Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees

American Economic Review

Volumn 88, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 1163-1187

  Kroszner, Randall S ^a   Stratmann, Thomas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001645347     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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