Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 67-82

  Besley, Timothy ^a,b   Coates, Stephen ^a,b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ELECTION; WELFARE PROVISION;

EID: 0035053913     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00160     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
2. Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters
3. Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence
4. An economic model of representative democracy
5. Sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy: A dynamic analysis
6. Common agency and coordination: General theory and application to tax policy
7. Protection for sale
8. Electoral competition and special interest politics
9. The political economy of the rent-seeking society
10. Information, access and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying
11. A model of political competition with citizen candidates
12. The politics of 1992: Fiscal policy and European integration
13. The social costs of monopoly and regulation
14. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft
15. Efficient rent-seeking