Corporate governance when managers set their own pay

European Financial Management

Volumn 14, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 921-943

  Ruiz Verdú, Pablo ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION   (Spain)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Managerial power; Shareholder power

Indexed keywords

EID: 54049095929     PISSN: 13547798     EISSN: 1468036X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2008.00465.x     Document Type: Article

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