Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: An analysis of the Argentine provinces

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 305-333

  Jones, Mark P ^a   Sanguinetti, Pablo ^b   Tommasi, Mariano ^c,d  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA   (Argentina)

^c UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRÉS   (Argentina)

^d Ctr Studs Institutional Devmt   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Argentina; Common pool; Federalism; Fiscal behavior

Indexed keywords

FEDERAL SYSTEM; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLITICAL PROCESS; PUBLIC SPENDING;

EID: 0034097111     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00059-6     Document Type: Article

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