Mechanism design for Single-Value domains

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2005, Pages 241-247

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Lavi, Ron ^b   Pavlov, Elan ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION MECHANISMS; SINGLE-VALUE COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; SINGLE-VALUE DOMAINS;

APPROXIMATION THEORY; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; DATA PROCESSING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 29344455307     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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3. Babaioff, M., and Walsh, W. E. 2005. Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation. Decision Support Systems 39:123-149.
4. Babaioff, M.; Lavi, R.; and Pavlov, E. 2005. Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies. In DIMACS workshop on "Large Scale Games".
5. Briest, P.; Krysta, P.; and Vocking, B. 2005. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. In STOC'05.
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