Impersonation-based mechanisms

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 592-597

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Lavi, Ron ^b   Pavlov, Elan ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS (CA); IMPERSONATION-BASED MECHANISMS; RATIONAL AGENTS; SOCIAL WELFARE;

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 33750720932     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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3. Babaioff, M.; Lavi, R.; and Pavlov, E. 2005. Mechanism design for single-value domains. In AAAI, 241-247.
4. Babaioff, M.; Lavi, R.; and Pavlov, E. 2006. Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies. In SODA, 1054-1063.
5. Cramton, P.; Shoham, Y.; and Steinberg, R. 2005. Combinatorial Auctions. The MIT press.
6. Khanna, S.; Muthukrishnan, S.; and Paterson, M. 1998. On approximating rectangle tiling and packing. In SODA, 384-393.
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