Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments

International Organization

Volumn 56, Issue 4, 2002, Pages

  Keefer, Philip ^a   Stasavage, David ^b  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036409483     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081802760403766     Document Type: Review

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