Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 239-261

  Saari, Donald G ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032360576     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050103     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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