Preference handling in combinatorial domains: From AI to social choice

AI Magazine

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 37-46

  Chevaleyre, Yann ^a   Endriss, Ulle ^b   Lang, Jérôme ^c   Maudet, Nicolas ^a  

^a Lab d'Analyse et Modélisation des Systèmes pour l'Aide à la Décision   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; DECISION MAKING;

COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING; COMPACT REPRESENTATION; COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICES; MULTI-ATTRIBUTES; MULTIAGENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION; PREFERENCE REPRESENTATION; RESEARCH TOPICS; SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY;

DECISION THEORY;

EID: 56649114195     PISSN: 07384602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1609/aimag.v29i4.2201     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Arrow, K. J.; Sen, A. K.; and Suzumura, K., eds. 2002. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. North-Holland.
2. Bartholdi, J. J.; Tovey, C. A.; and Trick, M. A. 1989a. The Computational Difficulty of Manipulating an Election. Social Choice and Welfare 6(3): 227-241.
3. Bartholdi, J. J.; Tovey, C. A.; and Trick, M. A. 1989b. Voting Schemes for Which It Can Be Difficult to Tell Who Won the Election. Social Choice and Welfare 6(3): 157-165.
4. Benoit, J.-P., and Kornhauser, L. 1999. On the Assumption of Separable Assembly Preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 16(3): 429-439.
5. Boutilier, C., and Hoos, H. H. 2001. Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions. In Proceedings or the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2001). San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann.
6. Boutilier, C.; Brafman, R. I.; Domshlak, C.; Hoos, H. H.; and Poole, D. 2004. CP-nets: A Tool for Representing and Reasoning with Conditional Ceteris Paribus Preference Statements. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 21: 135-191.
7. Bouveret, S., and Lang, J. 2008. Efficiency and Envy Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Logical Representation and Complexity. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 32: 525-564.
8. Brams, S.; Kilgour, D.; and Zwicker, W. 1998. The Paradox of Multiple Elections. Social Choice and Welfare 15(2): 211-236.
9. Braziunas, D., and Boutilier, C. 2008. Elicitation of Factored Utilities. AI Magazine 29(4): 79-92.
10. Chevaleyre, Y.; Dunne, P. E.; Endriss, U.; Lang, J.; Lemaître, M.; Maudet, N.; Padget, J.; Phelps, S.; Rodriguez-Aguilar, J. A.; and Sousa, P. 2006. Issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation. Informatica 30: 3-31.
11. Chevaleyre, Y.; Endriss, U.; Lang, J.; and Maudet, N. 2007. A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice. In Proceedings of the 33rd Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM-2007). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
12. Chevaleyre, Y.; Endriss, U.; and Lang, J. 2006. Expressive Power of Weighted Propositional Formulas for Cardinal Preference Modeling. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-2006), Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
13. Conitzer, V. 2008. Comparing Multiagent Systems Research in Combinatorial Auctions and Voting. Paper presented at the 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM-2008), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, January 2008.
14. Conitzer, V., and Sandholm, T. W. 2005. Communication Complexity of Common Voting Rules. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005). New York: ACM Press.
15. Conitzer, V., and Sandholm, T. W. 2006. Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. In Proceedings of the 21st AAAI Conference on Artiflcial Intelligence, 627-634. Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
16. Coste-Marquis, S.; Lang, J.; Liberatore, P.; and Marquis, P. 2004. Expressive Power and Succinctness of Propositional Languages for Preference Representation. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-2004). Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
17. Endriss, U.; Maudet, N.; Sadri, F.; and Toni, F. 2006. Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 25: 315-348.
18. Faliszewski, P.; Hemaspaandra, E.; Hemaspaandra, L. A.; and Rothe, J. 2006. A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems. Technical Report UR CSD TR903, University of Rochester Department of Computer Science, Rochester, NY.
19. Gonzales, C.; Perny, P.; and Queiroz, S. 2006. Preference Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains Using GAI-Networks. Paper presented at the DIMACS-LAMSADE Workshop on Voting Theory and Preference Modeling, Paris, October 2006.
20. Hemaspaandra, E.; Hemaspaandra, L. A.; and Rothe, J. 1997. Exact Analysis of Dodgson Elections: Lewis Carroll's 1876 Voting System Is Complete for Parallel Access to NP. Journal of the ACM 44(6): 806-825.
21. Lacy, D., and Niou, E. 2000. A Problem with Referendums. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12(1): 5-31.
22. Lang, J. 2004. Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 42(1-3): 37-71.
23. Lang, J. 2007. Voting and Aggregation on Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences. In Proceedings of the 20th Joint International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2007). Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
24. Lehmann, D.; Müller, R.; and Sandholm, T. W. 2006. The Winner Determination Problem. In Combinatorial Auctions, ed. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
25. Lipton, R. J.; Markakis, E.; Mossel, E.; and Saberi, A. 2004. On Approximately Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004). New York: ACM Press.
26. Nisan, N. 2006. Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions. In Combinatorial Auctions, ed. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
27. Parikh, R. 2002. Social Software. Synthese 132(3):187-211.
28. Procaccia, A. D., and Rosenschein, J. S. 2007. Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28: 157-181.
29. Pu, P., and Chen, L. 2008. User-Involved Preference Elicitation and Revision. AI Magazine 29(4): 93-103.
30. Rossi, F.; Venable, K.; and Walsh, T. 2004. mCP Nets: Representing and Reasoning with Preferences of Multiple Agents. In Proceedings of the 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2004), 729-734. Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
31. Sandholm, T. W. 1998. Contract Types for Satisficing Task Allocation: I Theoretical Results. In Satisficing Models: Papers from the AAAI Spring Symposium. Technical Report SS-98-05, March. American Association for Artificial Intelligence. Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
32. Sgall, J., and Woeginger, G. J. 2007. An Approximation Scheme for Cake Division with a Linear Number of Cuts. Combinatorica 27(2): 205-211.
33. Walsh, T. 2007. Representing and Reasoning with Preferences. AI Magazine 28(4): 59-70.
34. Xia, L.; Lang, J. and and Ying, M. 2007. Sequential Voting and Multiple Election Paradoxes. In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2007). Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Presses Universitaires de Louvain.