The evolution of shareholder voting for executive compensation schemes

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 715-737

  Morgan, Angela ^a   Poulsen, Annette ^b   Wolf, Jack ^a  

^a CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Proxy voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646756906     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.06.001     Document Type: Article

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