Scoring rules, condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity

Theory and Decision

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 175-196

  Lepelley, Dominique ^a   Pierron, Patrick ^a   Valognes, Fabrice ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Borda rule; Condorcet criteria; Plurality rule; Social homogeneity; Voting rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001263667     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005257316414     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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