What does political economy tell us about economic development - And vice versa?

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 7, Issue , 2004, Pages 247-272

  Keefer, Philip ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Institutions; Interest groups; Presidentialism; Property rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142773535     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104846     Document Type: Review

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