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Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 503-510

Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization

Author keywords

Auction; Competitive; Mechanism design; On line

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 0038784573     PISSN: 07349025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/780542.780616     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (48)

References (18)
  • 2
    • 0003978025 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • New approximation guarantees for minimum weight k-trees and prize-collecting salesman
    • A. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, A. Blum, and S. Vempala. New approximation guarantees for minimum weight k-trees and prize-collecting salesman. SIAM Journal of Computing, 1999.
    • (1999) SIAM Journal of Computing
    • Awerbuch, A.1    Azar, Y.2    Blum, A.3    Vempala, S.4
  • 9
    • 34250446073 scopus 로고
    • Multipart pricing of public goods
    • E. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 1971.
    • (1971) Public Choice
    • Clarke, E.1
  • 15
    • 84958810652 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
    • R. Lavi and N. Nisan. Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 233-241, 2000.
    • (2000) ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce , pp. 233-241
    • Lavi, R.1    Nisan, N.2
  • 18
    • 84980096808 scopus 로고
    • Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders
    • W. Vickery. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 1961.
    • (1961) Journal of Finance
    • Vickery, W.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.