Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: Logical representation and complexity

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 32, Issue , 2008, Pages 525-564

  Bouveret, Sylvain ^a   Lang, Jérôme ^b  

^a ONERA   (France)

^b CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING;

COMPACT REPRESENTATION; ENVY FREE; FAIR DIVISIONS; INDIVISIBLE GOOD; LOGICAL REPRESENTATIONS; NON-MONOTONIC REASONING;

EFFICIENCY;

EID: 52249089634     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2467     Document Type: Article

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