The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 271-283

  Gehrlein, William V ^a   Lepelley, Dominique ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

Approval voting; Cordorcet efficiency; D72

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009885484     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00020-7     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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