The dynamics of the management-shareholder conflict

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 379-404

  Fluck, Zsuzsanna ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033440942     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/12.2.379     Document Type: Article

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