Liberalism and empire: Logics of order in the American unipolar age

Review of International Studies

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 609-630

  Ikenberry, G John ^a,b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b German Marshall Fund ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6344255307     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210504006254     Document Type: Review

References (76)

1. This essay draws on G. John Ikenberry, 'The Illusions of Empire', Foreign Affairs (March/April 2004).
2. For the best discussion of unipolarity, see William Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', International Security, 21: 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 1-36.
3. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 368.
4. Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrow of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004).
5. Quoted in Norman Graeber, America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1984), p. 275.
6. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. See also Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969); and Gadriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
7. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. See also Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969); and Gadriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
8. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. See also Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969); and Gadriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
9. For discussions of international order, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 22-3; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
10. For discussions of international order, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 22-3; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
11. For discussions of international order, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 22-3; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
12. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 95.
13. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 127.
14. For an overview of balance-of-power theory, see Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996).
15. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126.
16. For a survey of hierarchical theories of order, see G. John Ikenberry and Dan Nexon, 'Hierarchy and International Relations Theory', unpublished paper, 2004.
17. See Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and John A. Hall, International Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
18. See Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and John A. Hall, International Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
19. David Lake, 'The New Sovereignty in International Relations', International Studies Review (2003), p. 311. See also Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
20. David Lake, 'The New Sovereignty in International Relations', International Studies Review (2003), p. 311. See also Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
21. These last two types of hierarchical orders roughly confirm to the distinction I make below between empire and hegemony.
22. See Paul MacDonald, 'Theorizing Hierarchy in International Politics', unpublished paper, 2003.
23. William Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', International Security.
24. For a discussion of this perspective, see G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
25. Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled, ch. 1.
26. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, 25: 2 (1999), pp. 179-96 For an alternative view, see Kenneth Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, 25: 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.
27. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, 25: 2 (1999), pp. 179-96 For an alternative view, see Kenneth Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, 25: 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.
28. See Alexander Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), ch. 7.
29. Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 45.
30. Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals ((New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). On the maritime and colonial empires, see Doyle, Empires. On the great land empires, see S.M. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (London: Transaction Books, 1992).
31. Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals ((New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). On the maritime and colonial empires, see Doyle, Empires. On the great land empires, see S.M. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (London: Transaction Books, 1992).
32. Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals ((New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). On the maritime and colonial empires, see Doyle, Empires. On the great land empires, see S.M. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (London: Transaction Books, 1992).
33. See Doyle, Empires.
34. For discussions of hegemony and hegemonic stability theory, see Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics, 28: 3 (April 1976); and Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1973). For a critique of this literature, see David Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emporor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?' International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), pp. 459-89.
35. For discussions of hegemony and hegemonic stability theory, see Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics, 28: 3 (April 1976); and Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1973). For a critique of this literature, see David Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emporor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?' International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), pp. 459-89.
36. For discussions of hegemony and hegemonic stability theory, see Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics, 28: 3 (April 1976); and Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1973). For a critique of this literature, see David Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emporor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?' International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), pp. 459-89.
37. For discussions of hegemony and hegemonic stability theory, see Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics, 28: 3 (April 1976); and Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1973). For a critique of this literature, see David Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emporor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?' International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), pp. 459-89.
38. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
39. Robert Keohane, 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Change in International Economic Regimes', in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George (eds.), Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 132.
40. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).
41. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).
42. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).
43. Thomas Risse, 'U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community', in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled.
44. These three characteristics of liberal order are explored in Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace.
45. For general depictions of the Westphalian state system, see Bull, The Anarchical Society; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For an important reinterpretation of the Westphalian settlement, see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Krasner argues that the norms of Westphalian sovereignty actually emerged long after 1648 and departures from it lace the entire history of the state system.
46. For general depictions of the Westphalian state system, see Bull, The Anarchical Society; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For an important reinterpretation of the Westphalian settlement, see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Krasner argues that the norms of Westphalian sovereignty actually emerged long after 1648 and departures from it lace the entire history of the state system.
47. For general depictions of the Westphalian state system, see Bull, The Anarchical Society; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For an important reinterpretation of the Westphalian settlement, see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Krasner argues that the norms of Westphalian sovereignty actually emerged long after 1648 and departures from it lace the entire history of the state system.
48. Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, L'alleanza Inevitabile: Europa e Stati Uniti oltre l'Iraq (Milan: Universita Bocconi Editore, 2003).
49. Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
50. On the 21st century continuity of the American strategy of openness, see Andrew J. Bacevitch, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
51. See Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
52. Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empire (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), p. 13.
53. See Michael Shifter, 'The US and Latin America: Through the Lens of Empire', Current History, 103: 670 (February 2004), pp. 61-7.
54. Geir Lundestad, The American 'Empire' (London: Oxford University Press, 1990).
55. Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975).
56. These features of the American system in Ikenberry, After Victory, ch. 6.
57. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
58. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
59. This liberal grand strategy is sketched in Ikenberry, 'America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era', in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 103-26.
60. For efforts to sketch the emerging politics of unipolarity, see Ikenberry (ed.), American Unrivaled; and Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
61. For efforts to sketch the emerging politics of unipolarity, see Ikenberry (ed.), American Unrivaled; and Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
62. Commentators on the left, right, and centre have identified a legitimacy crisis. See Perry Anderson, 'Force and Consent', New Left Review, 17 (September/October 2002); Robert Kagan, 'A Tougher War for the US Is One of Legitimacy', New York Times, 25 January 2004; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Domination or Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
63. Commentators on the left, right, and centre have identified a legitimacy crisis. See Perry Anderson, 'Force and Consent', New Left Review, 17 (September/October 2002); Robert Kagan, 'A Tougher War for the US Is One of Legitimacy', New York Times, 25 January 2004; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Domination or Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
64. Commentators on the left, right, and centre have identified a legitimacy crisis. See Perry Anderson, 'Force and Consent', New Left Review, 17 (September/October 2002); Robert Kagan, 'A Tougher War for the US Is One of Legitimacy', New York Times, 25 January 2004; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Domination or Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
65. For a useful discussion, see Bruce Cronin, 'The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations', European Journal of International Relations, 7: 1 (2001), pp. 103-30.
66. Donald Rumsfeld, remarks on Face The Nation, CBS, 23 September 2001.
67. Quoted in Dan Baltz, 'President puts onus back on Iraqi leader', The Washington Post, 7 March 2003, p. A1.
68. Charles Krauthammer, 'The New Unilateralism', The Washington Post, 8 June 2001, p. A29.
69. John Bolton, 'Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?' Chicago Journal of International Law, 1: 2 (2000), pp. 205-22.
70. Pierre Hassner, 'The United States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Empire?' Chaillot Papers, no. 54 (September 2002), p. 43..
71. See Max Boot, 'American imperialism? No need to run away from the label', USA Today, 6 May 2003, p. 15A; Boot, 'Washington needs a colonial office', Financial Times, 3 July 2003, p. 19; and Tom Donnelly, 'There's no place like Iraq . . . for US military bases', Weekly Standard, 5 May 2003.
72. See Max Boot, 'American imperialism? No need to run away from the label', USA Today, 6 May 2003, p. 15A; Boot, 'Washington needs a colonial office', Financial Times, 3 July 2003, p. 19; and Tom Donnelly, 'There's no place like Iraq . . . for US military bases', Weekly Standard, 5 May 2003.
73. See Max Boot, 'American imperialism? No need to run away from the label', USA Today, 6 May 2003, p. 15A; Boot, 'Washington needs a colonial office', Financial Times, 3 July 2003, p. 19; and Tom Donnelly, 'There's no place like Iraq . . . for US military bases', Weekly Standard, 5 May 2003.
74. These failings of neo-conservative thinking are discussed in G. John Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment', Survival (March 2004).
75. For a discussion of empire as a 'rimless hub and spoke' system, see Alex Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
76. These sources of the multilateral in American foreign policy are discussed in Ikenberry, 'Is American Multilateralism in Decline?' Perspectives on Politics, 1: 3 (September 2003).