CABOB: A fast optimal algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 374-390

  Sandholm, Tuomas ^a   Suri, Subhash ^b   Gilpin, Andrew ^c   Levine, David ^c  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

^b University of California   (United States)

^c CombineNet Inc ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Anytime algorithm; Auction; Bounding across components; Branch and bound; Branching heuristics; Combinatorial auction; Dynamically chosen heuristic; MIP; Random restart; Search; Winner determination; Winner determination algorithm

Indexed keywords

ANYTIME ALGORITHMS; AUCTION; BRANCH AND BOUND; BRANCHING HEURISTICS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; MIP; RANDOM RESTART; SEARCH; WINNER DETERMINATION; WINNER-DETERMINATION ALGORITHMS;

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; COSTS; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; INTERNET; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; VALUE ENGINEERING;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 18144420825     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0336     Document Type: Article

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