On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure

Group Decision and Negotiation

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 109-123

  Lepelley, Dominique ^a   Valognes, Fabrice ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

Condorcet efficiency; Manipulability; Social choice; Voting rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033421105     PISSN: 09262644     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008610701801     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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