,000 of which were used in the Afghan War. Six thousand five hundred JDAMs were used in the Iraq war. See Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, commander, United States Central Command Air Forces, "Operation Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers," Assessment and Analysis Division, USCENTAF, April 30, 2003, p. 3, http://www.iraqcrisis.co.uk/downloads/ resources/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf. Boeing is producing this weapon at the rate of 2,000 per month, and the military wants to increase production to 2,800 per month. See Nick Cook, "Second-Source JDAM Production Line Moves Closer," Jane's Defense Weekly, October 16, 2002, p. 5.
57. Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5-44, carefully and convincingly demonstrates that despite weeks of bombing, Iraqi mechanized ground forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq were still largely intact when the United States opened its ground attack. Perhaps 40 percent of Iraqi fighting vehicles were destroyed or immobilized by the air campaign, prior to the start of ground operations. Nevertheless, once the coalition ground operation began, Iraqi mechanized units managed to maneuver in the desert, in spite of U.S. command of the air. They did not suffer much damage from U.S. fixed-wing air attacks during the ground campaign. These forces were destroyed or enveloped by U.S. and allied mechanized ground forces. It should be noted, however, that army and marine attack helicopters destroyed much Iraqi armor.
58. Ibid., p. 12; and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 267-288.
59. Ibid., p. 12; and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 267-288.
60. The United States currently has military installations in three dozen foreign countries or special territories. See Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environ- ment), Department of Defense, "Summary," Base Structure Report (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory), Fiscal Year 2002 Baseline, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/ basestructure2002.pdf.This report counts only installations in which the United States has actually invested federal dollars. Missing from the list are Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, so a peculiar definition of U.S. base must guide the report. Unfortunately, comparable time series data do not exist to permit comparison to the last days of the Cold War. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen noted in 1997 that although the DoD had reduced active-duty military forces by 32 percent, it had reduced its domestic and overseas base structure by only 26 percent. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997). The vast majority of overseas installations that were either reduced or closed, 878 out of 952, were in Europe. See Department of Defense, "Additional U.S. Overseas Bases to End Operations," Department of Defense, news release, April 27, 1995. From 1988 to 1997, the number of U.S. troops stationed abroad (on land) dropped from 480,000 to 210,000; 80 percent of the reduction came in Europe. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000), Appendix C, p. C-2.
61. The United States currently has military installations in three dozen foreign countries or special territories. See Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environ- ment), Department of Defense, "Summary," Base Structure Report (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory), Fiscal Year 2002 Baseline, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/ basestructure2002.pdf.This report counts only installations in which the United States has actually invested federal dollars. Missing from the list are Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, so a peculiar definition of U.S. base must guide the report. Unfortunately, comparable time series data do not exist to permit comparison to the last days of the Cold War. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen noted in 1997 that although the DoD had reduced active-duty military forces by 32 percent, it had reduced its domestic and overseas base structure by only 26 percent. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997). The vast majority of overseas installations that were either reduced or closed, 878 out of 952, were in Europe. See Department of Defense, "Additional U.S. Overseas Bases to End Operations," Department of Defense, news release, April 27, 1995. From 1988 to 1997, the number of U.S. troops stationed abroad (on land) dropped from 480,000 to 210,000; 80 percent of the reduction came in Europe. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000), Appendix C, p. C-2.
62. The United States currently has military installations in three dozen foreign countries or special territories. See Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environ- ment), Department of Defense, "Summary," Base Structure Report (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory), Fiscal Year 2002 Baseline, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/ basestructure2002.pdf.This report counts only installations in which the United States has actually invested federal dollars. Missing from the list are Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, so a peculiar definition of U.S. base must guide the report. Unfortunately, comparable time series data do not exist to permit comparison to the last days of the Cold War. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen noted in 1997 that although the DoD had reduced active-duty military forces by 32 percent, it had reduced its domestic and overseas base structure by only 26 percent. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997). The vast majority of overseas installations that were either reduced or closed, 878 out of 952, were in Europe. See Department of Defense, "Additional U.S. Overseas Bases to End Operations," Department of Defense, news release, April 27, 1995. From 1988 to 1997, the number of U.S. troops stationed abroad (on land) dropped from 480,000 to 210,000; 80 percent of the reduction came in Europe. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000), Appendix C, p. C-2.
63. The United States currently has military installations in three dozen foreign countries or special territories. See Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environ- ment), Department of Defense, "Summary," Base Structure Report (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory), Fiscal Year 2002 Baseline, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/ basestructure2002.pdf.This report counts only installations in which the United States has actually invested federal dollars. Missing from the list are Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, so a peculiar definition of U.S. base must guide the report. Unfortunately, comparable time series data do not exist to permit comparison to the last days of the Cold War. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen noted in 1997 that although the DoD had reduced active-duty military forces by 32 percent, it had reduced its domestic and overseas base structure by only 26 percent. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997). The vast majority of overseas installations that were either reduced or closed, 878 out of 952, were in Europe. See Department of Defense, "Additional U.S. Overseas Bases to End Operations," Department of Defense, news release, April 27, 1995. From 1988 to 1997, the number of U.S. troops stationed abroad (on land) dropped from 480,000 to 210,000; 80 percent of the reduction came in Europe. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000), Appendix C, p. C-2.
64. Other post-Cold War allies offering overflight, port, or actual basing contributions to the war on terrorism include, among others, Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Djibouti, Estonia, Ethiopia, Latvia, Lithuania, Pakistan, and Slovakia. See U.S. Department of Defense, International Contributions to the War against Terrorism, fact sheet, June 7, 2002. See also William M. Arkin, "Military Bases Boost Capability but Fuel Anger," Los Angeles Times, January 6, 2002, p. A-1, noting that U.S. military personnel were working at thirteen new locations in nine countries in support of the war on terror.
65. Other post-Cold War allies offering overflight, port, or actual basing contributions to the war on terrorism include, among others, Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Djibouti, Estonia, Ethiopia, Latvia, Lithuania, Pakistan, and Slovakia. See U.S. Department of Defense, International Contributions to the War against Terrorism, fact sheet, June 7, 2002. See also William M. Arkin, "Military Bases Boost Capability but Fuel Anger," Los Angeles Times, January 6, 2002, p. A-1, noting that U.S. military personnel were working at thirteen new locations in nine countries in support of the war on terror.
66. Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy, fact sheet, "Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSRs)," October 2002. Thirty-three ships of various types, including 9 of the LMSRs, are employed to preposition equipment, ammunition, and fuel. See also Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy, fact sheet, "Afloat Prepositioning Force," April 2003. A total of 87 dry cargo ships of various kinds, including 11 LMSRs and many other roll-on roll-off ships are based in the United States.
67. Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy, fact sheet, "Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSRs)," October 2002. Thirty-three ships of various types, including 9 of the LMSRs, are employed to preposition equipment, ammunition, and fuel. See also Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy, fact sheet, "Afloat Prepositioning Force," April 2003. A total of 87 dry cargo ships of various kinds, including 11 LMSRs and many other roll-on roll-off ships are based in the United States.
68. "Boeing and U.S. Air Force Sign $9.7 Billion C-17 Contract," news release, Boeing Corporation, August 15, 2002, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2002/q3/nr_020815m.html. This follow-on procurement contract added 60 C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft to the 120 already on order.
69. IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, pp. 18-21, 60-63. It is worth noting that Britain and France are the only two countries in the world, aside from the United States, with any global power projection capability.
70. Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Pools, James E Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993 (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/ ucp.pdf; see especially pp. 107-117.
71. George H.W. Bush's administration reportedly issued draft defense planning guidance to the Pentagon in March 1992 with this objective. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival/" New York Times, March 8,1992, p. 14. For reportage, see Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992, pp. 1, 14; and Barton Gellman, "The U.S. Aims to Remain First among Equals," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 16-22, 1992, p. 19. For examples of contemporary commentary, see Leslie Gelb, "They're Kidding," New York Times, March 9, 1992, p. A17; James Chace, "The Pentagon's Superpower Fantasy," New York Times, March 16, 1992, p. 17; and Charles Krauthammer, "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?" Washington Post, March 13, 1992, p. A25.
72. George H.W. Bush's administration reportedly issued draft defense planning guidance to the Pentagon in March 1992 with this objective. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival/" New York Times, March 8,1992, p. 14. For reportage, see Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992, pp. 1, 14; and Barton Gellman, "The U.S. Aims to Remain First among Equals," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 16-22, 1992, p. 19. For examples of contemporary commentary, see Leslie Gelb, "They're Kidding," New York Times, March 9, 1992, p. A17; James Chace, "The Pentagon's Superpower Fantasy," New York Times, March 16, 1992, p. 17; and Charles Krauthammer, "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?" Washington Post, March 13, 1992, p. A25.
73. George H.W. Bush's administration reportedly issued draft defense planning guidance to the Pentagon in March 1992 with this objective. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival/" New York Times, March 8,1992, p. 14. For reportage, see Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992, pp. 1, 14; and Barton Gellman, "The U.S. Aims to Remain First among Equals," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 16-22, 1992, p. 19. For examples of contemporary commentary, see Leslie Gelb, "They're Kidding," New York Times, March 9, 1992, p. A17; James Chace, "The Pentagon's Superpower Fantasy," New York Times, March 16, 1992, p. 17; and Charles Krauthammer, "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?" Washington Post, March 13, 1992, p. A25.
74. George H.W. Bush's administration reportedly issued draft defense planning guidance to the Pentagon in March 1992 with this objective. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival/" New York Times, March 8,1992, p. 14. For reportage, see Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992, pp. 1, 14; and Barton Gellman, "The U.S. Aims to Remain First among Equals," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 16-22, 1992, p. 19. For examples of contemporary commentary, see Leslie Gelb, "They're Kidding," New York Times, March 9, 1992, p. A17; James Chace, "The Pentagon's Superpower Fantasy," New York Times, March 16, 1992, p. 17; and Charles Krauthammer, "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?" Washington Post, March 13, 1992, p. A25.
75. George H.W. Bush's administration reportedly issued draft defense planning guidance to the Pentagon in March 1992 with this objective. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival/" New York Times, March 8,1992, p. 14. For reportage, see Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992, pp. 1, 14; and Barton Gellman, "The U.S. Aims to Remain First among Equals," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 16-22, 1992, p. 19. For examples of contemporary commentary, see Leslie Gelb, "They're Kidding," New York Times, March 9, 1992, p. A17; James Chace, "The Pentagon's Superpower Fantasy," New York Times, March 16, 1992, p. 17; and Charles Krauthammer, "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?" Washington Post, March 13, 1992, p. A25.
76. George H.W. Bush's administration reportedly issued draft defense planning guidance to the Pentagon in March 1992 with this objective. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival/" New York Times, March 8,1992, p. 14. For reportage, see Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992, pp. 1, 14; and Barton Gellman, "The U.S. Aims to Remain First among Equals," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 16-22, 1992, p. 19. For examples of contemporary commentary, see Leslie Gelb, "They're Kidding," New York Times, March 9, 1992, p. A17; James Chace, "The Pentagon's Superpower Fantasy," New York Times, March 16, 1992, p. 17; and Charles Krauthammer, "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?" Washington Post, March 13, 1992, p. A25.
77. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 30. Accoding to the 2001 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 12, "Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions"; see also ibid., p. 36.
78. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 30. Accoding to the 2001 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 12, "Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions"; see also ibid., p. 36.
79. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 30. Accoding to the 2001 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 12, "Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions"; see also ibid., p. 36.
80. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 30. Accoding to the 2001 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 12, "Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions"; see also ibid., p. 36.
81. Owen R. Coté Jr., "The Future of the Trident Force, Security Studies Program," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 2002, pp. 25-29, discusses air defense suppression generally, and the significant problems posed by the SA-10, specifically. See also Owen R. Coté Jr., "'Buying . . . From the Sea': A Defense Budget for a Maritime Strategy," in Cindy Williams, ed., Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 146-150.
82. Owen R. Coté Jr., "The Future of the Trident Force, Security Studies Program," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 2002, pp. 25-29, discusses air defense suppression generally, and the significant problems posed by the SA-10, specifically. See also Owen R. Coté Jr., "'Buying . . . From the Sea': A Defense Budget for a Maritime Strategy," in Cindy Williams, ed., Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 146-150.
83. IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, p. 148, credits China with 144 SA-10s. This implies perhaps a dozen batteries. SA-10 is a NATO designation; Russia calls the weapon S-300. See Federation of American Scientists, "SA-10 Grumble," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/ s-300pmu.htm.
84. IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, p. 148, credits China with 144 SA-10s. This implies perhaps a dozen batteries. SA-10 is a NATO designation; Russia calls the weapon S-300. See Federation of American Scientists, "SA-10 Grumble," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300pmu.htm.
85. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report seems to be preoccupied with swiftness: For example, the DoD seeks forces to "swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts" (p. 17); "The focus will be on the ability to act quickly. U.S. forces will remain capable of swiftly defeating attack against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping time frames" (p. 21); and "One of the goals of reorienting the global posture is to render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement" (p. 25; repeated on p. 26).
86. Daniel Williams and Nicholas Wood, "Iraq Finds Ready Arms Sellers from Baltic Sea to Bosnia," International Herald Tribune, November 21, 2002.
87. Prior to the start of the third Gulf War in March 2003, Iraq was reported to have had 3,000 anti-aircraft guns. Many of Iraq's air defense duels with U.S. aircraft in the no-fly zones during the preceding decade depended on antiaircraft artillery. Iraq did not shoot down any Western aircraft before the war, but U.S. airmen nevertheless viewed these guns as a serious threat: "For years, the Iraqis used antiaircraft artillery (AAA), unguided rockets, and surface-to-air missiles against coalition aircraft in both the northern and southern no-fly zones. In fact, they started firing at our aircraft in 1992, and over the last three years Iraqi AAA has fired at coalition aircraft over 1,000 times, launched 600 rockets and fired nearly 60 SAMs." Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, news briefing, September 30, 2002. See IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, p. 106, for Iraq's AAA inventory.
88. According to Kenneth P. Werrell, "Between 1965 and 1973 flak engaged one-fourth of all flights over North Vietnam and accounted for 66% of U.S. aircraft losses over the North." Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), p. 102.
89. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 61-62. Thirty-eight aircraft were lost, and 48 were damaged. In explaining these low losses, Keaney and Cohen note: "Although some 'crews initially tried NATO-style low-level ingress tactics during the first few nights of Desert Storm, the sheer volume and ubiquity of barrage antiaircraft artillery, combined with the ability of Stinger-class infrared SAMs to be effective up to 12,000-15,000 feet, quickly persuaded most everyone on the Coalition side to abandon low altitude, especially for weapon release." See also General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June, 1997), Table II.7, p. 94. Fourteen aircraft were destroyed or damaged by radar SAMs, 28 by infrared SAMS, and 33 by AAA. AAA was much more likely than the other systems to damage rather than destroy a successfully engaged target.
90. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 61-62. Thirty-eight aircraft were lost, and 48 were damaged. In explaining these low losses, Keaney and Cohen note: "Although some 'crews initially tried NATO-style low-level ingress tactics during the first few nights of Desert Storm, the sheer volume and ubiquity of barrage antiaircraft artillery, combined with the ability of Stinger-class infrared SAMs to be effective up to 12,000-15,000 feet, quickly persuaded most everyone on the Coalition side to abandon low altitude, especially for weapon release." See also General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June, 1997), Table II.7, p. 94. Fourteen aircraft were destroyed or damaged by radar SAMs, 28 by infrared SAMS, and 33 by AAA. AAA was much more likely than the other systems to damage rather than destroy a successfully engaged target.
91. Moseley, "Operation Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers."
92. Rowan Scarborough, "Apache Operation a Lesson in Defeat," Washington Times, April 22, 2003, p. 1. This was apparently a clever Iraqi ambush. An Iraqi observer watched the helicopters take off and used a cell phone to alert some air defense units. On a prearranged signal, the local power grid was turned off for a few seconds to alert the rest. See Lt. Gen. William Scott Wallace, U.S. Army, "Fifth Corps Commander Live Briefing from Baghdad," May 7, 2003, U.S. Department of Defense news transcript, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030507-0157html.
93. Rowan Scarborough, "Apache Operation a Lesson in Defeat," Washington Times, April 22, 2003, p. 1. This was apparently a clever Iraqi ambush. An Iraqi observer watched the helicopters take off and used a cell phone to alert some air defense units. On a prearranged signal, the local power grid was turned off for a few seconds to alert the rest. See Lt. Gen. William Scott Wallace, U.S. Army, "Fifth Corps Commander Live Briefing from Baghdad," May 7, 2003, U.S. Department of Defense news transcript, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030507-0157html.
94. Between 1961 and 1968, 1,709 U.S. aircraft were lost over South Vietnam, of which 63 percent were helicopters and the rest fixed-wing aircraft. During this period, AAA was the only air defense weapon available to the communists in the South. Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM, p. 112.
95. Passive electronic intelligence collection consists of radio receivers
96. Some believe that the advent of stealth obviates this statement, but that does not seem to be the case. Stealth aircraft missions are generally planned to benefit from air defense suppression, though it appears that these missions rely on somewhat less direct suppressive support than do conventional bombing missions. Little more can be said, as the tactics of stealth missions are highly classified.
97. Relying on accounts by Adm. James Ellis, commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe during the Kosovo war, Timothy L. Thomas reports the Serbian strategy: "To prevent its air defense assets from being neutralized, the Serbian armed forces turned their assets on only as needed. They therefore presented a 'constant but dormant' threat. This resulted in NATO using its most strained assets (e.g., JSTARS, AWACS, or airborne warning and control system) to conduct additional searches for air defense assets and forced NATO aircraft to fly above 15,000 feet, making it difficult for them to hit their targets. Ellis noted that NATO achieved little damage to the Serbian integrated air defense system." see Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 14-29; quotation on p. 8 of the web version.
98. As Thomas notes, "Their [Serbian] offsets included deception, disinformation, camouflage, the clever use of radar, spies within NATO, helicopter movement NATO couldn't detect, and the exploitation of NATO's operational templating of information dominance activities (e.g., satellites, reconnaissance flights). See ibid., pp. 3, 9 of the web version.
99. On Serbia's air and ground strategies, as well as Serbia's tactical successes, see Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 54-66.
100. For a collection of deception tactics and countermeasures that the Serbs are said to have employed, see "Tactics Employed by the Yugoslav Army to Limit NATO Air Strikes' Effectiveness," Associated Press, November 18, 2002. Daryl Press notes that even in the deserts of Kuwait and southern Iraq, U.S. fighter aircraft experienced difficulties attacking a dug-in, camouflaged, ground force. See Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War," pp. 40-42. As of this writing, insufficient information has emerged to determine the effectiveness of these techniques in the U.S.-led war with Iraq that began in March 2003.
101. For a collection of deception tactics and countermeasures that the Serbs are said to have employed, see "Tactics Employed by the Yugoslav Army to Limit NATO Air Strikes' Effectiveness," Associated Press, November 18, 2002. Daryl Press notes that even in the deserts of Kuwait and southern Iraq, U.S. fighter aircraft experienced difficulties attacking a dug-in, camouflaged, ground force. See Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War," pp. 40-42. As of this writing, insufficient information has emerged to determine the effectiveness of these techniques in the U.S.-led war with Iraq that began in March 2003.
102. Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, "Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing," April 5, 2003, U.S. Department of Defense news transcript, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/ t04052003_t405mose.html, alludes to enforcement of the no-fly zones as an opportunity to degrade the Iraqi air defense system. He reports that after the first three or four days of the war, his flyers were able to switch from suppression to destruction of Iraqi air defenses, which suggests that the defenders suffered heavy losses in the early days, perhaps because they turned their radars on too often. Finally he said that "every time they move one of those things [a SAM or radar] they have a tendency to break something on them," which suggests unreliable and/or poorly maintained equipment. After the conventional phase of the war ended, an Iraqi air defense officer, Gen. Ghanem Abdullah Azawi, declared: "There has been practically no air defense since 1991. Nobody rebuilt it. We didn't receive any new weapons." Quoted in William Branigin, "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers: Self-Deception a Factor in Defeat," Washington Post, April 27, 2003, p. A25.
103. Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, "Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing," April 5, 2003, U.S. Department of Defense news transcript, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/ t04052003_t405mose.html, alludes to enforcement of the no-fly zones as an opportunity to degrade the Iraqi air defense system. He reports that after the first three or four days of the war, his flyers were able to switch from suppression to destruction of Iraqi air defenses, which suggests that the defenders suffered heavy losses in the early days, perhaps because they turned their radars on too often. Finally he said that "every time they move one of those things [a SAM or radar] they have a tendency to break something on them," which suggests unreliable and/or poorly maintained equipment. After the conventional phase of the war ended, an Iraqi air defense officer, Gen. Ghanem Abdullah Azawi, declared: "There has been practically no air defense since 1991. Nobody rebuilt it. We didn't receive any new weapons." Quoted in William Branigin, "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers: Self-Deception a Factor in Defeat," Washington Post, April 27, 2003, p. A25.
104. One journalist who toured Iraqi defenses south of Baghdad either in late March or early April reports that Iraqi units were well dispersed, dug in, and camouflaged. He saw some damaged equipment but more that had survived. Robert Fisk, "Saddam's Masters of Concealment Dig In, Ready for Battle," Independent, April 3, 2003, p. 1. On April 5, U.S. troops "found herds of tanks abandoned by the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard" in Karbala. See Jim Dwyer, "In Karbala, G.I.'s Find Forsaken Iraqi Armor and Pockets of Resistance," New York Times, April 6, 2003, sec. B, p. 4. One postwar report suggests that "fewer than 100 Republican Guard tanks were knocked out in the battles around Baghdad, so coalition officers say hundreds of modern T-72 main battle tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles are still to be found." Tim Ripley, "Building a New Iraqi Army," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 2003, p. 3. Other journalists toured the same area after the end of conventional fighting and reported the existence of vast, but entirely unused, prepared defensive positions and the destruction of many reasonably well-camouflaged Iraqi combat vehicles, though they kept no count. They note little evidence of dead Iraqi soldiers and suggest that many units melted away. Terry McCarthy, "What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?" Time, May 12, 2003, pp. 24-28.
105. One journalist who toured Iraqi defenses south of Baghdad either in late March or early April reports that Iraqi units were well dispersed, dug in, and camouflaged. He saw some damaged equipment but more that had survived. Robert Fisk, "Saddam's Masters of Concealment Dig In, Ready for Battle," Independent, April 3, 2003, p. 1. On April 5, U.S. troops "found herds of tanks abandoned by the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard" in Karbala. See Jim Dwyer, "In Karbala, G.I.'s Find Forsaken Iraqi Armor and Pockets of Resistance," New York Times, April 6, 2003, sec. B, p. 4. One postwar report suggests that "fewer than 100 Republican Guard tanks were knocked out in the battles around Baghdad, so coalition officers say hundreds of modern T-72 main battle tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles are still to be found." Tim Ripley, "Building a New Iraqi Army," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 2003, p. 3. Other journalists toured the same area after the end of conventional fighting and reported the existence of vast, but entirely unused, prepared defensive positions and the destruction of many reasonably well-camouflaged Iraqi combat vehicles, though they kept no count. They note little evidence of dead Iraqi soldiers and suggest that many units melted away. Terry McCarthy, "What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?" Time, May 12, 2003, pp. 24-28.
106. One journalist who toured Iraqi defenses south of Baghdad either in late March or early April reports that Iraqi units were well dispersed, dug in, and camouflaged. He saw some damaged equipment but more that had survived. Robert Fisk, "Saddam's Masters of Concealment Dig In, Ready for Battle," Independent, April 3, 2003, p. 1. On April 5, U.S. troops "found herds of tanks abandoned by the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard" in Karbala. See Jim Dwyer, "In Karbala, G.I.'s Find Forsaken Iraqi Armor and Pockets of Resistance," New York Times, April 6, 2003, sec. B, p. 4. One postwar report suggests that "fewer than 100 Republican Guard tanks were knocked out in the battles around Baghdad, so coalition officers say hundreds of modern T-72 main battle tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles are still to be found." Tim Ripley, "Building a New Iraqi Army," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 2003, p. 3. Other journalists toured the same area after the end of conventional fighting and reported the existence of vast, but entirely unused, prepared defensive positions and the destruction of many reasonably well-camouflaged Iraqi combat vehicles, though they kept no count. They note little evidence of dead Iraqi soldiers and suggest that many units melted away. Terry McCarthy, "What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?" Time, May 12, 2003, pp. 24-28.
107. One journalist who toured Iraqi defenses south of Baghdad either in late March or early April reports that Iraqi units were well dispersed, dug in, and camouflaged. He saw some damaged equipment but more that had survived. Robert Fisk, "Saddam's Masters of Concealment Dig In, Ready for Battle," Independent, April 3, 2003, p. 1. On April 5, U.S. troops "found herds of tanks abandoned by the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard" in Karbala. See Jim Dwyer, "In Karbala, G.I.'s Find Forsaken Iraqi Armor and Pockets of Resistance," New York Times, April 6, 2003, sec. B, p. 4. One postwar report suggests that "fewer than 100 Republican Guard tanks were knocked out in the battles around Baghdad, so coalition officers say hundreds of modern T-72 main battle tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles are still to be found." Tim Ripley, "Building a New Iraqi Army," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 2003, p. 3. Other journalists toured the same area after the end of conventional fighting and reported the existence of vast, but entirely unused, prepared defensive positions and the destruction of many reasonably well-camouflaged Iraqi combat vehicles, though they kept no count. They note little evidence of dead Iraqi soldiers and suggest that many units melted away. Terry McCarthy, "What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?" Time, May 12, 2003, pp. 24-28.
108. William M. Arkin, "Speed Kills," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2003, pt. M, p. 1, suggests that the Iraqis suffered grievous damage when they tried to maneuver under cover of a late-March sandstorm. More generally, a U.S. Marine noncommissioned officer declared, "Every time they try to move their tanks even 100 yards, they get it from our aircraft. We are everywhere." See Matthew Fisher, "Skirmishes in Baghdad: Marines Blow Up Scores of Abandoned Iraqi Tanks and Armoured Vehicles," Times Colonist (Victoria, Canada), April 7, 2003, p. A5.
109. William M. Arkin, "Speed Kills," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2003, pt. M, p. 1, suggests that the Iraqis suffered grievous damage when they tried to maneuver under cover of a late-March sandstorm. More generally, a U.S. Marine noncommissioned officer declared, "Every time they try to move their tanks even 100 yards, they get it from our aircraft. We are everywhere." See Matthew Fisher, "Skirmishes in Baghdad: Marines Blow Up Scores of Abandoned Iraqi Tanks and Armoured Vehicles," Times Colonist (Victoria, Canada), April 7, 2003, p. A5.
110. Philip Shenon, "The Iraqi Connection: Serbs Seek Iraqi Help for Defense, Britain Says," New York Times, April 1, 1999, p. A 16. This appears to have been two-way commerce. Until very recently, any companies in the former Yugoslavia apparently exported military equipment to Iraq in violation of the UN arms embargo. See Williams and Wood, "Iraq Finds Ready Arms Sellers from Baltic Sea to Bosnia."
111. Philip Shenon, "The Iraqi Connection: Serbs Seek Iraqi Help for Defense, Britain Says," New York Times, April 1, 1999, p. A 16. This appears to have been two-way commerce. Until very recently, any companies in the former Yugoslavia apparently exported military equipment to Iraq in violation of the UN arms embargo. See Williams and Wood, "Iraq Finds Ready Arms Sellers from Baltic Sea to Bosnia."
112. A fiber-optic network was reportedly added to Iraq's air defense command and control system. See IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, p. 98.
113. Andrew Koch and Michael Sirak, "Iraqi Air Defences under Strain," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 28, 2001. The article also notes that while some Serbs have reportedly helped Iraq militarily over the years, others reportedly provided intelligence about Iraq to the United States and Britain.
114. Department of Defense, news briefing, June 10, 1999. See the slide "Air Defense BDA," http: / / www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/990610-J-0000K-008.jpg.
115. IISS, The Military Balance 2002-2003, p. 98.
116. For reviews of the evidence supporting this point, see William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, MR-1408-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), pp. 40-44; and "The Great Scud Hunt: An Assessment," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 1996, http://www.cdiss. org/scudnt6.htm.
117. For reviews of the evidence supporting this point, see William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, MR-1408-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), pp. 40-44; and "The Great Scud Hunt: An Assessment," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 1996, http://www.cdiss. org/scudnt6.htm.
118. Two soldiers and two journalists were killed, fifteen soldiers were wounded, and 17 military vehicles were destroyed. Steven Lee Myers, "A Nation at War: Third Infantry Division; Iraqi Missile Strike Kills Four at Tactical Operations Center," New York Times, April 8, 2003, sec. B, p. 3.
119. IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, pp. 103-105, 153-154, 279, 299. Nearly 10 million are in Iran, which conscripts perhaps only 125,000 of its 950,000 eligible males annually. North Korea appears to conscript virtually all of its eligible males.
120. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st, Supporting Research and Analysis, September 15, 1999, p. 40.
121. Alexander Higgins, "UN-Backed Study Estimates 639 Million Small Arms in World," Associated Press, June 24, 2002; see also "Red Flags and Buicks: Global Firearm Stockpiles," chapter summary, Small Arms Survey, 2002, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/Yearbook/EngPRkitCH2_ 11.06.02.pdf.
122. Alexander Higgins, "UN-Backed Study Estimates 639 Million Small Arms in World," Associated Press, June 24, 2002; see also "Red Flags and Buicks: Global Firearm Stockpiles," chapter summary, Small Arms Survey, 2002, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/Yearbook/EngPRkitCH2_ 11.06.02.pdf.
123. James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter 1995-1996), p. 61.
124. Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size," New York Times, February 28, 2003, p. 1.
125. Tom Squitieri, "Postwar Force Could Be 125,000," USA Today, April 28, 2003, p. 1.
126. Bradley Graham, "Iraq Stabilization Impinges on Army Rotation, Rebuilding," Washington Post, June 6, 2003, p. A21.
127. "'Too Few Troops' in Iraq," BBC News, May 26, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/ hi/middle_east/2938176.stm.
128. Tom Bowman, "Pentagon to Consider Large-Scale Troop Cuts," Baltimore Sun, July 10, 2001, p. 1A. A reduction of almost 90,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is contemplated because "with personnel eating up a significant portion of the defense budget, and with Rumsfeld and his aides eager to harness the latest technology and weaponry, the Pentagon has begun to focus on cutting jobs among the 1.4 million people on active duty." See also Robert S. Dudney, "Hyper-extension," Air Force Magazine, August 2002, p. 2, noting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's reluctance to add manpower, which he considered to be "enormously expensive."
129. Tom Bowman, "Pentagon to Consider Large-Scale Troop Cuts," Baltimore Sun, July 10, 2001, p. 1A. A reduction of almost 90,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is contemplated because "with personnel eating up a significant portion of the defense budget, and with Rumsfeld and his aides eager to harness the latest technology and weaponry, the Pentagon has begun to focus on cutting jobs among the 1.4 million people on active duty." See also Robert S. Dudney, "Hyper-extension," Air Force Magazine, August 2002, p. 2, noting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's reluctance to add manpower, which he considered to be "enormously expensive."
130. The final defense authorization for fiscal year 2003 approved a modest increase in the size of the U.S. active force.
131. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), is the source for what follows.
132. Ibid., p. 21.
133. Ibid., pp. 31, 230.
134. Ibid., pp. 110-111. The RPG-7, intended as a point-detonated antitank projectile, reportedly also has a time fuse to ensure that it will explode somewhere in the midst of the enemy in the event that the shooter misses his target. The Somalis may have somehow shortened the time setting on this fuse, to cause the projectile to burst in the air at relatively short range - essentially turning it into a medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery round. Alternatively, the Somalis may simply have learned the range at which this explosion would normally occur and fired at least some of their RPGs at helicopters at the appropriate range.
135. Ibid. p. 109.
136. Ibid. p. 333.
137. The 1968 Battle for Hue in South Vietnam offers a cautionary tale that is much studied by the U.S. military. Hue was not a particularly large city, with 140,000 people on sixteen square kilometers, though its heavy stone construction provided excellent defensive positions. It took twenty-five days for 11 South Vietnamese and 3 U.S. Marine Corps infantry battalions, with vastly superior firepower, to evict 16 to 18 Vietcong and North Vietnamese infantry battalions from the city. U.S. Army units assisted with critical supporting attacks outside the city. The U.S. and South Vietnamese troops suffered 600 killed and 3,800 wounded and missing to do so, and the fighting destroyed much of the city. Estimates of communist dead range from 1,000 to 5,000, out of a force of perhaps 12,000. See Abbott Associates, Modern Experience in City Combat, Technical Memorandum 5-87, AD-A180 999 (Aberdeen, Md.: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1987), pp. 67-68. Casualty estimates are from Jack Shulimson, Lt. Col. Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and Captain David Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), p. 213.
138. The 1968 Battle for Hue in South Vietnam offers a cautionary tale that is much studied by the U.S. military. Hue was not a particularly large city, with 140,000 people on sixteen square kilometers, though its heavy stone construction provided excellent defensive positions. It took twenty-five days for 11 South Vietnamese and 3 U.S. Marine Corps infantry battalions, with vastly superior firepower, to evict 16 to 18 Vietcong and North Vietnamese infantry battalions from the city. U.S. Army units assisted with critical supporting attacks outside the city. The U.S. and South Vietnamese troops suffered 600 killed and 3,800 wounded and missing to do so, and the fighting destroyed much of the city. Estimates of communist dead range from 1,000 to 5,000, out of a force of perhaps 12,000. See Abbott Associates, Modern Experience in City Combat, Technical Memorandum 5-87, AD-A180 999 (Aberdeen, Md.: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1987), pp. 67-68. Casualty estimates are from Jack Shulimson, Lt. Col. Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and Captain David Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), p. 213.
139. Barry R. Posen, "Urban Operations: Tactical Realities and Strategic Ambiguities," in Michael C. Desch, ed., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), pp. 153-154. See also Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, FM 3-06.11 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 28, 2002), secs. 4-13, 4-37, 5-12.
140. Barry R. Posen, "Urban Operations: Tactical Realities and Strategic Ambiguities," in Michael C. Desch, ed., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), pp. 153-154. See also Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, FM 3-06.11 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 28, 2002), secs. 4-13, 4-37, 5-12.
141. According to Gen. Alaa Abdelkadeer, a Republican Guard officer interviewed after the war, the Iraqis had discussed the details of an urban defense of Baghdad before the war, "but none of this was carried out. " Robert Collier, "Iraqi Military Plans Were Simplistic, Poorly Coordinated," San Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 2003, p. A-19.
142. Peter Baker, "A 'Turkey Shoot,' but with Marines as the Targets," Washington Post, March 28, 2003, p. A1; Dexter Filkins and Michael Wilson, "A Nation At War: The Southern Front; Marines, Battling in Streets, Seek Control of City in South," New York Times, "March 25, 2003, p. A1; John Roberts, "On the Scene: A Formidable Foe," March 26, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 200 . . . 6/iraq/scene/printable546258.shtml; and Andrew North, "Nasiriya, 0941 GMT, " in "Reporters' Log: War in Iraq," BBC News, March 31, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk/reporters.
143. Peter Baker, "A 'Turkey Shoot,' but with Marines as the Targets," Washington Post, March 28, 2003, p. A1; Dexter Filkins and Michael Wilson, "A Nation At War: The Southern Front; Marines, Battling in Streets, Seek Control of City in South," New York Times, "March 25, 2003, p. A1; John Roberts, "On the Scene: A Formidable Foe," March 26, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 200 . . . 6/iraq/scene/printable546258.shtml; and Andrew North, "Nasiriya, 0941 GMT, " in "Reporters' Log: War in Iraq," BBC News, March 31, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk/reporters.
144. Peter Baker, "A 'Turkey Shoot,' but with Marines as the Targets," Washington Post, March 28, 2003, p. A1; Dexter Filkins and Michael Wilson, "A Nation At War: The Southern Front; Marines, Battling in Streets, Seek Control of City in South," New York Times, "March 25, 2003, p. A1; John Roberts, "On the Scene: A Formidable Foe," March 26, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 200 . . . 6/iraq/scene/printable546258.shtml; and Andrew North, "Nasiriya, 0941 GMT, " in "Reporters' Log: War in Iraq," BBC News, March 31, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk/reporters.
145. Peter Baker, "A 'Turkey Shoot,' but with Marines as the Targets," Washington Post, March 28, 2003, p. A1; Dexter Filkins and Michael Wilson, "A Nation At War: The Southern Front; Marines, Battling in Streets, Seek Control of City in South," New York Times, "March 25, 2003, p. A1; John Roberts, "On the Scene: A Formidable Foe," March 26, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 200 . . . 6/iraq/scene/printable546258.shtml; and Andrew North, "Nasiriya, 0941 GMT, " in "Reporters' Log: War in Iraq," BBC News, March 31, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk/reporters.
146. Conway, "First Marine Expeditionary Force Briefing."
147. Anthony Davis, "The Afghan Files: Al-Qaeda Documents from Kabul," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (February 2002), p. 16. Davis visited Kabul shortly after its fall and collected many al-Qaeda documents. According to Davis, "Much of the literature also underlines the extent to which al-Qaeda was a highly organized military undertaking as well as a committed terrorist network. Detailed training manuals and student notebooks indicate that theoretical and on-the-job training involved not only small arms and assault rifles but a range of heavier weapons, including 12.7 millimeter machine guns, AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, mortars, and even 107 mm BM-1 and BM-12 rocket systems." Ibid., p. 18
148. Anthony Davis, "The Afghan Files: Al-Qaeda Documents from Kabul," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (February 2002), p. 16. Davis visited Kabul shortly after its fall and collected many al-Qaeda documents. According to Davis, "Much of the literature also underlines the extent to which al-Qaeda was a highly organized military undertaking as well as a committed terrorist network. Detailed training manuals and student notebooks indicate that theoretical and on-the-job training involved not only small arms and assault rifles but a range of heavier weapons, including 12.7 millimeter machine guns, AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, mortars, and even 107 mm BM-1 and BM-12 rocket systems." Ibid., p. 18
149. The section that follows relies largely on journalistic accounts of the battle. I have supplemented these accounts with some information gleaned in private conversations with U.S. military officers. See also the excellent study by Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002), pp. 28-37.
150. Richard T. Cooper, "The Untold War: Fierce Fight in Afghan Valley Tests U.S. Soldiers and Strategy," Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2002, p. 1.
151. In the case of one communications bunker, an army intelligence specialist noted: "You wouldn't see it unless you looked directly on it. Predator wouldn't have been able to see it." The bunker contained a radio set up with "low probability of intercept techniques," which would have made it very difficult for U.S. electronic intelligence assets to detect its presence. See Thomas E. Ricks, "In Mop Up, U.S. Finds 'Impressive' Remnants of Fallen Foe," Washington Post, March 20, 2002, p. 1.
152. Cooper, "The Untold War," p. 1; see also Department of Defense, "Background Briefing on the Report of the Battle of Takur Ghar," May 24, 2002.
153. Cooper, "The Untold War," p. 1; see also Department of Defense, "Background Briefing on the Report of the Battle of Takur Ghar," May 24, 2002.
154. According to one reporter, "Five [AH-64] Apaches were present at the start of the battle, a sixth arrived later that morning and a seventh flew up from Kandahar to join the fight that afternoon. None of the helicopters was shot down, but four were so badly damaged they were knocked out of the fight. The fire the Apaches braved was so intense that when the day was over, 27 of the 28 rotor blades among the seven helicopters sported bullet holes, said Lt. Col. James M. Marye, the commander of the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment." Sean D. Naylor, "In Shah-E-Kot, Apaches Save the Day - and Their Reputation," Army Times, March 25, 2002, p. 15.
155. Sean D. Naylor, "What We Learned from Afghanistan," Army Times, July 29, 2002, p. 10. It appears to me that a problem with al-Qaeda mortar fuses saved some American lives; Soviet shells with point-detonated fuses occasionally bored into the mud without exploding. Western time or proximity fuses would not have had this problem and would have produced a more lethal explosion.
156. Walter Pincus, "Attacks on U.S. Forces May Persist, CIA, DIA Chiefs Warn of Afghan Insurgency Threat," Washington Post, March 20, 2002, p. 1. The director of the CIA, George Tenet, testified to Congress, "There are many, many points of exit that people in small numbers can get out. We're frustrated that people did get away." Quoted in ibid.
157. Ricks, "In Mop Up, U.S. Finds 'Impressive' Remnants of Fallen Foe" reports "sheaves of rocket-propelled grenades." Commenting on the lessons of the 2003 Iraq war, Col. Mike Hiemstra, director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned, notes, "The Proliferation of rocket-propelled grenades [RPGs] across the world continues to be huge." See "More 'Must-Have' Answers Needed," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 2003, p. 25. The RPG was widely used by the Iraqis in the 2003 war; it seems to have been their only effective antiarmor weapon.
158. Ibid.; and Cooper, "The Untold War," p. 1, report night-vision devices being found in two separate al- Qaeda positions.
159. Ibid.; and Cooper, "The Untold War," p. 1, report night-vision devices being found in two separate al- Qaeda positions.
160. U.S. Department of the Navy, . . . From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, White Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, September 1992). See also Forward . . . from the Sea, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, December 1994), pp. 46-49.
161. U.S. Department of the Navy, . . . From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, White Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, September 1992). See also Forward . . . from the Sea, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, December 1994), pp. 46-49.
162. Adm. Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, "Sea Power 21 Series - Part I," National Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128, No. 196 (October 2002).
163. The Pentagon recognizes the special problems of littoral warfare: "Anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines, and advanced mines could threaten the ability of U.S. naval and amphibious forces to operate in littoral waters." Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 31;
164. see also p. 43. Recognition is not the same as solution, however. They recognized the problem in 1992: "Some littoral threats . . . tax the capabilities of our current systems and force structure. Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive directly from command of the high seas. It is an objective which requires our focused skills and resources." U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward . . . From the Sea, p. 4. Yet progress has been slow.
165. According to the General Accounting Office, the Navy, "does not have a means for effectively breaching enemy sea mines in the surf zone; detecting and neutralizing enemy submarines in shallow water; defending its ships against cruise missiles, or providing adequate fire support for Marine Corps amphibious landings and combat operations ashore." General Accounting Office, Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War-Fighting Capabilities Needed, GAO/NSIAD-01-493 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, May 2001), p. 2.
166. The problem of inexpensive technology complicating great power naval operations in the littorals is not new. This was a key fact of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century naval life, which ended the practice of the "close blockade." See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 199-200.
167. This is my personal assessment. For suggestive, supporting material, see the various country entries in IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003.
168. See Gregory K. Hartmann and Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 254-262. These authors note that naval mine warfare has usually proven to be very cost effective. During World War II, U.S. forces damaged or sank five to nine Japanese ships per $1 million dollars of mine warfare expenditure. Ibid., pp. 236-237. See also "Appendix A: Mine Threat Overview," U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Plan, 4th ed., Programs for the New Millennium.
169. See Gregory K. Hartmann and Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 254-262. These authors note that naval mine warfare has usually proven to be very cost effective. During World War II, U.S. forces damaged or sank five to nine Japanese ships per $1 million dollars of mine warfare expenditure. Ibid., pp. 236-237. See also "Appendix A: Mine Threat Overview," U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Plan, 4th ed., Programs for the New Millennium.
170. See Gregory K. Hartmann and Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 254-262. These authors note that naval mine warfare has usually proven to be very cost effective. During World War II, U.S. forces damaged or sank five to nine Japanese ships per $1 million dollars of mine warfare expenditure. Ibid., pp. 236-237. See also "Appendix A: Mine Threat Overview," U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Plan, 4th ed., Programs for the New Millennium.
171. The mine was an Italian-manufactured "Manta," which cost perhaps $10,000. Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), p. 267.
172. Ibid., p. 37.
173. "Minister of State for the Armed Forces and the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Alan West: Press Conference at the Ministry of Defence," London, April 11, 2003, http://www.operations.mod.uk/ telic/press_11april.htm.
174. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 296-297.
175. Robert W. Love, A History of the U.S. Navy, 1942-1991 (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1992), p. 784.
176. Paul Lewis and Steward Penney, "Timeline: Week Two," Flight International, April 8, 2003, p. 11.
177. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 36.
178. Hastings and Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands, pp. 153-156, 227-228.
179. Love, A History of the U.S. Navy, pp. 787-789.
180. David B. Crist, "Joint Special Operations in Support of Earnest Will," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-02), pp. 15-22. Crist notes some forty-three attacks in 1986, though only one actually sank a ship.
181. Richard Scott, "UK Plans to Counter Threat of Terrorists at Sea," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 19, 20002, p. 8. According to Scott, "Staff in the UK Ministry of Defence's Directorate Equipment Capability . . . have identified a significant gap in the capability of ships to adequately defend themselves against fast attack craft (FACS) fast inshore attack craft (FIACS), and acknowledge a capability upgrade as an urgent priority." Ibid. In an act of perhaps unintentional irony, the second story on the same page of the magazine is "Taiwan to Launch Prototype Stealth PCFG," or fast- attack missile patrol boat. If Taiwan can build stealthy small craft, then so can many other small and middle-sized countries, and the threat can be expected to grow.
182. Robert Burns, "Ex-General Says Wargames Were Rigged," Associated Press, August 16, 2002.
183. John Morgan, captain, U.S. Navy "Anti-Submarine Warfare: A Phoenix for the Future," Undersea Warfare, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1998), http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/ autumn98/anti.htm. Morgan warns, "Finally, ASW is hard. The San Luis operated in the vicinity of the British task force for more than a month and was a constant concern to Royal Navy commanders. Despite the deployment of five nuclear attack submarines, twenty-four-hour-per-day airborne ASW operations, and expenditures of precious time, energy, and ordnance, the British never once detected the Argentine submarine. The near-shore regional/littoral operating environment poses a very challenging ASW problem. We will need enhanced capabilities to root modern diesel, airindependent, and nuclear submarines out of the 'mud' of noisy, contact-dense environments typical of the littoral, and be ready as well to detect, localize, and engage submarines in deep water and Arctic environments." Ibid.
184. John Morgan, captain, U.S. Navy "Anti-Submarine Warfare: A Phoenix for the Future," Undersea Warfare, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1998), http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/ autumn98/anti.htm. Morgan warns, "Finally, ASW is hard. The San Luis operated in the vicinity of the British task force for more than a month and was a constant concern to Royal Navy commanders. Despite the deployment of five nuclear attack submarines, twenty-four-hour-per-day airborne ASW operations, and expenditures of precious time, energy, and ordnance, the British never once detected the Argentine submarine. The near-shore regional/littoral operating environment poses a very challenging ASW problem. We will need enhanced capabilities to root modern diesel, airindependent, and nuclear submarines out of the 'mud' of noisy, contact-dense environments typical of the littoral, and be ready as well to detect, localize, and engage submarines in deep water and Arctic environments." Ibid.
185. I have heard this from several U.S. naval officers. Iran apparently began operating its first Kilo submarine in 1993. At the time Vice Admiral Henry Chiles, commander of the Atlantic Fleet's submarine force did not consider the Iranians to be a "serious military threat." He did expect that "a year from now I think they'll have a greatly improved military capability." Quoted in Robert Burns, "Admiral Calls Iranian Subs a Potential Threat to U.S. Interests," Associated Press, August 4, 1993.
186. Iraq's naval tactics were not adept during Operation Desert Storm: "Fortunately for the allies, the Iraqis had failed to activate many of the weapons, and chose not to cover the minefields with aircraft, naval vessels, artillery, or missiles. More expertly laid and defended mines would have sunk ships and killed sailors and marines." Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 267.
187. "U.S. Alarmed by Growing Iranian Might: U.S. Navy Commander," Agence France-Presse, February 4, 1996. Vice Adm. Scott Redd, then commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, declared, "Iran now poses a threat to navigation and aircraft flying over the Gulf." Referring to then new Iranian sea-launched antiship missiles he noted, "From a military point of view, I have to warn of the new threat, which is represented by Iran's ability to launch missiles from all directions and not only from its shores." Quoted in ibid.
188. North Korea exports several vessels designed for coastal operations, including miniature submarines. It has sold several such vessels to Iran. See Bill Gertz, "N. Korea Delivers Semisubmersible Gunships to Iran," Washington Times, December 16, 2002.
189. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy together operate 99 destroyers and frigates. The U.S. Navy operates 117 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. European surface combatants are smaller and less capable than those of the U.S. Navy, but they permit the surveillance and control of a great deal of additional sea space. Moreover, these navies either possess significant littoral combat experience, such as Britain, or build some of the world's most lethal littoral weapons, such as France (antiship missiles) and Italy (bottom mines). IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, country entries.
190. Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: Allies - German and Spanish Navies Take on Major Role Near Horn of Africa," New York Times, December 15, 2002, p. 36. Task Force 150 is an 8 ship flotilla conducting patrols in the Indian Ocean in search of al-Qaeda operatives. Its first commander was German, and its second was Spanish. This is part of a larger multinational operation in the region, which includes ships from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. "Greece Contributes Frigate to Anti-Terrorism Campaign," Xinhua news agency, March 12, 2002.
191. Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: Allies - German and Spanish Navies Take on Major Role Near Horn of Africa," New York Times, December 15, 2002, p. 36. Task Force 150 is an 8 ship flotilla conducting patrols in the Indian Ocean in search of al-Qaeda operatives. Its first commander was German, and its second was Spanish. This is part of a larger multinational operation in the region, which includes ships from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. "Greece Contributes Frigate to Anti-Terrorism Campaign," Xinhua news agency, March 12, 2002.
192. IISS, The Military Balance, 2002-2003, country entries.
193. I b i d.
194. The Pentagon has set the goals of "defeating anti-access and area denial threats," and "denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strikes . . . against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains." Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 30. Moreover, "Likely enemies of the United States and its allies will rely on sanctuaries - such as remote terrain, hidden bunkers, or civilian 'shields' - for protection. The capability to find and strike protected enemy forces while limiting collateral damage will improve the deterrent power of the United States and give the president increased options for response if deterrence fails." Ibid., p. 44.
195. The Pentagon has set the goals of "defeating anti-access and area denial threats," and "denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strikes . . . against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains." Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 30. Moreover, "Likely enemies of the United States and its allies will rely on sanctuaries - such as remote terrain, hidden bunkers, or civilian 'shields' - for protection. The capability to find and strike protected enemy forces while limiting collateral damage will improve the deterrent power of the United States and give the president increased options for response if deterrence fails." Ibid., p. 44.