On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 81-90

  Tataru, Maria ^a   Merlin, Vincent ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

Borda; Condorcet; Scoring rules; Social choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031202610     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00005-X     Document Type: Article

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