Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

European Financial Management

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 231-250

  Peasnell, Kenneth V ^a   Pope, Peter F ^a   Young, Steven ^a  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Board of directors; Cadbury report; G3; G32; Managerial ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 85013784975     PISSN: 13547798     EISSN: 1468036X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-036X.00217     Document Type: Article

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