Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 194-216

  Knez, Marc ^a   Camerer, Colin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009336482     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.2000.2882     Document Type: Article

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