Representing and reasoning with preferences

AI Magazine

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 59-69

  Walsh, Toby ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

^b UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY;

PREFERENCES; REPRESENTING;

CASE BASED REASONING;

EID: 39049105103     PISSN: 07384602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (34)

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