President Perot or fundamentals of voting theory illustrated with the 1992 election

Public Choice

Volumn 106, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 275-297

  Tabarrok, Alexander ^a  

^a Independent Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035582855     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005205411820     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Bhagat, S. and Brickley, J.A. (1984). Cumulative voting: The value of minority shareholder voting rights. Journal of Law and Economics 27: 339-365.
2. Brams, S.J. and Fishburn, P.C. (1983). Approval voting. Boston: Birkhauser.
3. Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C. and Merrill, S. III. (1988). The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen. Public Choice 59: 121-131.
4. Brams, S.J. and Nagel, J.H. (1991). Approval voting in practice. Public Choice 71: 1-17.
5. Brams, S.J. and Merrill, S. III. (1994). Would Ross Perot have won the 1992 Presidential election under approval voting? PS: Political Science and Politics 29: 39-44.
6. Brischetto, R. (1995). Cumulative voting as an alternative to districting. National Civic Review 84: 347-354.
7. Guinier, L. (1994). The tyranny of the majority. New York: Free Press.
8. Joslyn, R.A. (1976). The impact of decision rules in multi-candidate campaigns: The case of the 1972 democratic Presidential nomination. Public Choice 25: 1-17.
9. Kellett, J. and Mott, K. (1977). Presidential primaries: Measuring popular choice. Polity 9: 528-537.
10. Kiewiet, R.D. (1979). Approval voting: The case of the 1968 Presidential election. Polity 12: 170-181.
11. Levin, J. and Nalebuff, B. (1995). An introduction to vote counting schemes. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 3-27.
12. Merrill, S. III. (1988). Making multicandidate elections more democratic. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
13. Moore, B.F. (1920 (1970)). The history of cumulative voting and minority representation in Illinois 1870-1919. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation.
14. Myerson, R.B. and Weber, R.J. (1993). A theory of voting equilibria. American Political Science Review 87: 102-114.
15. Niemi, R. (1984). The problem of strategic behavior under approval voting. American Political Science Review 78: 952-958.
16. Saari, D.G. (1990). Susceptibility to manipulation. Public Choice 64: 21-41.
17. Saari, D.G. (1994). Geometry of voting. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
18. Saari, D.G. and Newenhizen, J. van (1988a). Is approval voting an unmitigated evil?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill. Public Choice 59: 133-147.
19. Saari, D.G. and Newenhizen, J. van (1988b). The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems. Public Choice 59: 101-120.
20. Sawyer, J. and MacRae, D. (1962). Game theory and cumulative voting in Illinois: 1902-1954. American Political Science Review 56: 936-946.
21. Schwartz, T. (1986). The logic of collective choice. New York: Columbia University Press.
22. Tabarrok, A. and Spector, L. (1999). Would the Borda Count have avoided the civil war? Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 261-288.
23. Weber, R.J. (1995). Approval voting. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 39-50.